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This dissertation analyses the contribution that Amartya Sen’s idea of justice can 
make to inform development policies. Particularly, it examines to what extent Sen 
succeeds in presenting a useful theoretical framework for orienting political action 
towards justice-enhancing change.  
In The Idea of Justice (2009), Sen argues that ideal theories of justice which aim 
at identifying the nature of a perfectly just society—what he calls ‘transcendental’ 
theories—are not appropriate either for examining prevalent injustices or for 
rectifying them. Sen therefore proposes a ‘comparative framework’ of justice 
capable of providing useful practical guidance to advance justice or reduce 
injustice, a task for which ‘transcendental’ Rawlsian-like theories are redundant. 
This dissertation critically assesses these two claims advanced by Sen. Taking 
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice as an illustration, it argues that ideal theories are 
indeed essential, even if not sufficient, for the reduction of injustice. Therefore, it 
advances that it is necessary to complement ideal and nonideal approaches to 
justice. It then advocates for a ‘dual Rawlsian/Senian framework’. Yet this 
dissertation argues that, even if coupled with an ideal theory, Sen’s nonideal 
theory remains insufficient to orient injustice-reduction actions because it fails to 
take into account the overarching social nature of injustice and its perpetuation. 
In the light of this shortcoming, this dissertation stresses the need to 
conceptualise injustice as something different from simply the lack of justice and 
to understand it in a more dynamic and relational way. Ultimately, this implies 
further complementing a dual framework with a broader conceptualisation of 
injustice. The dissertation illustrates this argument with the social policy of 
Oportunidades in Mexico. It concludes that, in order to create a more just society, 
injustice-reduction policies need to go beyond the removal of capability-







I. Development ethics, Sen’s Idea of Justice and 
the reproduction of injustice 
 
In recent years, Mexico achieved what was once unthinkable. Thanks to political 
agreements and a partial consensus between different and opposed political 
forces (political parties, labour unions, and entrepreneurs), the federal congress 
approved a series of legal and economic reforms which are seen as the way 
forward for developing the country1. On 21 November 2012, Mexico approved 
amendments to labour laws, among other amendments. In the words of the 
incoming President of Mexico, the main feature of these labour reforms is the 
promotion of ‘competitiveness, the flexibility of labour markets and the ease of job 
hiring’ (La Grilla 2012; my translation). Yet the policy has generated conflicting 
opinions. While some sectors embraced it with optimism, others were troubled by 
it.  
Most of the arguments in its favour were related to its (expected) positive impact 
on the country’s economic growth and hence for its ‘development’. For instance, 
according to the Mexican representatives of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the reform would increase the GDP of 
Mexico by 4% (Hernández 2012). Similarly, the financial rating agency Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P) expressed sympathy with the labour reform because it enhanced 
the country’s attractiveness for investment (Cruz 2012). Likewise, the Mexican 
Business Coordinating Council (CCE) signalled that this was a positive step in 
increasing the productivity and economic growth on account of the ‘modern’ 
relationships in labour practices. This position was also shared by the Mexican 
Association for Human Resources Management (AMEDIRH), which expressed its 
support in the following words: ‘The way to create jobs in modern society is 
[through] companies… The law that best protects workers is one that protects the 
companies where they work’ (Borda 2012; my translation). 
The speculated benefits of this reform, however, do not come without associated 
social costs, as these ‘modern’ relations of labour threaten historical labour rights 
attained since the Mexican Revolution of 1910. One danger is that formal work 
                                                        
1 The banner of this consensus is called ‘Moving Mexico’ (Mover a México, in Spanish). Information 




can now be made temporary (‘determinate’, ‘by season’, ‘indeterminate’, ‘by unit 
of time [i.e. hourly]’, or for a one-time job). Therefore, an employment relationship 
in systematic short contracts can occur without employees gaining seniority, 
social security, and pension benefits (Art. 39-F). Also, employees can now be 
placed under the condition of ‘subject to be tested’ (probation) for a period of 90 
days, or up to 180 days for high-level jobs. Meanwhile, redundancy payments are 
significantly reduced. As a result, corporations are now able to dismiss employees 
‘without [involving] any responsibility for the employer’ (that is, without any 
compensation to the employee) (Art. 35, 39-A). Besides, outsourcing employment 
is now supported by the reform (Art. 13)2. (For a more comprehensive analysis of 
the labour reform, see Bensusán 2013.)  
In other words, the labour reform threatens workers’ protection and their 
employment stability, but it does so with the intention of increasing the productivity 
and competitiveness of the country and hence its economic development. 
Certainly, there is no clear way to evaluate these reforms as none of these worries 
is unreasonable, yet these practical questions are of primary importance for any 
society since they are ubiquitous in the process of development. How can a 
society decide whether any given policy implementation such as the labour reform 
is actually desirable from a socially ethical point of view? The answer to this 
question depends—to a certain extent—on what is meant by development and on 
how best it can be attained in a socially desirable way. This is precisely the object 
of study of the area of development ethics in which this dissertation is situated, 
an area that can be broadly understood as the ethical critical assessment of the 
ends as well as the means of development (e.g. see Astroulakis 2011, Crocker 
2008, 1991, Goulet 1997, Qizilbash 1996; see also Sen 1988, Seers 1969 for 
discussions on the meaning of development). 
 
1.1 Development ethics and social justice 
One justification of social and political actions depends—at least partly—on 
whether they are seen as conducive to development or not. The difficulty, 
however, lies on determining whether the conceptualisation of development and 
                                                        
2 Note that outsourcing is usually considered to be beneficial for corporation’s productivity but 
detrimental for labourers’ work conditions (Perraudin et al. 2013), and workers’ discontent has been 




the policies it justifies are acceptable from an ethical point of view. For example, 
social policies may be judged from efficiency-related concerns, or in relation to 
their contribution to economic prosperity, from the perspective of equality, or 
related to some other desirable end in society. For a long time, these ethical 
decisions have usually been based, or at least legitimised, within a utilitarian 
framework which—in practice—has been characterised by (1) an exclusive focus 
on the consequences (with no attention to processes) of social, economic and 
political actions and (2) the evaluation of the state of affairs in terms of a numerical 
aggregate measure of income (with no direct attention to other desirable 
outcomes or to its distribution) (see Sen 1999a, pp. 58–63, Sen 1988, Seers 
1969). Together, these features have provided the background conditions for 
equating the meaning of development to that of economic development and thus 
to an excessive focus on economic growth as the ultimate end of development 
and human progress3. Actually, the approval of the labour reforms in Mexico 
shows that the identification of development in purely monetary terms and its 
underlying framework continues to be dominant when it comes to promoting and 
legitimising social policies in most countries today. In this way, this idea of 
development has greatly shaped our shared social, economic and political reality 
in the past and continues to do so in the present. 
From this perspective, one could say that the labour reform in Mexico is ethically 
acceptable even with its associated social costs. Hard-hearted defenders of the 
utilitarian-inspired conception of development could argue that the goal of 
economic growth is so important that it can override other valuable goals, 
including the suffering of some for the sake of a general greater good (assumed 
to be captured by growth). In practical terms, this means that the relevance of any 
other social concern has to be justified in terms of its impact on economic growth. 
To put it in crude terms, as long as there is an increment in the economic arena, 
a state of affairs or a policy is positively evaluated from this perspective regardless 
of its impact on other potentially important social concerns such as inequality, 
discrimination, child mortality, education and so on, at least until they are proven 
to be counterproductive for the economy4. As a result, as Goulet (1997) laments, 
                                                        
3 This dissertation uses the generic term of ‘utilitarian-inspired notion of development’ to 
emphasise the practical implication of utilitarianism in development thinking and to 
distinguish it from utilitarianism as a philosophical doctrine. 
4 For instance, recently, some studies from important worldwide organisations have emphasised the 
relevance of some of these social concerns in terms of their contribution to economic improvement 





the study and practice of development are reduced to a ‘technical examination of 
how to mobilize resources and people most efficiently and fashion the institutional 
arrangements best suited to growth’ (p. 1160)5. 
In recent decades, however, the pragmatic solutions offered by this approach 
have come under severe criticism from distinct corners of the world but for similar 
reasons. Ultimately, the growing discontent with the kind of structures promoted 
by this utilitarian-inspired view of development, its disregard for human diversity, 
the widespread inequalities around the world, as well as the type of social and 
environmental relationships shaped by this narrow view of development, have 
reignited an important debate about what development is and how it can best be 
achieved. The central point of this debate is to unveil the current disguise under 
which the notion of development has been trapped for so long and thrust it back 
into the ethical arena where it belongs, in order to challenge the human and 
environmental suffering for the sake of economic growth (Goulet 1971, p. vii cited 
by Des Gasper 2008; see also Goulet 1997, Sen 1988).  
Hence, in contrast to the mainstream approach, which obscures the inextricable 
normative component of the concept of development, development ethics departs 
from the recognition that development cannot be detached from ethical 
judgements and normative valuations (Crocker 2008, 1991; Deneulin 2011b; 
Goulet 1980, 1997; Seers 1969)6. Both the object of development—what we aim 
for—and the means of development—how we get there—entail normative 
positions that ought to be ethically assessed. Any competing understanding of 
development carries with it certain kinds of social, economic, political and 
environmental policies which prioritise certain values and certain distributions of 
burdens and benefits in society over others, which in turn determine the kind of 
lives that people are able to lead. In this respect, the notion of development is 
inseparable from ‘question of values…and criteria for determining what are 
tolerable costs to be born in the course of change’ (Goulet 1997, p. 1161). Stated 
differently, development ethics is inseparable from questions of justice, that is, 
from concerns about how the benefits and the cost of social cooperation ought to 
be allocated and weighted in society. 
                                                        
5 In this respect, the utilitarian approach to development can be an example of the branch of 
economics that Sen (1987) calls the ‘engineering’ approach, which is ‘concerned with primarily 
logistic issues rather than with ultimate ends and such questions as what may foster “the good of 
[wo]man” or “how should one live”’ (p. 4).  




In this respect, the social challenges that afflict the world today pose a strong 
demand for changing the paradigm that places development in the narrow aisle 
of monetary evaluations. The literature of development ethics stresses the need 
for a framework that is able to counteract the legitimisation of social policies based 
solely on the utilitarian-inspired view of development as economic growth and to 
redirect social and political efforts towards a more just society.  
This dissertation critically analyses to what extent theories and approaches to 
social justice succeed in providing this alternative framework. Following Amartya 
Sen’s work The Idea of Justice (2009), this dissertation departs from the 
foundational idea that development cannot be detached from discussions about 
social justice. From the renewed perspective of Sen’s work, development is a 
matter of advancing justice or reducing injustice. There is, however, still an 
important disconnection between the abstract nature of theoretical work 
advanced within social justice literature and the practical guidance it offers to 
design policies, institutions and political actions that are likely to be effective in 
reducing injustice. The literature of social justice still has a long way to go at this 
practical level. Therefore, the main object of study of this dissertation is the 
connection between the diagnosis of injustice and the conceptual framework 
needed to reduce it in practice.  
Using the example of labour reforms in Mexico, the remainder of this chapter 
introduces the general ideas that subsequent chapters will examine in greater 
detail. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that this chapter and the rest of 
the dissertation are discussed at a certain level of abstraction and thus the role of 
concrete examples within the context of Mexico is for illustrative purposes.  
 
1.2 Why is a theory of justice necessary? 
Discussions about justice have always been a warranted concern in human life, 
but it is the content of what justice entails that is never fully grasped. Still, justice 
usually refers to the ethical standard that determines ‘how the good and the bad 
things in life should be distributed among members of a human society’ (Miller 
1999, p. 1 cited by Robeyns 2009a) and thus to ensure that everyone gets what 
they are due in terms of advantages and burdens. As mentioned earlier, utilitarian 




framework to settle these demands. In fact, one could say that this is well reflected 
in the National Development Plan of Mexico (2013–2018)7, which, despite making 
reference to other genuine concerns such as inclusion, human rights, and so on, 
shows that its main priority and most important end is that of reaching higher 
levels of economic growth which is seen as best realised through raising 
productivity8. Similarly, the justification of recent labour reforms based on their 
contribution to economic growth confirms further that Mexico, like many other 
countries, still relies on an understanding of development as economic growth, 
sometimes at the expense of great harm borne by some people. But is economic 
growth, or some other utilitarian-inspired metric, the highest end to which society 
should strive? Is it acceptable to sacrifice workers’ rights for the sake of economic 
growth? More generally, is it acceptable that some pay the cost for the benefits 
that others will enjoy? That is, can development be disjoined from issues of 
justice? Stated more broadly, is economic growth prior to issues of justice?  
Theories of justice aim at providing a systematic framework to think about these 
concerns and offer an answer to these kinds of questions. In this respect, John 
Rawls’ major work A Theory of Justice (1971) signified the rebirth of social justice 
as a major social concern. His theory emerged as an explicit response to utilitarian 
ethics and its failure to adequately address the demands of justice. Despite being 
the target of countless debates and discussions on the topic (e.g. Brighouse and 
Robeyns 2010, Sen 2009, Nussbaum 2004, Sandel 1998, Mulhall and Swift 
1992), Rawls’ theory continues to be considered the most prominent work on 
political philosophy of our times (Brighouse 2004). As such, it can be regarded as 
(to paraphrase Rawls) the most reasonable conception of justice (instead of, for 
example, utilitarianism, perfectionism or libertarianism) according to our moral 
intuitions about what would be an ethically acceptable way to arrange society. In 
his view, a society would be best organised if it respected all individuals equally 
and treated them as ends in themselves rather than as means for another 
imposed end (e.g. economic growth). In broad terms, his theory defends two 
principles of justice: (1) the liberty principle (equal liberties for all) and (2) fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle (i.e. economic inequalities are 
tolerable only to the extent that they are for the benefit of the least advantaged 
                                                        
7 Available at http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=5299465. 
8  The OECD ‘Better Policies’ report on Mexico (2012), called Better policies for inclusive 




members of society). Respecting these principles would make a society qualify 
as just. 
In this way, Rawls’ theory provides a systematic alternative framework to 
utilitarianism that can be useful for evaluating different social arrangements as 
well as social policies. For example, using his conception of justice, we can 
assess whether the labour legislation in Mexico could be ethically acceptable or 
not. The reform would be considered just if it were concordant with the demands 
of justice, that is, if it could be seen as a step towards—or at least not contrary 
to—the two principles of justice suggested above. Although it is not the purpose 
of this dissertation to offer a thorough analysis of the labour reform in Mexico, 
some basic information about the reality of the country is sufficient to show the 
non-alignment of the reform with the Rawlsian requirements of justice9.  
In 2012, the year when the reform was approved, Mexico had 51.6% of the 
population living below the national measure of poverty. In 2014, this figure was 
53.2% (World Development Indicators). Mexico is also one of the most unequal 
countries in the world; the last reported Gini coefficient (2012) was 48.1 on a scale 
of 0 to 100, where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 represents the situation 
where only one person possess all income (World Development Indicators). 
Similarly, according to the OECD’s latest report on inequality (2015b), in Mexico, 
the average income of the richest 10% is 30.5 times greater than the average 
income of the bottom 10%. This measure is the worst amongst OECD countries 
and it has been getting worse over the years. In terms of social inequality, the 
country’s Office of National Statistics (INEGI 2013) has recently categorised the 
majority of people as of low social class (59.1%) and a small minority as of upper 
social class (1.7%). Moreover, this inequality takes place within a country with 
extremely limited social mobility. If one is born in the lowest 20% of the social 
scale, the probability of remaining there is up to 50%, whereas about four (81%) 
out of five who are born rich remain so. Likewise, only 6 out of 100 people are 
able to perform a job that is different from the one their parents did (Vélez et al. 
2013). These trends of social inequalities, the OECD (2015b) argues, can be 
explained by differentials in access to education, type of labour performed, and 
social security. These in turn can be related to discriminatory practices which have 
                                                        
9 Chapter VI offers a more comprehensive view of the context in Mexico and a brief account of 




been ubiquitous within legal, economic and social services in the context of 
Mexico since colonial times (CONAPRED 2012). 
To appreciate the latter, take for example the first letter that Columbus sent from 
America to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. In the letter, Columbus wrote about 
the generosity and naivety of the ‘Indians’ who lived in the territory recently 
conquered and the ease of taking advantage of them and exploiting them (even 
if he warned against doing so): 
They are content with whatever trifle of whatever kind that may be given 
to them, whether it be of value or valueless. I forbade that they should be 
given things so worthless as fragments of broken crockery, scraps of 
broken and lace tips, although when they were able to get them, they 
fancied that they possessed the best jewel in the world… I gave them a 
thousand handsome good things, which I had brought, in order that they 
might conceive affection for us and, more than that, might become 
Christians and be inclined to the love and service of Your Highnesses and 
of the whole Castilian nation, and strive to collect and give us of the things 
which they have in abundance and which are necessary to us10.  
Even if these words are distant in time, the problem is that they remain worryingly 
accurate to describe several features of life in Mexico today. This historical 
‘accident’ has become a constant process that is now well grounded in the social 
arrangement of society and proliferated by the way institutions are arranged and 
the interactions that take place within them. In other words, it is not surprising that 
an implicit understanding that certain people or groups of people can be ‘used’ for 
the sake of a ‘bigger’ goal (for example, that of advancing economic growth) 
erodes the political and institutional arrangements that have been adopted in 
Mexico, as in other countries throughout Latin America. 
It can therefore be expected that these situations of poverty, inequality, 
discrimination and marginalisation in Mexico are found also in the job market. In 
this respect, Mexico shows very low historical levels of unemployment of 4.9% 
(World Development Indicators). Although this may sound like good news, the 
reality is not that good. Putting aside methodological difficulties related to the 
measurement of unemployment, Heath (2014) suggests that these low levels of 
                                                        




unemployment are the result of structural issues of the labour market in Mexico. 
Paradoxically, the highest levels of unemployment are amongst the highly 
educated whereas the poorest non-educated are most likely to be employed. This 
might be the result of their extremely impoverished circumstances, which force 
them to ‘accept any type of work, no matter how little it pays’ (Heath 2014, p. 3). 
Indeed, Mexico has one of the lowest minimum wages in Latin America— above 
only El Salvador and Nicaragua—and it is below the minimum necessary to afford 
the minimum basket of goods for one person; this means it is below the poverty 
line (Frente a la Pobreza 2016). This is despite the fact that Mexican workers 
record—on average—the largest number of hours worked per year amongst all 
OECD countries (OECD Data 201511).  
In this context, it is to be expected that those at the bottom of the social scale can 
be disproportionally affected by the reform as a result of the ‘flexible’ and ‘modern’ 
labour relations, which, in effect, mean no job security and no social benefits. 
According to a thorough analysis of the reform, Bensusán (2013) concludes that 
there is a danger that this reform will exacerbate social inequality. As such, it is 
very hard to think that this policy—which in general terms reduces workers’ 
protection while increasing employers’ power—could be considered just under a 
Rawlsian framework, even if economic growth were actually promoted as a result 
of it12.  
Evidently, it is not possible at this stage to draw conclusions about the actual 
justness of the labour reform. Rawls himself acknowledged that his principles 
might not always hold for real-life circumstances. This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter III; for now, what is important to realise is that a Rawlsian theory 
of justice allows us to evaluate these reforms from another stance in which justice 
is a priority. Under the current understanding of development as economic growth, 
the reforms are clearly justified. Yet this is only because there is an assumption 
that what a society should aim for is to increase economic growth. But if the goal 
of a society was something else, then it is not necessarily clear that the labour 
reform is ethically acceptable. From a Rawlsian perspective, for example, one 
                                                        
11  2237 hours compared with 1669 hours in the UK, for example. Available at 
https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm. 
12 In fact, given the last available data, this has not happened either. In terms of GDP growth, there 
was an important reduction from 4% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2013 and 2.2 in 2014, whereas in terms of 





would ask: If we want a society that, at some point in time, honours the two 
principles of justice, would these labour reforms be acceptable?  
For the sake of illustration, throughout this chapter it is assumed that the previous 
analysis does allow us to classify the legal document as unjust13. As such, one 
could argue that discussions about justice are essential for current debates about 
the proper way to arrange societies and thus for a normative framework of 
development aiming at promoting justice. 
 
1.3 The need and the insufficiency of ‘nonideal’ theories of justice 
As useful as a theory of justice can be, however, the literature on the topic has 
been recently criticised for being too abstract and detached from the actual 
circumstances of the real world and therefore far from influencing social policies 
that could have an effect on the situation of the world (Sen 2006, Wolff and De-
Shalit 2007). Knowing that a state of affairs or a policy can be considered unjust 
does not in itself say anything about what kind of policies would be desirable and 
likely to be effective to improve the lives of millions of Mexicans, for example. In 
fact, some authors even suggest that the translation of these abstract theories 
into actual policies can even be counterproductive (e.g. Phillips 1985). It is thus 
not entirely clear where the usefulness of a theory of justice lies for the practical 
aim of reducing injustice; and some even question whether they are necessary at 
all. Hence, one could argue that, at best, this Rawlsian-like theorising—called 
ideal theories—can shed light only on what a perfectly just society would look like 
but that they do not offer much guidance about how to get there.  
For this reason, recent literature highlights the need for developing a more 
practical conception of justice for the real circumstances of the world (Sen 2006, 
Schmidtz 2011). It advocates for a nonideal framework capable of informing the 
design and implementation of social policies likely to be effective in the real world. 
Sen’s Idea of Justice (2009) emerges as a response to these demands and at the 
same time links considerations of justice with development practice. In his work, 
Sen argues against what he calls the ‘transcendental’ view of justice (i.e. ideal 
                                                        
13 For instance, this can be on the ground of Rawls’ ‘general principle’, which he suggested could 
not be transgressed under any circumstances. It says that social reforms and courses of action are 
ethically acceptable if and only if they are for the advantage of all and, especially, for the benefit of 




theories aiming at defining what a perfectly just society is) and takes as his starting 
point a shared notion of injustice in the world and the urgency to remediate it. As 
such, Sen (2009) aims at proposing a workable approach to reduce injustice in 
the world, for which, he affirms, the information provided by ideal theory is 
practically irrelevant. 
In essence, the core idea underlying Sen’s approach is the notion of advancing 
justice via people’s freedom and public reasoning. He argues that given the 
practical demands that development concerns entail, what is needed to start 
making the world more just is a comparative framework capable of ranking 
different suboptimal social arrangements as more or less just. This ranking in turn 
should be focused on people’s capabilities to do and be14 (see Sen 1999a, 1990, 
1985, 1980). From this perspective, a social arrangement where individuals enjoy 
more capabilities or have less capability-deprivation is more just than another. 
Finally, Sen insists, these capability enhancements should be the product of 
inclusive public reasoning between individuals. In this way, justice is enhanced if 
individuals enjoy more capabilities as a result of public deliberation. But is this a 
useful framework for orienting action in practice, as it claims to be? 
Placing Sen’s approach in the context of the labour reforms in Mexico would imply 
that, first, one would have to agree (even if for different reasons) that labour 
practices were unjust in order to motivate action to remedy it; otherwise, Sen’s 
comparative framework would have no say on that matter. Were it the case that 
the labour market were unjust with respect to some valuable capability-
deprivation, then the new labour reform would have to be publicly discussed to 
then agree on a solution that expands people’s capabilities. The problem arises 
once one realises that there is nothing in Sen’s proposal that can avoid accepting 
the (utilitarian-inspired) labour document exactly as it is, and even worse, to 
legitimise it as a justice-enhancement reform once it passes the test of public 
deliberation (as happened to a certain extent in Mexico). For instance, after public 
discussion, the legal reforms could have been accepted because it enhances 
people’s (men’s and women’s) capability to work due to the increased 
attractiveness and ease for enterprises to employ more people on account of the 
flexible ‘modern’ labour relations. This possibility can be consistent with what 
                                                        
14 Capabilities are defined as the real opportunity (freedom) someone has to choose between (any) 
different combinations of beings and doings (i.e. what Sen calls functionings) that he or she has 




Sen’s comparative proposal would consider justice-enhancement arrangements, 
as long as these proposals emerged from ‘public’ discussion. 
This brief account point towards one of the arguments developed in this 
dissertation, namely the insufficiency of Sen’s approach to reduce injustice on its 
own. For irrespective of its merits, a nonideal theory would still need to prove that 
its produced outcomes are in line with an ideal of justice. This dissertation 
therefore advocates for the complementarity between Sen’s comparative 
approach and Rawls’ ideal theory and analyses whether this ‘dual framework’ 
provides a useful theoretical approach to promote justice in practice. This 
dissertation advances (a) that critically reflecting on the connection between these 
two approaches and the kind of practical guidance that a dual framework can 
provide is intrinsically important for the aim of constructing a more just society and 
(b) that this is independent of and different from the theoretical exercise of finding 
the best metric to evaluate justice. This is where the main contribution of this 
dissertation lies since this reflective exercise has received much less attention in 
the literature. 
 
1.4 The need for a relational idea of injustice  
Sen’s move to a more practical theorising of justice represents a much-needed 
step in the direction of bringing theories of justice to inform injustice-reduction 
interventions or policies. He pertinently recognises that it is necessary to shift the 
almost exclusive focus of political philosophers on ideal theorising to a focus on 
the urgent matter of reducing injustice. For the latter, Sen identifies that positive 
change has to occur in gradual steps through comparative merits and that this 
process has to be carried out via public discussion and inclusive participation, 
amongst other things. Nonetheless, it is not at all clear how, even if coupled with 
an ideal theory, these changes can actually be attained. In other words, although 
Sen aims at presenting a more practical theory to reduce injustice, the problem is 
that there is simply no real guidance about how these normative ideals can be 
translated into practice in specific unjust social realities. But if the aim of reducing 
injustice is taken seriously, it is imperative to reflect on how these normative ideas 
ought to be operationalised in practice, even if at a very general level. Failing to 
do so is opening the door for the co-optation of the approach and the usurpation 




becoming accomplices in perpetuating injustice. It is the role of development 
ethics to critically reflect on this issue to provide richer theoretical clarification and 
better practical guidance. This implies that there is a need for an extra level of 
theorisation to render theories of justice fitter for practical purposes. 
This dissertation is thus in line with other scholars who recognise distinct 
‘dimensions’ or ‘layers’ of normative justice (e.g. Gilabert 2008, Robeyns 2008). 
However, the emphasis in this dissertation is slightly different. For example, 
Robeyns identifies three layers of normative justice: ideal theory, nonideal theory, 
and action design and implementation. The main difference is that she associates 
the last layer with empirical research. In contrast, the point in this dissertation is 
not to further highlight the empirical aspect or the need to look at specific realities 
and understand their particularities in order to suggest exact concrete policies. 
Neither does it perform the empirical exercise of finding causal or inferential 
connections between specific policies and their overall outcome in people’s 
capabilities. Although both of these exercises are valuable, this dissertation 
follows a different route. It presents a theoretical exercise at a more general level 
for the purpose of gaining deeper theoretical clarification between layer two and 
layer three of Robeyns’ typology. This can be seen as a previous reflective step 
that can be of great utility for orienting the practical efforts of action design and 
implementation. In this sense, this dissertation can be associated with the 
nonideal aspect of transitional justice. 
This dissertation therefore assesses the contribution of normative justice in 
relation to the kind of guidance that it is likely to inspire for injustice-reduction 
interventions. It argues that ideal and nonideal theories—such as Rawls’ theory 
and Sen’s approach—remain insufficient for ensuring adequate political guidance 
to transform unjust realities because of their failure in adequately 
diagnosing/appraising injustice and its reproduction in the real world. This, in turn, 
highlights the need to further complement this dual framework with a conception 
of injustice. In particular, it emphasises the need to move from a narrow 
conceptualisation of injustice, understood simply as the lack of justice (i.e. lack of 
capabilities), to a more dynamic and relational one. This move endows a dual 
framework with a more accurate diagnosis of the relational nature of injustice, 
which in turn broadens the scope of normative judgement to the intersubjective 




For example, this would point out that behind an unjust case of capability-
deprivation suffered by some people, there are some ‘hidden’ (and sometimes 
not-so-hidden) social and relational processes that vindicate such a situation. To 
illustrate, in the case of the labour reforms in Mexico, one could argue that there 
are two distinct factors at play. On the one hand, it can be argued that at its core 
lies a sincere expectation of its positive economic impact for the country. On the 
other hand, there is also a less evident aspect which can be related to specific 
social mechanisms in Mexico that render the wellbeing and liberties of certain 
people (those who will be affected) less valuable than the expected outcome of 
higher levels of investment and economic growth for the country. It is the latter 
aspect which may not be adequately grasped by Sen’s comparative approach. 
Unfortunately, it is a pattern that can be found in multiple cases and different 
scenarios. 
This is well captured in a recent film about the struggles experienced in Bolivia in 
the year 2000, when there was an attempt to privatise the provision of water, 
including—to some extent—rainfall. This episode is known as La guerra del agua 
de Cochabamba (Cochabamba’s Water War). This policy was promoted by the 
World Bank and was highly supported by the government despite the knowledge 
that this process would lead to an inevitable increase in prices that would leave 
many of the country’s poorest citizens without this vital resource. In one scene, 
the prime minister responds to one of his foreign guests, who challenged the 
government’s position about the social protests taking place in the streets below 
and about the conditions in which the poorest people lived: 
Perhaps if you were better informed… In a country with few resources it is 
hard to maintain a water supply without major foreign investment. These 
people think that government money grows on trees, and given their long 
history of exploitation, Indians’ distrust is embedded in their genes. It is 
difficult to reason with them, especially when they are illiterate. But that is 
how it is. We have objective reports from Harvard professors, the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund]… In this globalized world the Indians burn 
water bills and hurl rocks at the police. It is the cult of victim versus 
modernity… (Even the Rain 2010). 
This dissertation argues that it is these kinds of institutionalised patterns of beliefs, 




society unjust. It shows that a Rawls/Sen dual framework of justice is incapable 
of fully appraising the reproduction of injustice in its intersubjective form. 
Consequently, a framework capable of accounting for it is also needed to 
complement Sen’s idea of justice to effectively guide political action. In other 
words, just as nonideal theories need an objective (identified by ideal theory) 
where to aim, they also need a ground to depart from (i.e. a relational 
understanding of injustice). In the absence of this ground, Sen’s nonideal 
approach lacks the power to address the social mechanisms (people’s actions 
and interactions) that maintain the unjust status quo and its perpetuation over 
time. Ultimately, this implies that enhancing human capabilities does not 
necessarily translate into a more just society. In contrast, this dissertation 
contends that in order to create a more just society, we need to go beyond the 
removal of capability-deprivations that people suffer, by broadening the scope of 
injustice-reduction policies to also address the ways in which injustice is 
reproduced through social interactions.  
 
1.5 Constructing a more just society: Sen’s Idea of Justice and the 
reproduction of injustice 
For many decades, the utilitarian-inspired thinking of development has dominated 
many of the economic and social policies around the world, but in recent decades, 
normative ideas of justice have reinvigorated the much-needed political and social 
debate about how a society should be organised. In this process, normative ideas 
of justice have forcefully challenged common understandings of social progress 
and development associated with the utilitarian school of thought. Nonetheless, 
although the literature on social justice is extensive, it has fallen short of providing 
a systematic conceptual framework to inform the advancement of justice or 
reduction of injustice in the world through political action. Yet unjust social 
realities, such as rising levels of inequality, marginalisation, exploitation and 
domination around the world, urge the academic world to move forward the highly 
theoretical work of justice in the direction of actual practical guidance to transform 
people’s realities into a more just society.  
It is precisely this urgency for making the world more just, or less unjust, which 
lies at the core of Sen’s recent work on justice (Sen 2009, 2006). Sen’s work on 




thinking about development and issues of justice15. At first, it emerged solely as a 
better alternative space for assessing individual wellbeing than other, competing 
approaches such as utilitarianism and resource-based measures, rather than as 
a theory explicitly aiming at guiding the social arrangement of society. In The Idea 
of Justice (2009), however, Sen further develops his capability approach to 
become part of a broader conception of comparative justice. In it, Sen aims at 
offering a practice-oriented idea of justice capable of guiding actual policies in the 
real world. Its main aim is ‘to clarify how we can proceed to address questions of 
enhancing justice and removing injustice’ (Sen 2009, p. ix) … ‘for which the 
identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient’ 
(Sen 2009, p. 15). 
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse Sen’s proposition. It 
asks to what extent it succeeds in presenting a useful practical framework for 
reducing injustice as it claims to do. The discussion will focus on two main areas: 
(1) the claim that it can be a self-sustained framework of justice and (2) the 
expediency of the kind of guidance it can provide for reducing injustice. In line 
with Sen’s concerns, this dissertation does not engage directly with theoretical 
reflections on what a just society is, but with the theoretical question about how 
justice can be promoted in practice—although it will argue that the former remains 
essential for the latter. In addition, it takes the theoretical exercise of advancing 
justice to a higher level of application. It is directly concerned with the applicability 
of normative ideas of justice. To do this, it engages in theoretical discussions with 
different approaches to justice and critically reflects on the way in which this 
normative work can better assist the aim of reducing injustice in practice.  
To develop its central argument, this dissertation asks the following: What is the 
usefulness of normative ideas of justice for development practice aiming at 
reducing injustice? To what extent does Sen’s approach to justice succeed in 
offering a practical framework for reducing injustice in the real world? What kind 
of guidance does Sen’s idea of justice offer to inform injustice-reduction 
interventions in the real world? 
                                                        
15 The capability approach has been developed by several scholars, and for distinct purposes, the 
emphasis on development and issues of justice is justified for the purposes of this dissertation. Yet 
the capability framework has proven to be a very useful normative framework for evaluating social 
arrangements, designing social policies, guiding international development efforts, and so on. (See 
Deneulin 2014b for references of different ways in which the capability approach can be used; see 
also Robeyns 2009a, 2005.) The capability approach is widely flexible to be used and developed in 




This dissertation provides possible answers to these questions and presents 
implications of its argument for political guidance to tackle injustice in the context 
of poverty alleviation in Mexico. Overall, this dissertation finds that the literature 
on social justice is overly concentrated on the specification of what justice entails 
(ideal theories, e.g. Rawls 1971) or in the remedial actions needed if some 
advancements are to be achieved (nonideal theories, e.g. Sen 2009) or both. Yet 
both theoretical exercises remain entirely normative and thus detached from 
specific social contexts where injustice takes place. This analytical detachment 
from the social context where injustice occurs, however, renders both approaches 
insufficient for examining injustice in the real world and thereby for offering 
adequate guidance to remedy it. To overcome this difficulty, a broader 
conceptualisation of injustice is needed. Insights of other approaches outside the 
liberal philosophical tradition, namely critical theories, will provide this.  
In developing its argument, this dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive 
normative framework for thinking about the reduction of injustice in practice. It is 
comprehensive because it does not adopt or defend a particular approach; rather, 
it takes central tenets of different approaches to justice and organises them in a 
way that highlights the strengths of each approach and compensates their 
weaknesses. It shows that in order to reduce injustice effectively, a 
comprehensive framework should contain three components: (1) an ideal theory 
of justice concerned with the definition of what justice is (to know what we aim for, 
to systematically identify injustice, and to rule out unjust means in the process of 
advancing justice), (2) a nonideal theory of justice to identify how to move in the 
direction of justice (that is, to identify the necessary mechanisms through which 
justice can be advanced in the real world), and finally (3) the need for a relational 
conception of injustice in order to provide a ground from where the scope of 
injustice-reduction interventions ought to depart (it provides a more accurate 
diagnosis of the unjust context and its reproduction). 
The analysis presented in this dissertation will be entirely theoretical. This is 
because in order to provide better practical guidance, a clear theoretical frame of 
reference and adequate normative scope are needed. This dissertation is an initial 
step in that direction. Chapter II introduces ideal theories using Rawls’ theory of 
justice as the main example of an ideal theory. It clarifies the scope of ideal 
theories and sets the structure under which subsequent chapters are discussed. 




underlines the insufficiency of the former in effectively guiding political action for 
specific unjust realities. This chapter also introduces the first part of Sen’s Idea of 
Justice and, in particular, his critique against ‘transcendental’ theories which can 
be seen as his ‘point of departure’. Chapter IV scrutinises Sen’s comparative and 
conceptual framework (what the dissertation calls his ‘methodological proposal’) 
and reaffirms the claim that on its own it cannot deal with injustice adequately. It 
concludes by suggesting a dual (Rawls/Sen) framework. Chapter V analyses 
Sen’s approach as a formal nonideal theory (i.e. as part of a dual framework) and 
the kind of guidance it can command in practice and concludes that it does not 
succeed in offering a practical framework for transforming unjust realities. Finally, 
chapter VI uses the poverty-reduction programme in Mexico to illustrate the 


















II. Rawls’ ideal theory of justice 
 
Development can be understood in many different ways16, but even contrasting 
ideas usually have at their very core a notion of improvement. Broadly speaking, 
development can be identified with a transition from one state of affairs to another 
that is better in some meaningful way. What is not clear is what the content of the 
word ‘meaningful’ should be and how it can be appraised. Yet the answers to 
these questions matter greatly for they determine much of how a society is 
organised. By shedding light on (1) what a society should aim for and (2) the 
informational basis used to assess it, they also determine how these goals are 
pursued. This in turn also determines how the burdens and benefits of a society 
are distributed and what the relevant burdens and benefits are. In this sense, 
development is always about issues of justice. What vary among different 
understandings of development are what justice entails and the place that justice 
has in the arrangement of societies. The problem with the dominant (utilitarian-
inspired) notion of development is that it provides an inadequate answer to what 
society should strive for. In addition, the guidance it offers to attain its goal of 
economic growth results in unacceptable burdens for some and excessive 
benefits for others. Hence, issues of distributive justice can be belittled and, as 
such, from this perspective, the social ‘improvements’ of development can justify 
injustices. This is why a growing number of scholars have been questioning 
utilitarianism as a defensible moral basis for guiding development efforts in 
societies since the second half of the previous century (e.g. see Sen and Williams 
1982).  
This chapter introduces the first component of a comprehensive three-level 
framework of justice: an ideal theory of justice capable of systematically informing 
us what justice entails and why utilitarian notions of development are not ethically 
acceptable unless it is consistent with the demands of justice. The chapter 
addresses three points: first, it discusses the practical relevance that an ideal 
conceptualisation of justice has for the purpose of promoting justice in the real 
world; second, it examines why it has to work within the boundaries of ideal 
theories; and, third, it argues why justice, and thus development, requires the 
                                                        




priority of the individual. To do this, this dissertation takes the most important 
contemporary work of moral and political philosophy as an illustration of an ideal 
theory, namely Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971). This is justified for the following 
reasons: (1) it successfully highlights the utilitarian deficiencies as a way to 
arrange societies, (2) it provides a reasonable framework to define what justice is 
in a systematic way, and (3) it is relevant to all contemporary discussions about 
justice (Robeyns 2009a) and especially to Sen’s work. Given the structuring role 
that ideal theory plays in the development of the whole argument of the 
dissertation, some aspects of Rawls’ theory will be covered in more detail than 
others.  
The chapter begins by presenting how this dissertation understands ideal theory 
and then provides an overview of Rawls’ theory, the reasoning behind his 
proposal and his conceptualisation of justice. Then, the chapter provides a more 
detailed analysis of Rawls’ theory while considering a general critique to it. This 
has the dual purpose of showing its idealness and its effective justification of the 
priority of the individual as the ultimate object of moral concern. 
 
2.1 Justice as ideal theory 
Before one analyses a specific ideal theory of justice, it is important to clarify 
briefly what is meant by ‘ideal theory’ and the role it plays in the advancement of 
justice. This is particularly important given that there is no agreement in the 
literature on what it is exactly that renders a theory of justice to be classified as 
ideal (e.g. see Stemplowska and Swift 2012; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; 
Valentini 2012, 2009; Swift 2008). Thus, the concept of ideal theory is still a fuzzy 
one. As a result, what is expected from ideal theories will usually depend on the 
specific understanding of the term17. Despite some differences in the literature, 
this dissertation finds that ideal theories can be broadly characterised by two 
simultaneous features: 
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nonideal, and the ground of injustice) in this dissertation can also be blurry at times. Yet for analytical 




1) Ideal theories are mainly concerned with the identification of the nature of 
fundamental values that we ought to pursue to the extent we can. In the 
case of justice, ideal theory tells us what a just society looks like. 
 
2) The development of the principles of justice is, to a certain extent, 
independently justified from historical, institutional, feasibility concerns 
and the constraints of human nature. 
Both of these characteristics have to be fulfilled by a theory in order to be 
considered an ideal theory. This is due to the recognition that there can be a 
plurality of values that may work as ideals (as in the everyday use of the word) 
within one society without satisfying the second characteristic (that is, without 
being independently justified). For example, some ideals can be entrenched 
within the traditions of societies, and although they can orient behaviour and 
social decisions, these are not necessarily independently justified. One of the 
problems with these cultural ideals is that they may lack a critical stance from 
which to evaluate the values that certain practices espouse (Sandel 1998). There 
can also be situations in which distinct fundamental values clash with each other. 
For instance, most modern countries are characterised by desires of equality, 
freedom, democracy and material prosperity but have not been successful in 
finding an adequate ordering of these. Therefore, to paraphrase Rawls (1996), it 
is when these first-order or entrenched ideals are in dispute with or clash with 
others that we need a fundamental ideal theory (that fulfils the two conditions) to 
try to settle these disputes. Theories of justice provide such a level of abstraction 
to serve this purpose and it is in this fundamental sense that this dissertation 
employs the notion of ideal theory.  
The two features of ideal theory, nonetheless, are expressed in its most general 
form so that there can be some differences in the degree that they are fulfilled by 
distinct theories. For example, there are some authors who defend a ‘purist’ view 
in which the development of principles of justice cannot be constrained by making 
any reference at all to human features or to any fact of the world as we know it 
(e.g. see Cohen 2003). Yet other authors, though generally unconstrained by 
feasibility and human constraints, do take into account some facts (even if they 
are of the most general kind) of the world as we know it (e.g. Rawls 1971). As 
Valentini (2011) puts it, the difference between these two strands is that some 




think and that others believe that it must inform what we ought to do (see also 
Robeyns 2008). This dissertation does not participate in this debate. However, 
given its practical purpose of presenting a comprehensive approach for 
‘advancing justice in practice’, it takes the moderate version to illustrate this ideal 
level of theorisation18. To this end, Rawls’ theory of justice offers a well-suited 
approach. He believed in presenting a ‘workable conception’ of justice that could 
be considered a ‘realistic utopia’ (i.e. the best we can realistically hope for, ‘taking 
[wo]men as they are and laws as they might be’ [cited by Simmons 2010, p. 7]).  
One should also note that within the definition of ideal theory, there is no explicit 
requirement for an ideal theory to be practically useful here and now. This means 
that an ideal theory cannot be asked to be applicable to, or offer a readily practical 
solution in, real-life situations. Although ideal theory may offer some guidance 
(e.g. see Boot 2012, Valentini 2009), this is not a requirement that can be 
demanded from an ideal theory to be considered useful and desirable on the 
whole. The role of ideal theory is that of ‘specifying ideals’ (Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012, p. 53)19, thus illuminating what makes a society qualify as 
just. In doing so, it also provides a framework to systematically and coherently 
determine whether a situation or a state of affairs is inconsistent with the demands 
of justice. That is, a Rawlsian framework can be used to evaluate whether a real-
life situation or social programme, such as the Mexican labour policy, runs counter 
to the ideal that ought to be pursued and thus the framework can be used to 
demand its rectification. Ideal theory thus has two practical contributions: (1) by 
identifying injustice, it calls for action; and (2) it sets an objective where to aim at. 
But it does not necessarily say anything about how to remedy an unjust situation 
or how to move in the direction of a just society (see also Robeyns 2008).  
Now that we have an initial idea of what is expected from an ideal theory and thus 
under which standard to assess its usefulness, this dissertation presents Rawls’ 
theory of justice and its justification. This should clarify why a specification of 
justice has to be developed as an ideal theory, how Rawls fits within its 
boundaries, and why justice has to be concerned with the lives of all individuals 
and not with an externally imposed end such as economic growth. (Even if—at 
                                                        
18 It is also this moderate form of ideal theory which is discussed in the ideal/nonideal debate. 
Moreover, if nonideal critiques find this moderate version of ideal theory to be questionable for 
practical matters, then the extreme version of ideal theory is even more problematic. 
19 In this dissertation, ideal theory is conceptualised as something closer to what Hamlin and 




least in some countries—economic growth might be indispensable, this does not 
justify its supremacy.)  
 
2.1.1 Rawls: The rebirth of ideal justice 
The discussion presented in this section and the following ones is in no way 
comprehensive, either in the depth or in the breadth of the arguments that can be 
found in the literature. This is because the aim of this dissertation is not to cover 
Rawls’ theory in detail or to defend it against certain critiques. Instead, only the 
‘idealness’ behind Rawls’ whole proposal is of interest for its purposes, and this 
is mainly covered in A Theory of Justice (1971, abbreviated as TJ from now on20). 
Hence, this dissertation relies primarily on that work; however, when appropriate, 
it uses other references from the same author to complement or clarify an idea. 
Rawls was determined to develop a conception of justice that could be presented 
as a ‘reasonably systematic alternative to utilitarianism’ (TJ, p. xi) and 
consequentially to place the virtue of justice as a primary matter of concern within 
political and moral philosophy. The decades after the first publication of A Theory 
of Justice have confirmed that—to a certain extent—he was successful in both of 
these motivations. Utilitarianism is the main target of his work because of the 
prevalence of this school of thought and its influence in the arrangement of 
societies and in moral philosophy in the last few centuries. In general terms, 
utilitarianism holds that what we ought to do is that which generates the greatest 
good for society, where the ‘good’ is usually expressed in some form of pleasure 
such as happiness or preference satisfaction, which in turn is captured under the 
notion of utility. Although there are different forms of utilitarianism (e.g. see Sen 
1980, 1985; Nussbaum 2011a), Rawls focused on ‘utilitarian thought generally 
and so to all… different version[s] of it’ (TJ, p. 22). 
Rawls’ TJ compellingly argues that the utilitarian doctrine fails to guarantee an 
essential requirement of justice, namely being fair to all individuals by respecting 
them equally. Specifically, Rawls finds himself at issue with utilitarianism for two 
interrelated reasons. He believes that, first, utilitarianism is not capable of 
                                                        
20 All direct quotes referring to Rawls’ Theory of Justice will be represented only by TJ, followed by 





seriously taking into account the distinctness between persons and, second, as a 
consequence, utilitarianism is not able to protect the basic rights and liberties that 
individuals are entitled to if they are to be conceived of as free and equal. Indeed, 
strictly speaking, under the practical logic of utilitarianism, rights and liberties are 
valued as far as they serve the first priority of maximising some form of social 
utility (e.g. via economic growth), no more. That is, as the example of the Mexican 
labour reform illustrated, workers’ rights, workers’ safety, and so on are 
subordinated to the goal of rendering the company/society more productive. On 
the contrary, Rawls sees justice as ‘uncompromising’ (TJ, p. 4), as ‘the first virtue 
of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought’ (TJ, p. 3). This view of justice 
has the main purpose of respecting equally every individual’s rights and liberties 
and thus of rejecting the utilitarian justification that the sacrifice of some human 
beings can be compensated by the greater advantages enjoyed by others. 
From Rawls’ perspective, justice is the ideal that ought to guide the arrangement 
of society. As such, Rawls’ formulation defends the moral primacy of justice and 
individuals’ rights over other values and ends (Mulhall and Swift 1992). But before 
we turn to more foundational features of the theory, it is necessary to overview 
the theory21. 
 
2.1.2 Rawls’ ideal theory of justice: An overview 
TJ seeks to define what a just arrangement of society is. To do this, Rawls 
considers that the subject matter of justice should be ‘the basic structure of 
society’ (TJ, p. 3), understood as all major social institutions held together as a 
scheme, which include the political constitution and the principal economic and 
social arrangements (including the family22). The reason for focusing on the basic 
structure of society is that it is where the basic rights and duties and the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation are distributed (TJ, p. 6). Rawls further advises 
that the focus of a theory of justice should be on ‘the major institutions’ because 
of the pervasive influence that this structure has in shaping people’s ‘life 
                                                        
21 See Rawls (1971, 1977, 1980). For other useful reviews of Rawls’ life and work, see Pogge and 
Kosch (2007), Kilcullen (1996), Richardson (2008), and Wenar (2008). 
22 See Rawls (1999) for his discussion of the family. However, in a previous article clarifying the 
idea of ‘the basic structure of society’, Rawls does not mention the family as part of it (Rawls 1977). 
Hence, the place of the family within the basic structure has been a controversial topic. See 
McKeown (2015, chapter V) for a discussion about the implications and difficulties of including the 




prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do’. In 
Rawls’ view, it is the cumulative of these institutions which is responsible for 
determining a person’s expectations of what his or her entitlements are, as well 
as their ‘initial chances in life’ from the instant, and the place, in which someone 
is born (TJ, pp. 6–7). It is the role of justice, then, to mediate structural outcomes 
that result in unequal life chances and distorted understandings of people’s 
entitlements and duties that favour certain social positions at the expense of 
others.  
Similarly, it is precisely because of the deep inescapable influence of the basic 
structure in our view of the world and the great distinctness of people that the 
principles of justice—under which all other states of affairs are to be assessed—
must not be influenced by the specificities of current social circumstances. Rawls 
(1977) writes: 
Agreements reached when people know their present place in an ongoing 
society would be influenced by disparate social and natural contingencies. 
The principles adopted would then be selected by the historical course of 
events that took place within that structure. We would not have gotten 
beyond social happenstance in order to find an independent standard (p. 
161). 
Hence, in order to avoid favouring particular social positions or certain 
conceptions of the good, an ideal conception of justice has to be derived by 
rational people under conditions of freedom and equality for all. These are the 
main conditions that Rawls considers necessary if principles of justice are to be 
fair and acceptable to everyone. This is exactly what he aims to accomplish 
through the two core ideas of his work: the original position and the veil of 
ignorance. Rawls presents the ‘original position’ as a hypothetical situation where 
individuals are able to decide and agree on the principles of justice to regulate 
society. Meanwhile, the ‘veil of ignorance’ is the necessary condition that 
facilitates the possibility for persons to recognise each other as moral persons 
equally situated and free. That is, the veil of ignorance is a heuristic device that 
invites us to put aside all personal characteristics and social circumstances such 
as our position in society, socio-economic situation, race, gender, skills, as well 
as our conception of the good, and so on, when placed in the original position. 




veil of ignorance depict a situation where persons are considered equal and free. 
They are free in two senses: free from social contingencies and free to choose 
(the principles of justice). 
In this way, Rawls meets the necessary moral conditions for fair principles of 
justice to be accepted by individuals under ideal conditions. However, to reach an 
agreement, there is some information that the parties in the original position must 
know. For example, why there is a need for such a contract between them in the 
first place, what their motivations are when deliberating with others, and what 
exactly it is that they are to agree on. So far, only what the parties do not know in 
the original position has been described (i.e. their personal characteristics and 
their conception of the good), but if the parties do not know what the good is that 
they are seeking, then it is not clear what they can bargain about in the 
hypothetical situation. To complete the reflective exercise, Rawls suggests the 
following scenario. First, in the original position, the parties assume that society, 
for which the principles of justice are going to apply, is characterised by the 
‘circumstances of justice’. These are the ‘normal conditions under which human 
cooperation is both possible and necessary’, which is marked generally by a 
conflict of interests on the division of social advantages where moderate scarcity 
of material and natural goods prevail (TJ, pp. 126–127). Second, the parties in 
the original position are conceived as rational (‘taking the most effective means 
to given ends’; TJ, p. 14) and mutually disinterested (i.e. they try to advance their 
own interests in absolute, rather than relative, terms). Rawls explains further: 
The intention is to model [wo]men’s conduct and motives in cases where 
questions of justice arise. The spiritual ideals of saints and heroes can be 
as irreconcilably opposed as any other interests. Conflicts in pursuit of 
these ideals are the most tragic of all. Thus justice is the virtue of practices 
where there are competing interests and where persons feel entitled to 
press their rights on each other. In an association of saints agreeing on a 
common ideal, if such a community could exist, disputes about justice 
would not occur… But a human society is characterized by the 
circumstances of justice…[the] aim is to reflect in the description of the 
original position the relations of individuals to one another which set the 




Third, in terms of the participants’ motivation, Rawls conceives them as ‘moral 
persons’, that is, as having the capacity to be rational and reasonable. A moral 
person is rational in the sense that she has the capacity to form, revise and pursue 
a conception of the good and is reasonable in so far as she has a capacity for a 
sense of justice. It is, then, their ‘highest-order interests’ (Rawls 1996, p. 75)—
their two moral capacities -, along with their unknown conception of the good that 
the parties aim to secure for themselves in the original position. Finally, although 
the parties do not know what their ends will be, they do know that there are useful 
things called ‘primary goods’ that they need in order to advance their ends and 
moral capacities. These goods are defined as things that any rational person 
would want irrespective of her rational ends. Therefore, the parties would 
rationally prefer ‘more of rather than less’ (TJ, p. 92) to ensure their success in 
advancing their highest-order interests whatever their conception of the good may 
be. The primary goods include rights and liberties, opportunities, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.  
In sum, Rawls’ TJ aims at modelling the relevant moral conditions to determine 
which principles of justice would be agreed to in a hypothetical situation where 
human beings are represented as free and equally situated. Under these ideal 
conditions, Rawls claims, the resulting principles will provide the most fair, stable 
and reasonable conception of justice, in comparison to other alternatives, to 
arrange the basic structure of society. These principles are the following:  
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all.  
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged (the 
difference principle) and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
In addition, Rawls suggests an ordering between these principles which emerge 
from the original position. The first principle, namely equal liberties, has lexical 
priority over the second, and part (b) of the second (equal fair opportunities) has 
priority over part (a) (the difference principle). According to Rawls’ ideal theory, 




look like. That is, these ideal principles are the standard under which all other 
social arrangements and states of affairs ought to be assessed23. 
This lexicographical order of the principles, however, is derived strictly for ideal 
circumstances of a well-ordered society. According to TJ (pp. 4–5), a society is 
well ordered if (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles of justice and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are 
generally known to satisfy these principles. Yet for the present conditions of real-
world societies, the priority order may no longer hold (TJ, p. 245, 303; see also 
Culp 2015, Goodin 1995). Still, Rawls advises that they do have the purpose to 
guide and be relevant for guiding current societies ‘as far as circumstance permit’ 
(TJ, p. 246). The next chapter shall take this discussion further24. As will be clear, 
however, for the specific purposes of this dissertation—namely to analyse the 
practical usefulness of normative ideas of justice to orient political action and, 
more specifically, to scrutinise Sen’s proposal on that endeavour—it is only the 
ideal aspect of Rawls’ TJ that is relevant.  
In this regard, it is important to note that, with these two principles, Rawls provides 
an alternative moral foundation to utilitarianism in determining the endpoint which 
society should strive for. This in turn provides a distinct basis for our 
understanding of development, which has very important implications. From this 
perspective, for example, a larger share of social utility is no longer enough to 
count as ‘meaningful’ social improvement unless it is consistent with the demands 
of justice. That is, a social arrangement where its major institutions are organised 
to maximise the end of economic growth (as a proxy of social utility) at the 
expense of individuals’ rights or liberties is unjust and thus must be transformed. 
According to Rawls’ principles of justice, ‘[e]ach person possesses an inviolability 
                                                        
23 Since its publication, Rawls’ TJ has been widely scrutinised and criticised from different points of 
view. Reviewing the Rawlsian literature is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, it does 
not engage in an extensive examination of the entire literature, not even of Rawls’ corpus. In relation 
to Rawls’ work, see Political Liberalism (1996) for a refined presentation of his theory; other clarifying 
works of his theory include Rawls (1980, 1977, 1974); see The Law of Peoples (2000) for his 
thoughts about global justice. For critiques to Rawls’ work, see, for example, Okin (1989) for a 
feminist point of view; see Brighouse and Robeyns (2010) for a debate about the metrics of justice 
between Rawls’ primary goods and the capability approach; see Nussbaum (2006) and Richardson 
(2006) for discussions about the difficulty of Rawls’ theory to deal with some groups, such as the 
severely disabled (see also Robeyns 2009b for other references); see Nussbaum (2004), Sen 
(2006) for issues of global justice; see Nozick (1974) for a libertarian critique; see Sandel (1982) 
and Mulhall and Swift (1992) for communitarian critiques; see Valentini (2012) for different lines of 
critiques to Rawls’ work related to the ideal/nonideal debate; see Young (1990) for a critique related 
to identity from the critical tradition and Kymlicka (1995) for a similar stance from the liberal tradition 
of multiculturalism. 




founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by 
a greater good shared by others’ (TJ, p. 3). 
To be just, then, a society ought to be organised in a way that safeguards Rawls’ 
principles of justice: equal civic and political liberties to all individuals and 
‘economic schemes that work to the greatest benefit of the worst off against the 
background of fair equality of opportunity’ (Gilabert 2008, pp. 412–413). Under 
this new ideal, the social improvements of development would entail moving in 
that direction. For example, a Rawlsian perspective of a basic structure of society 
would require that a labour reform be considered successful on the basis not only 
of the economic benefits it generates but also of whether it respects workers’ 
rights, whether it promotes equal opportunities for workers to thrive, and whether 
its distribution of profits works for the advantage of the worst off. Stated in a 
different way, a social arrangement is ethically acceptable if and only if it treats all 
individuals as ends in themselves and thus it secures the two principles of justice. 
What Rawls’ theory implies is that, if development ethics is concerned with justice, 
then development has to be about the individual and her freedom to pursue her 
life plan. 
The centrality of the individual for considerations of justice is critical to understand 
Sen’s position on development and justice (chapters III and IV). However, it also 
requires further clarification because it is less straightforward than often assumed 
in the literature and/or because it does not always mean the same for different 
scholars and thus it might have different implications for development25. It is in 
this spirit, then, that the following section introduces Rawls’ justification of the 
priority of the self for matters of justice. It shows that a just conception of 
development requires respecting the priority of the self and her freedom over 
other ends such as maximising happiness or achieving a specific human purpose 
or a particular notion of the good.  
                                                        
25 For some, for example, the focus on the individual and her life may call for perfectionist ends, 
where perfectionism stands for theories which advocate for the promotion of a conception of the 
good even if it is incomplete, whereas for others this might be incompatible with justice. Deneulin 
(2002) defines perfectionism as ‘a moral theory which regards certain activities, like knowledge, 
health or artistic creation as good, independent of any subjectivity… According to perfectionist moral 
theories, “certain properties constitute human nature—they make humans humans, and the good 
life develops these properties to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature” (Hurka 





2.2 Development ethics and the priority of the self  
Rawls’ TJ convincingly advises that when society is organised in such a way that 
its notion of development places a specific end or a conception of the good as its 
highest goal, then justice will be transgressed. That is, the lives of some 
individuals and their way of living will suffer the consequences for the sake of such 
higher ends. This is because if considerations of justice are valued because of 
their contribution to another end or ‘good’, then automatically that other end 
becomes more important than the demands of justice themselves. Hence, the 
only way to guarantee justice is if the principles under which a society should be 
ethically arranged—and social policies legitimised—are not dependent on, or 
derived from, a final human purpose, end or a particular conception of the good. 
Rawls illustrates this point by making reference to utilitarianism and its core idea 
of enhancing overall happiness. This is because utilitarianism fails to adequately 
take into account the subject-specific variability of the mere principle of 
maximising happiness. For the desire of happiness can be interpreted differently 
and/or achieved by alternative means from one person to another or even by the 
same person over time. Hence, when a specific notion of happiness is applied to 
society as a whole while ignoring the distinctness of persons, it will lead to the 
coercion of certain persons by imposing on them the conception of others. This 
happens, for example, when utility is taken as the catch-all concept of happiness 
and economic growth as the means to achieve it.  
In this way, utilitarianism might unfairly thwart the freedom of some to strive for 
their own understanding of happiness and/or to employ the means required to 
achieve it. This is what Rawls has in mind when concluding that utilitarianism is 
not capable of respecting the distinctness of individuals. Consequently—Rawls 
argues—social decisions based on utilitarianism can override justice rather than 
secure it (Sandel 1982). Notably, this is not an exclusive problem with the end of 
happiness. What this means is that justice cannot be justified in the name of any 
form of end or ‘good’, because it will succumb to the same difficulties when a 
single interpretation of a given end is applied to all persons. This is the reason 
why Rawls, as Kant before, relies on the concept of human freedom for 
considerations of justice. Because it is only when no particular conception of an 
end/good is regulative of society that one (I and everyone else) is free of coercion 




itself, intrinsically valuable and independently justified (i.e. without making any 
reference to any end or conception of the good). Thus, the only way in which 
justice can be guaranteed is by having an ideal conception of justice independent 
of all empirical ends.  
For this reason, Rawls places the subject herself (the individual) rather than the 
objects (ends, good) that she seeks as the foundation under which the principles 
of justice have to be justified. In this respect, Rawls can be considered a 
‘deontological liberal’ (Sandel 1982, p. 15) because, for him, the virtue of justice 
is prior to the good and the individual is prior to her ends. For Rawls, it is the 
individual self who becomes the basis of moral or political principles26 and not a 
specific good or end that she pursues. In other words, it is the ‘subject of ends, 
namely a rational being himself, [who] must be made the ground for all maxims of 
action’ (Kant 1785, cited by Sandel 1982, p. 6). This implies that the individual 
becomes an end in herself (not the means to achieve an already-specified end) 
and as such it is the self who ought to be at the centre of social arrangements and 
their transformation, i.e. the social improvements of development. 
It is this intuitive idea that a Rawlsian framework of justice compellingly advances 
to challenge the idea that development can be separated from social justice for 
the sake of economic growth. In his view, no individual—or specific groups of 
individuals—should pay the cost for the benefits of others. Likewise, there is no 
reason why some, as in the case of the labour reform in Mexico, should ‘accept 
the [expected] greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for [them to] 
lower [their] expectations’ (TJ, p. 178). From this perspective, it makes no sense 
for society to be more preoccupied to advance a certain specified end, or the 
means to achieve it, rather than procure the subject herself and her freedom to 
follow her own conception of what constitutes a good life (within the limits of 
justice). 
One should note that the emphasis here is on the individual herself rather than 
her ‘capacity to choose’, which is sometimes mistakenly taken as the primary 
concern of Rawlsian-inspired liberals. It is not uncommon to find scholars who 
reverse the emphasis to argue that it is the capacity of the individual to choose 
her ends—that happens to ‘reside in the subject’—and not the subject herself, 
what Kant, Rawls and other liberals defend. For example, Sandel (1982) states 
                                                        




that ‘[o]n the deontological view, what matters above all is not the ends we choose 
but our capacity to choose them. And this capacity, being prior to any particular 
end it may affirm, resides in the subject’ (p. 6). 
Contrarily to this kind of interpretation, this dissertation maintains that the priority 
of justice starts with the self (from which the capacity to choose is but one of its 
qualities). From this reading, then, it is primarily the concern to protect the 
individual person from unjustified coercion which is the reason why Rawls defends 
individuals’ capacity to choose, which in turn is seen as emergent from the 
capacity that the subject has to be rational and reasonable (Rawls 1996). For 
Rawls, it is when the individual takes priority over the ends she pursues that 
justice can be secured. More clearly, the focus on the individual and her freedom 
is a requisite for justice to be prior in a Rawlsian sense. From this brief discussion, 
one can conclude that for development to be about justice, development has to 
be focused on the individual person in the deontological liberal sense27.  
However, as important as this finding may be, it is not free of controversy. It is 
precisely the mere emphasis on the individual as something distinguishable from 
her ends or social nature that some scholars find problematic and inaccurate for 
discussions about justice. Essentially, they worry about the conception of an 
individual as completely detached from her ends and her social context. They ask, 
‘How do we know that there is any such subject, identifiable apart from and prior 
to the objects it seeks?’ (Sandel 1982, p. 7). For the purpose of this dissertation, 
it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of critique associated with the 
‘individualistic’ aspect of the theory: (1) those who argue that Rawlsian-like 
theories are essentially individualistic and thus biased against relational 
understandings of the self and (2) those who associate the issue of individualism 
with its neglect of the actual social and intersubjective processes that constitute 
the self and her experiences.  
The two types of critique have the same origin, namely the imputation of an 
individualistic bias of Rawlsian-like theories of justice which downplay, in one way 
or another, the relational features of human existence. The remainder of this 
                                                        
27  This conclusion has the twofold implication of providing a more solid justification for the 
contemporary attention on the individual person as the centre of development and, at the same 
time, of making us suspicious of more demanding approaches that favour certain notions of the 
good at the expense of others as this would violate the priority of the right over the good (see also 
Rawls 1996). This means that no acceptable conception of the good can override the rights of 
individuals, and as such only those conceptions of the good that are compatible with such demands 




chapter concentrates on the first critique while very briefly touching on the second. 
It does so because it takes the second line of critique to be more relevant for the 
practical implications of theories of justice (in chapter V), whereas the first line of 
critique is directly related to methodological concerns about Rawls’ conception of 
the self. Hence, it is the methodological issue which is primarily related to the 
objective of this chapter. In addressing this concern, this chapter provides a 
deeper understanding of Rawls’ theory as well as the ideal level in which it works. 
In addition, it reaffirms the priority of the individual for thinking about justice while 
showing that it might be more compatible with relational concerns—and thus to a 
relational understanding of injustice—than might appear at first sight. Together, 
these two reasons help strengthen the case for defending a comprehensive 
framework of justice composed by three different levels of theorisation about 
justice which—instead of being conceived as mutually exclusive—are seen as 
necessary for adequately orienting political efforts to construct a more just society.  
 
2.3 The Rawlsian self: An ideal conception 
The Rawlsian conception of the subject has been criticised from distinct fronts, 
though one may say that it is more because of the implications of presupposing 
this type of self—rather than the conception of the subject itself—that different 
philosophical perspectives have challenged this assumption28. This section is 
concerned only with the critiques directed towards Rawls’ defence of the priority 
of the individual. These critiques advocate for a more relational understanding of 
the self. Therefore, in illustrating this concern, it follows Sandel (1982), who could 
be seen as posing the strongest critique from the perspective of a relational self 
to the Rawlsian conception of the person (Mulhall and Swift 1995, Picket 1998). 
From this line of critique, what is at stake is the obvious resemblance between the 
conception of the self in Rawls’ justice as fairness and the Kantian self. In Kant’s 
terms, the subject is conceived as an abstract transcendental self that cannot be 
grasped empirically because in the material world she is disguised by different 
desires, goals and preferences. However, behind that empirical person, Kant 
argues, there is a self who is the ground that makes our experience possible by 
                                                        
28  For example, the libertarian perspective (e.g. see Nozick 1974) criticises the Rawlsian self 
because of its resulting implication for the Rawlsian different principle in the second principle. On 
the other hand, the communitarian perspective (see Mulhall and Swift 1992, Sandel 1998) questions 




unifying ‘our diverse perceptions and holds them together in a single 
consciousness’ (Sandel 1982, p. 8). Thus, according to Kant, there is a unity in 
all of us that has a will and is capable of reason, namely the transcendental 
(noumenal) self, who is the actual bearer of all possible ends. Therefore, it is only 
when individuals are treated as ‘transcendental selves’ that the person is 
conceived as a subject of experience (as a free agent) and not merely as an object 
of experience (an instrument) for the purpose of achieving a certain desire found 
in the contingencies of life. In this way, as Rawls does, Kant defends the priority 
of the individual over her inclinations, aspirations, ends, and so on in the real 
material world. 
The problem is that this Kantian interpretation of the transcendental self raises 
the question: how can someone know whether there is actually something such 
as the unity that Kant refers to, in all of us? How can someone know whether this 
transcendental self exists at all? Indeed, one of the difficulties of the Kantian 
notion of the self is that it seems arbitrary from a moral point of view as this 
‘transcendental self’ cannot be empirically appraised in real life. Consequently, it 
may be arbitrarily biased towards individualistic values. Now, the real question is 
whether Rawls’ theory can also be charged of the same critique. Evidently, one 
may find it extremely difficult to separate the Rawlsian conception of the self within 
the original position (and its implications) from the spirit of the Kantian conception 
of the transcendental (noumenal) self. Hence, Rawls is also accused of an 
(apparent) individualistic conception of the self that fails in two ways: it fails to take 
seriously into account the relationality of the self, and it fails due to our incapacity 
to understand ourselves as a transcendental self who is detached from all 
empirical contingencies. Sandel (1982) distinguishes between these two critiques 
in the following way: 
 The sociological perspective claims that Rawlsian-like theorising 
endorses a particular social ontology that is ‘methodologically individualist 
or atomist’ (Young 1990, p. 45) and as such it disregards the inherently 
social nature of the person. The person and her self-understanding (i.e. 
her identity), they argue, are quintessentially social products; her own 
goals, desires and even ‘the way that she thinks of herself as an individual’ 
are originated in the social world (Mulhall and Swift 1995, pp. 14–15). 
From this perspective, an independent self completely detached from her 




convictions is unimaginable, and so by implication, a neutral impartial 
subject is also impossible in real life. Advocates of this perspective 
suggest that instead of developing principles of justice derived from 
individuated selves with pre-social identities, what is needed is the 
cultivation of more collective values such as altruism, benevolence, and 
respect for distinct groups and social identities.  
 
 The teleological perspective, of which Sandel can be thought of as the 
main expositor among many, argues that it is the metaphysics of the 
individuated self which remains controversial and problematic. 
Particularly, the way in which Rawlsian-like theories characterise the 
relationship between the self and its ends. Sandel maintains that the 
problem is that for us to be persons ‘for whom justice is primary, we must 
be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstances in a certain 
way’ (1982, p. 49). Particularly, according to Sandel, a person must always 
regard herself separated from her ends: always at a certain distance, 
though conditioned, but ‘never fully constituted by them’ (p. 22). He calls 
this the ‘subject of possession’, a subject characterised by an identity fixed 
ex ante of our experiences. Thus, it excludes the possibility of 
understanding oneself as merged with our shared ends with others. It is 
from this idea that he concludes that the conception of the person within 
the original position threatens the neutrality of the theory (Mulhall and Swift 
1992) since it is biased against relational self-understandings of 
community. 
What the sociological objection mainly refutes is that Rawls’ form of liberalism 
ignores that individuals are conditioned ‘all the way down’ by the social context 
and therefore it is biased towards individualistic values. Somehow related but 
different, the teleological perspective argues that the assumed subject of 
possession within the original position is incapable of taking into account the 
relationality of individuals and the collective nature of the ends that individuals 
pursue in real life. This is the type of subject that Sandel makes reference to when 
he concludes that we cannot see ourselves in that peculiar way. Therefore, it is 
alleged that the principles of justice are not truly independently derived as they 
favour an individualistic understanding of the self, detached from her ends and 
relations (i.e. subject of possession). Thus, contrarily to Rawlsian liberalism, these 




relations. Consequently, some of these scholars suggest that it is not justice that 
needs to be an absolute priority but instead other virtues such as benevolence or 
the moral good that individuals ought to seek29. The following section shows that 
these critiques miss the point of Rawls’ ideal theory.  
 
2.3.1 Rawls’ ideal conception of the self as an assumption in the 
original position  
According to Sandel, the problem is precisely the subject of possession advanced 
by Rawls who is characterised as an ‘antecedently individuated subject… a 
subject whose identity is given independently of the things I have, independently, 
that is, of my interest and ends and my relations with others’ (Sandel 1982, p. 55). 
From Sandel’s perspective, this implies that for Rawls someone’s identity must 
be fixed at any given time throughout one’s [real] life. Sandel insists that this is 
not true in real life, and he argues repeatedly that we simply cannot understand 
ourselves as the type of persons that deontological liberalism asks us to be (1982, 
p. 11, p. 14, p. 65). Conversely, he fervently argues that there are occasions 
where the ends one holds can be so thoroughly adopted by the self that they 
actually become constituents of her personal identity rather than merely attributes 
that she possesses. In his own words: 
[someone can lose possession of something] as the desire or ambition 
becomes increasingly constitutive of my identity, it becomes more and 
more me, and less and less mine… the less I possess it, and the more I 
am possessed by it. Imagine that a desire, held tentatively at first, 
gradually becomes more central to my overall aims, until finally it becomes 
an overriding consideration in all I think and do. As it grows from a desire 
into an obsession, I possess it less and it possesses me more, until finally 
it becomes indistinguishable from my identity (Sandel 1982, p. 56; 
emphasis in original). 
In this passage, Sandel illustrates in a clear way why the subject of possession 
represented in the original position may not adequately relate to our true moral 
experiences. He suggests that sometimes the values that an individual holds are 
                                                        
29 This is not necessarily true of Young (1990) or other theorists within the critical theory tradition. 
Their main concern is the inadequate attention to social processes and intersubjective relations of 




so strongly attached to her that they actually make her the very person that she 
is. One may wonder, however, how different, really, Sandel’s own understanding 
of the self is from that of Kant’s conception. Actually, one could say that his own 
description is as vulnerable to the same objection of arbitrariness made to Kant’s 
transcendental self. Whilst Kant’s is arbitrary because it is abstracted from all 
contingency, Sandel’s is arbitrary because it is undistinguishable from 
contingency. In this respect, both (Kant’s and Sandel’s) accounts ‘may be unable 
to distinguish between the lives of the saint and the scoundrel’ (Sandel 1982, p. 
37) as long as they both fit with the requirements of their own descriptions. Barry 
(1984) goes even further and writes that Sandel’s view ‘gives [the] green light to 
every string-pulling parent and crony-hiring academic. And at the end of that road 
stand Torquemada, Stalin, Hitler, and Begin’ (p. 525). As will be clear below, this 
is precisely what Rawls tries to solve with his own method. 
While Rawls himself accepts that his theory is ‘highly Kantian in nature’ (TJ, p. 
xviii) and, as such, he adopts a similar conception of the self, he does it in a very 
particular way. He insists that an ideal conception of justice independent of all 
empirical ends is needed as an external point of view to assess social 
arrangements. But, to overcome the arbitrariness attached to the Kantian self, he 
suggests that at the same time this external point of view would have to be 
connected with the already situated selves in the real world. This is precisely the 
role of the device of representation, the original position, in Rawls’ TJ. It aims at 
finding a point of view ‘that enables us to envision our objective from afar’ but at 
the same to be a ‘form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt 
within the world’ (TJ cited in Sandel 1982, p. 17). This is what Rawls refers to as 
the ‘Archimedean point’, meaning a point from where it is possible to develop a 
conception of justice that is not contingent on, or justified by, any conception of 
the good, any desire, or a particular social or human interest ‘generated by a 
particular arrangement of institutions’ (TJ p. 260) that happened to exist as a 
result of historical contingencies.  
Whether he was successful in this task is a matter of dispute. What is important 
to bear in mind, nonetheless, is that Rawls’ aim is to advance the Kantian notion 
that there is a dignity that all humans share by the simple reason of their 
existence. Thus, what matters is not so much the idea of an individualistic subject 
capable of detachment from her circumstances but that the dignity of the subject 




possessing it. For Rawls, every single individual is always a subject whose dignity 
and moral worth are invulnerable to transformation by empirical experience.  
This idea is well illustrated by a scene in a film called My Name is Khan (2010). 
At one point, a young Indian Muslim with Asperger’s syndrome listens to other 
Muslims cursing at Hindus. He then repeats those words in front of his mother 
without really understanding what he is saying. His mother, troubled by what her 
child is saying, tells him a story to explain to him that what he was doing is not 
right. She grabs a notebook and a pencil and starts drawing sketches (only using 
lines and circles) of two human beings that are indistinguishable from each other, 
but one of the human beings is beating the other. Her mother then asks him: 
‘which of these is the Muslim and which the Hindu?’ The young man tries to 
answer but he simply cannot tell the difference. ‘They are similar’—he replies. His 
mother goes on to tell him that the only difference between them is what the 
person is doing—whether treating the other kindly or not. Of course, the mother’s 
explanation raises other questions but the important point is that the mother 
shows the young man that one person’s ends, attributes, desires, and so on do 
not render him more or less valuable; each of the two persons was an individual 
with equal moral worth. 
This is the non-empirical ‘independent’ self who is presented as a priority when 
thinking about justice. It is precisely this non-empirical self whom Rawls tries to 
illuminate in his theory with the construction of the original position and its 
assumptions. The idea is to make it accessible to real persons within ‘the canons 
of reasonable empiricism’ (Rawls 1977, p. 165). This is Rawls’ departure from 
Kant. Rawls recurs to a strategy that would be unthinkable and even self-
defeating for Kant. He incorporates certain empiricist assumptions in his 
hypothetical situation, what he calls ‘the circumstances of justice’, and at the same 
time prevents the parties from knowing their specific attributes and ends. As 
mentioned above, the ‘circumstances of justice’ refer to the assumption that real 
life is marked by moderate scarcity of material and natural goods and thus is 
generally marked by a conflict of interests on the division of social advantages. In 
this way, by including some general assumptions such as individuals’ rationality 
and certain human life conditions, the theory and its principles aim at connecting 




Although this tactic of including some ‘empirical conditions’ within the account of 
the circumstances of justice might seem to contradict Rawls’ own intention of an 
individual completely independent from empirical contingencies, it instead 
accentuates and distinguishes the strength and the ideal aspect of his proposal. 
It highlights the hypothetical nature of the original position, in which the ‘empirical 
conditions’ become only an account within the specific artificially constructed 
situation. Thus, these conditions do not necessarily have to be a realist empirical 
representation of the world. The fact that the circumstances of justice are not to 
be taken as a ‘straightforward empirical generalization’ is best understood by 
Sandel himself: 
[T]he account of the circumstances of justice is an account within the 
account of the original position, which, it must be recalled, is hypothetical 
to begin with. The conditions described there are meant to be the 
conditions in which the parties to the original position carry out their 
deliberations, not the actual conditions in which ordinary human beings 
live their lives… The objections depend in large part on the mistaken 
assumption that the facts of the circumstances of justice are meant to be 
facts of life in the real… But the description of the circumstances of justice 
cannot be regarded as a straightforward empirical generalization, to be 
established or refuted by the best evidence of sociology, psychology, and 
so on. Since the entire account of the circumstances of justice is located 
within the account of the original position, the conditions and motivations 
it describes are asserted only of the parties to the original position and not 
necessarily of real human beings. Once installed as a premise of the 
original position, the account of the circumstances of justice ceases to 
work as a simple empirical account which can be checked for accuracy 
against actual human conditions (Sandel 1982, pp. 40–41, emphasis 
added). 
This distinction between the device of representation of the original position, and 
the actual human circumstances in the real world, is also constantly stressed by 
Rawls. For example, he wrote: ‘We must keep in mind that the parties to the 
original position are theoretically defined individuals’ (TJ, p. 147); ‘We need not 
suppose of course that persons never make substantial sacrifices for one another, 
since moved by affection and ties of sentiment they often do’ (TJ, p. 178). In fact, 




the ‘sociological objection’. Because deontological liberalism ‘is in important ways 
less restrictive than the sociological objection suggests. Altruism and 
benevolence, for example, are wholly compatible with this liberalism, and there is 
nothing in its assumption to discourage their cultivation [in real life]’ (Sandel 1982, 
p. 12).  
Similarly, Mulhall and Swift (1995) suggest that, in TJ, Rawls clearly 
acknowledges ‘the constitutive role of social matrices’ in people’s own desires, 
abilities, language, and so on in real life (p. 199). Therefore, any objection to 
Rawls’ theory from this perspective reveals a misunderstanding of the Rawlsian 
hypothetical device where the accounts of theoretical persons, their motivations, 
and the circumstance of justice are solely ‘premises of the original position’. This 
therefore does not imply that they ‘hold for persons in real life’ (Sandel 1982, p. 
42). Hence, once the ideal level at which Rawls’ theory works is properly 
understood, it is possible—along with Sandel—to dismiss the sociological 
objection as being inaccurate. Yet this conclusion raises the question: why is this 
not sufficient to dismiss also the teleological conception, that is, the claim that 
Rawls’ theory asks us to understand ourselves as ‘subject of possession’ in real 
life? Sandel treats the conception of the person differently from other premises in 
the original position, but it is not clear why. 
One reason might be that Sandel considers that this particular premise (i.e. the 
conception of the self) is not a reasonable assumption within the original position. 
Indeed, Rawls himself suggests that it is not enough to have acceptable 
principles; we must also make sure that the premises producing those principles 
are equally acceptable to ‘our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium’ (TJ, 
p. 579). Rawls writes:  
In searching for the most favoured description of this situation we work 
from both ends… By going back and forth, sometimes altering the 
conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our 
judgments and conforming them to principles, I assume that eventually we 
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match out considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as 




Following Rawls, Sandel accepts that the criterion for judging the validity of the 
descriptive premises within the Rawlsian exercise is ‘given by our “intuitions” 
about what is empirically true’ (Sandel 1982, p. 43). Thereafter, the question that 
arises is whether the description of ‘the parties to the original position [who] are 
theoretically defined individuals’ (TJ, p. 147, emphasis added) is an assumption 
that is concordant with our intuitions. Specifically, the question is whether the 
conception of individuals who do not know their conceptions of the good, social 
position, aims, attributes, and so on is an acceptable assumption for discussing 
matters of justice. Hence, we could ask, is it not generally true that when 
discussing issues of justice, we would consider unacceptable that someone could 
make reference to her personal attributes or to her social/material position to 
defend her judgement? If the description of subjects who are ignorant of their own 
ends in the original position is simply a representation of individuals deliberating 
about justice, then Rawls’ conception of the individual might be a reasonable 
premise after all. 
Indeed, one could argue that this is the core motivation behind Rawls’ justice as 
fairness, which has nothing to do with favouring some conceptions of the good 
(like individualist values) over others. In this regard, Rawls writes that his 
conceptualisation of the self ‘ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged 
in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of 
social circumstances’ (TJ, p. 12). In Political Liberalism (1996), Rawls further 
clarifies that the original position does not presuppose a metaphysical conception 
of the person but a political one. This means that it aims at characterising 
individuals interacting in political and social relationships. On this account, the 
original position is thus simply a device of representation that ‘models the 
conditions that appropriately limit what they can put forward as good reasons’ 
(Rawls 1996, p. 25)30. Similarly, in an article published in 1980, Rawls confirms 
this view when explaining the assumption of the veil of ignorance. He writes: 
‘[e]xcluding this information is required… [o]therwise the parties would have 
disparate bargaining advantages that would affect the agreement reached’ (p. 
523). 
                                                        
30 Kilcullen (1996) reaches the same conclusion:  
I think that what Rawls is now describing is not too dissimilar to the way in which we actually 
argue about justice. If we say "you just have to submit, because I'm stronger/richer etc.", 
that is not an argument in terms of justice. Arguments about justice do not make any 





Rawls is thus not ambiguous in his goal of advocating for the priority of justice, 
and as this chapter suggests, it appears that the only possibility to succeed is by 
relying on a certain view of the individual as distinguishable from her ends (Barry 
1984). But this does not mean that someone has to understand herself as a 
subject of possession whose identity cannot change in the real world. Instead, it 
means that even if Rawls’ theory maintains that the individual (and not her ends 
or her identity) is the unit of moral concern, one could still argue that ‘[j]ustice as 
fairness is not, plainly, Kant's view, strictly speaking…[rather] the adjective 
“Kantian” expresses analogy and not identity’ (Rawls 1980, p. 517). Just as the 
assumption of mutually disinterested individuals does not rule out the emergence 
of other forms of motivations (altruism, benevolence) in real life, then, the 
theoretical non-empirical self in the original position does not rule out the 
emergence of different understandings of the self in reality (see also Rawls 1980, 
p. 545; Freeman 2012)31.  
This interpretation of Rawls implies that it is simply wrong to believe that 
individuals in real life have to understand themselves as subjects of possession 
or that there is a biased conception of the self behind the veil of ignorance. It 
seems that the problem with these two critiques—the sociological and the 
teleological—of Rawls’ exercise is that both misinterpret the hypothetical and 
ideal nature of the theory whose main role is to identify what a perfectly just 
society would look like if individuals mutually understand each other as equal 
moral persons. Its aim is to model ‘a type of society within which people accord a 
particular moral status to one another’ (Mulhall and Swift 1995, p. 199) regardless 
of her identity (within the limits of justice). Rawls is explicit in these demands32: 
For in this situation [the original position] [wo]men have equal 
representation as moral persons who regard themselves as ends (TJ, p. 
180, emphasis added). 
The members of such a society [well-ordered] are, and view themselves 
as, free and equal moral persons (TJ, p. 82, 1999 ed., emphasis added).  
                                                        
31 Still, Rawls’ conceptualisation of the self has also been criticised on different grounds (e.g. O’Neill 
1989 cited by Schwartzman 2006, see also Robeyns 2008). This is briefly touched upon in the 
following chapter.  




Thus to respect another as a moral person is to try to understand his aims 
and interests from his standpoint… (TJ, p. 338).  
Ultimately, it is from this interpretation of the original position that one can make 
sense of Rawls’ claim that one’s public identity as a moral person ‘is not affected 
by changes over time’ in her conception of the good (Rawls 1980, p. 545) and at 
the same time admit that for that person, her actual identity will surely be affected. 
Yet, from a moral point of view, this person is still a subject whose dignity ought 
to be respected. Hence, one could say that to understand each other in such a 
way is a chief normative aspect of Rawls’ entire conception of justice. This 
conclusion follows from Rawls’ significant concern with the pervasive influence of 
the basic structure and the context on one’s own identity and on the way one 
regards others.  
Notwithstanding the interpretation presented here, it is important to note that it is 
commonly assumed that the sociological and the teleological critiques led Rawls 
to recast the presentation of his theory in Political Liberalism (1996)33. Whether 
this is true or not is not relevant. But what this change may reveal is that, contrarily 
to the critiques, Rawls was more interested in reconciling rather than excluding 
competing views (Barry 1984) and in achieving the acceptance of, rather than 
imposing, the priority of justice and hence of the self.  
 
2.4 Development ethics and ideal theory 
This chapter started with the observation that the idea of development—however 
conceived—and its practical implications always spill over to human lives for 
better or for worse. The dominant approach of development (inspired by 
utilitarianism) has failed to hold its promise of a better life for all and at the same 
time has propelled an urgent demand for a more just world. In this respect, Rawls’ 
theory of justice not only provided powerful reasons for why justice is to be a 
fundamental concern of development, but more importantly it provided a coherent 
alternative framework to assess social arrangements from the perspective of 
justice. Hence, this chapter focused on offering an initial explanation of the role 
                                                        
33 Rawls denies this interpretation. He indicates that this refinement was necessary for issues of 
internal consistency. This change, however, did not represent a departure from the essential ideas 




an ideal theory can have for the task of promoting justice, why such a framework 
has to be developed within ideal conditions, and why Rawls’ theory is appropriate 
to play this role 34 . In addition, in presenting some debates about Rawls’ 
conceptualisation of the individual self, this chapter aimed at clarifying the 
distinction between ideal theory and other real-life empirical concerns which will 
be relevant in later chapters. The following chapters will continue to develop these 
points and show that the role of ideal theory is indeed essential—even if 
insufficient—for the task of promoting justice in the real world.  
So far, on the basis of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, this chapter suggested—but did 
not prove—that the usefulness of an ideal theory of justice lies in (1) providing the 
direction to which development policies should aim for (i.e. it sets an objective) 
and in (2) providing a framework to evaluate states of affairs and as such it helps 
to identify injustice. The next chapter further clarifies these two roles of ideal 
theory. For the moment, the important point is to recognise that Rawls’ ideal 
theory provides an ‘Archimedean point’ from where society and social policies can 
be evaluated. For example, it facilitated the evaluation of the labour policy in 
Mexico from the perspective of justice. Using Rawls’ ideal theory, one was able 
to conclude that the policy was unjust because it sacrificed workers’ rights for the 
sake of increasing economic growth and at the same time risked reproducing 
unjustified inequalities. Moreover, it is similarly important to stress that Rawls’ 
ideal theory also offered a strong philosophical foundation for redirecting the 
notion of development to the lives of individuals and their moral worth. It illustrates 
that if development—understood as providing an objective where to aim—is truly 
concerned about justice, then it can only be about individuals and their freedom.  
Yet, despite these valuable insights, an ideal conception of justice may not be all 
we want from a theory of justice. Knowing that, ideally, a society should look like 
a Rawlsian ‘well-ordered’ society does not say much about how to get there. It 
does not give information for developing alternative courses of action to make the 
world more just, nor does it say enough about how to evaluate these different 
alternatives against each other (Sen 2006) or how these ideas ought to be 
translated in practice.  
                                                        
34 As further elaborated in chapter VI, this dissertation assumes that Rawls’ ideal theory is well 




For this reason, the recent literature on justice has questioned the usefulness of 
an ideal theory of justice developed at high levels of theoretical abstraction and 
thus detached from the real lives and the real problems that most people face, 
while the urgency for a practical conception of justice remains. What is lacking, 
some argue, is a conception of justice capable of influencing actual social policies. 
These scholars demand the elaboration of a nonideal approach to justice to rectify 
injustice in the real world (e.g. Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). These demands raise 
other kinds of questions. For example, can ideal theory guide practical policies or 
is a nonideal theory indispensable? Should nonideal theory be an extension of 
ideal theory? If so, how should they be merged? Or should nonideal theory be a 
self-standing approach? If so, does it mean that ideal theory is redundant? The 
next chapter addresses these worries. Particularly, it critically analyses Sen’s Idea 
of Justice (2009)—arguably, the most robust nonideal theory to date—in the light 





III. Sen’s comparative approach: A replacement of 
the transcendental approach? 
 
The last chapter discussed ideal theory as a theory which aims at defining what 
justice is under specific conditions unconstrained from historical and institutional 
contingencies with the intention to provide a useful external standard to assess 
social reality. It concluded by briefly pointing out its unfitness to orient social 
policies to reduce injustice in practice. This insufficiency of ideal theory to deal 
with these practical issues has led some authors to question its overall usefulness 
for this task. They insist that the problem is their abstract nature which renders 
them useless for offering useful guidance to confront the kinds of injustice that the 
world faces today. Consequently, scholars agree that a nonideal theory of justice 
is needed.  
This chapter starts by presenting the ideal/nonideal debate to clarify the distinction 
between the two as well as to understand some of the issues that ideal theory 
face when translated to practice. It will argue that although nonideal perspectives 
do highlight some of the obstacles for translating ideal principles into practice, 
their critiques miss the point of ideal theory and thus are misplaced when 
presenting ideal/nonideal theories as mutually exclusive. At this point, the chapter 
introduces Sen’s Idea of Justice (2009) as a related but somehow different line of 
critique. Similarly to nonideal literature, Sen insists that rather than aiming to 
discover the nature of the ‘perfectly just society’, efforts should be concentrated 
on advancing justice of societies. But going further, he affirms that an ideal 
definition of justice is not needed at all to reduce injustice in the world, and he 
presents an alternative framework to replace Rawlsian-like ideal theories. The 
chapter critically analyses the first part of Sen’s proposal, what the chapter calls 
‘his point of departure’. It argues that, similar to nonideal critiques, Sen’s proposal 
is not successful at displacing ideal theory for remedying injustice. The chapter 
concludes by classifying Sen’s work as a potential nonideal framework, 





3.1 Justice: Ideal and nonideal understandings 
Until recently, the literature of justice was largely concerned with ideal theory, or 
the identification of the principles that would determine what makes a society 
perfectly just. Meanwhile, other aspects related to the practical matter of 
advancing justice or reducing injustice were largely disregarded. The problem is 
that ideal theory is not all we need to reduce injustice in the world, since having 
an ideal of justice may be of little help when intended to be applied to a real case 
of injustice. It is precisely these concerns about the usefulness of ideal theories 
in orienting actual justice-promoting actions which have motivated a lot of 
discussion about the role of this kind of theorising in real life. This literature 
emphasises the urgency for having a more realistic, practical conception of 
justice. It questions whether ideal theory is really necessary for the practical 
concerns of reducing injustice here and now. These worries take place within the 
literature of nonideal theories, which are of first importance for the topic of this 
dissertation. If justice is to be a fundamental concern for development practice, it 
is imperative to start paying much more attention to the mechanisms through 
which justice can be advanced as part of development action. 
The analysis presented here, however, will show that just because one may be 
anxious to see the demands of justice translated into practice, that in itself does 
not necessarily render ideal theory useless (even if some might see it that way). 
Actually, it might be when it is needed the most. As this dissertation will argue, a 
comprehensive approach to justice—composed of an objective where to aim at 
(ideal theory), a practical way to get there (nonideal theory), and a ground from 
where to depart (Idea of injustice)—is better suited to construct a more just society 
through political action. The previous chapter introduced the first level of 
theorisation. This chapter defends and clarifies its position in relation to nonideal 
theory. It shows that even if Rawls was interested in developing the most 
reasonable theory of justice—thus concerned with ideal theory—he also was 
highly concerned with the viability of his theory in the real world. As a matter of 
fact, it was Rawls himself who initially set the division between ideal and nonideal 
theory (Stemplowska and Swift 2012) and suggested that it was the latter which 
should deal with the practical problems we face in the real world. 
Rawls distinguished the ideal from the nonideal features by assuming ‘strict 
compliance’ and ‘favourable circumstances’. Whereas the former implies that 




refers to the minimum socio-economic conditions necessary to realise a just 
society. Since the feature of ‘favourable circumstances’ can be thought of as 
‘relatively prevalent in the modern world’ (Stemplowska and Swift 2012, p. 375), 
ideal theory is usually reduced to the issue of full compliance—assuming that it is 
compliance with the right principles that leads to a just world (Robeyns 2008). 
According to Rawls, the reason for assuming these ideal circumstances is that 
this will allow us to portray a ‘conception of a just society that we are to achieve if 
we can’ (TJ, p. 246). This is consistent with the idea that the nature of a conception 
of justice cannot depend on the actual circumstances of a given society, such as 
people’s level of compliance. Otherwise, we may end up with a very partial picture 
of what we really want from a conception of justice.  
Although this was Rawls’ initial rationale for the distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theory, this distinction has been expanded in recent years (Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012, Stemplowska 2008), though it remains widely understudied 
(Simmons 2010, Robeyns 2008). In general, the discussion has shifted more to 
the methodology employed in ideal theories (rather than on the principles it 
produces) and to the inability of ideal theories to guide action. In very broad terms, 
it could be said that what supporters of nonideal theories find objectionable is the 
fact that ideal theory and its principles are derived from idealised scenarios, 
unrestricted from all the flaws and the less-than-perfect conditions that 
characterise the real world. As such, they do not provide useful or accurate 
guidance for these nonideal circumstances (Sen 2009, 2006, Farrelly 2007, 
Goodin 1995, Phillips 1985). Some examples of the most pressing issues 
discussed in the literature are those related to ‘fact-sensitivity’ and ‘idealisation’ 
(where strict compliance can be one of the expressions of these, though it is also 
treated as a separate issue altogether; e.g. see Phillips 1985, Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012)35. 
                                                        
35 The list of problems presented here is not exhaustive and others have summarised them under 
different names. For example, Valentini (2009) tackles what she calls ‘the guidance critique’ highly 
related to the problem of idealisation, though in a subsequent work she uses yet another typology 
to present different critiques (see Valentini 2012); Swift (2008) differentiates between 
‘epistemological’ and ‘practical’ political philosophy to defend the use of ideal theory in nonideal 
circumstances; see Simmons (2010) on the priority of ideal theory over nonideal theory; see also 
Stemplowska (2008) for a different distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. Others talk about 
the distinction between abstraction and idealisation (e.g. Goodin 1995, Schwartzman 2006), 
whereas Robeyns (2008) subsumes the two under the name of idealisation; still others criticise the 
whole exercise of ideal theory as being hegemonic and ideological and thus a form of injustice (e.g. 
Mills 2003, Schwartzman 2006). Importantly, this variation in the terminology is also relevant 
because the kind of critiques directed towards ideal theory will be highly contingent on the definition 




The charge of idealisation usually relies on the distinction between abstraction 
and idealisation. On the one hand, ‘abstraction’ refers to the act of omitting or 
excluding some information considered arbitrary from a moral point of view in 
order to simplify the reality. On the other hand, ‘idealisation’ refers to the act of 
either representing reality with extra characteristics or attributes which seem 
impossible to ever hold in real life or portraying reality in a way that misrepresents 
morally relevant categories (Goodin 1995, Stemplowska 2008, Robeyns 2008, 
O’Neill 1987 cited by Schwartzman 2006). In general, the latter strategy is what 
is considered problematic for developing ideal theories whereas the former is not. 
For instance, Rawls’ conception of the person in the original position can be seen 
as including both abstraction and idealisation. It abstracts because it represents 
an individual behind the veil of ignorance, that is, ignorant of morally arbitrary 
categories for justice (i.e. personal attributes, social position, gender, etc.). It 
idealises because it represents an individual completely independent from others, 
which is deemed to misrepresent—and thus be biased against—the reality of the 
provision of care (Robeyns 2008)36. 
In terms of fact-sensitivity, the charge (somehow related to the issue of 
abstraction) is that ideal theories do not pay sufficient attention to empirical facts 
such as power relations, political feasibility, and psychological limits of human 
nature (Valentini 2009). Hence, even if Rawls’ theory can be considered to be 
moderately fact-sensitive by including the circumstances of justice in the original 
position, it has been suggested that it is not sufficiently so to be ‘realistically 
possible’ (Farrelly 2007, p. 845)37. Although idealisation and fact-sensitivity are 
distinct methodological critiques, both have been used to question the validity and 
the operationalisation of ideal principles in specific unjust contexts. This chapter 
focuses on this practical issue rather than on the methodological one which is 
directly linked to the justifiability of what an acceptable ideal theory would be. The 
relevance of this debate for the argument of this dissertation is, then, that it points 
out some of the difficulties that ideal theories (such as Rawls’) face to be 
practically possible here and now and hence it highlights the need of a nonideal 
theory.  
                                                        
36 Scholars from the critical tradition usually criticise both abstraction and idealisation. They claim 
that it is the methodology of detaching from the real world in general which is problematic (see 
chapter V).  
37 Although Farrelly (2007) seems to conflate idealisation and fact-sensitivity as the same problem, 
his claim is that normative theorists must pay more attention to what is feasible by including more 




In the specific case of Rawls, it is often said that because its principles are derived 
from idealised and fact-insensitive circumstances, his theory is not successful in 
guiding political efforts to remedy injustice in the world. As a matter of illustration, 
one could say that, despite its abstraction, Rawls’ original position is a normative 
assumption that denounces as unjust the discrimination of people on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Similarly, his principles of justice would consider as 
unjust a situation where people do not enjoy fair equal opportunities. The problem 
is that Rawlsian justice may not make any difference to the reality of the lives of 
those discriminated groups here and now. This is because his principles are 
developed for ideal circumstances, including a perfectly just scheme of institutions 
where it is assumed that people generally comply with it. Meanwhile, the theory 
completely disregards all important facts about the particular historical situation, 
for example, what kind of discriminations people suffer, who are discriminated 
against, why they are discriminated, who discriminates them, etc. Certainly, for 
the case of ethnic discrimination observed in Latin American countries, one would 
have to consider the long history of colonialism and the power relations that it has 
developed over time as well as the acceptance of discriminatory practices as part 
of the culture and values of the society in question. In the absence of this 
information, critics argue, Rawls’ theory becomes futile to guide actual 
interventions that can be effective and realistically possible here and now38. 
Yet the latter example illustrates only one part of the problem, that of ideal theory 
being insufficient to derive adequate guidance. But there can be an even more 
problematic case, critics warn, namely when ideal theory orients action in a way 
that does more harm than good. To illustrate, let us consider the example of 
informal domestic work in Mexico, which is a relatively common practice in most 
Latin American countries. Such work is often done by poor women with little or no 
education for a very low wage, without a contract or any work-related benefits 
(such as social security and seniority allowance), which means that these workers 
can be dismissed anytime with no compensation. These poor women workers are 
thus highly vulnerable in terms of life conditions. Let’s assume further that a 
Rawlsian-inspired law, based on, say, equal fair opportunities, is brought into 
force to formalise domestic work in order to ensure regulated work time, 
redundancy payments, paid holidays, and social security paid by their 
                                                        





employers39. Notwithstanding the possible usefulness of this law for the benefits 
of these women’s living conditions, there is also a danger that it may be 
counterproductive. For instance, one of the effects of this law is that it may render 
many of these women unemployed because of the higher cost of hiring them. 
Another outcome could be the non-applicability of the law by continuing an 
informal agreement between the parties: although it would maintain women at 
work, their status would be strictly illegal and thus probably more vulnerable.  
For these reasons, some theorists claim that ideal theory, at best, fails to provide 
guidance for the nonideal circumstances and, at worst, can even be 
counterproductive (Stemplowska and Swift 2012; e.g. see Goodin 1995, Philips 
1985). But can the worth of ideal theorising be reduced to the sole test of offering 
practical guidance here and now? Should ideal theory be rejected because of its 
(apparent) uselessness for the nonideal circumstances of the real world? The lack 
of direct applicability of ideal theory to specific cases of injustice has led to two 
different positions about these questions: those who worry about the practical 
feasibility of ideal theory and are doubtful of its usefulness for orienting action and 
those who dismiss it altogether and instead advocate for its replacement (e.g. 
Farrelly 2007, Sen 2009). The more extreme critique, that is, the total rejection of 
ideal theory, will be addressed later on. This section deals first with the less 
extreme critique, that is, the ‘guidance critique’ (Valentini 2009). 
Defenders of ideal theory argue that those who attack the methodology of ideal 
theorising in order to discredit it for its inability to provide adequate guidance are 
missing the point. The value of ideal theory should not be assessed in terms of 
the practical guidance it provides. For instance, Swift (2008) compellingly defends 
the value of theorising that simply aims at finding ‘truth’ which can ‘bear on actions’ 
at some point. He calls this the ‘epistemological’, in contrast to the ‘practical’, role 
of political philosophy (p. 367). For this purpose, some authors recognise that 
making ‘false assumptions’ is unavoidable and indeed desirable for developing a 
sound ideal theory of what a perfectly just society would look like (Stemplowska 
and Swift 2012, Robeyns 200840). Similarly, Stemplowska (2008) argues that this 
is particularly true if the theory is to make us reflect on the influence that certain 
constraints impose on our reasoning, or what we can achieve if we commit to 
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certain values, or simply what the world ought to be. Likewise, some authors 
suggest that taking into account feasibility constraints is not necessary for theories 
aiming ‘to guide political action’ (Swift 2008, p. 363) or for the moral justification 
of fundamental principles (Gilabert 2008). In Hamlin and Stemplowska’s (2012) 
words: 
… we can only pursue the general inquiry into the nature and structure of 
values successfully if we are not tied to any particular feasibility constraint 
and are free to construct and compare hypothetical scenarios without 
reference to their feasibility. Assuming any particular feasibility constraint 
would give us only a very partial glimpse at our values (p. 55; emphasis in 
original). 
In other words, these authors emphasise that the proper role of ideal theories of 
justice is to develop a systematic conception of perfect justice. Hence, those who 
demand more from ideal theories in terms of concrete practical guidance 
misunderstand the nature of ideal theory. There is simply no reason to equate 
ideal theory with the immediate task of orienting action. In fact, Rawls raised 
warnings about directly translating his ideal principles into actual circumstances 
which depart from the ideal conditions from which the principles were derived (TJ, 
pp. 245 and 247; see also Stemplowska and Swift 2012, Goodin 1995)41. That is, 
in line with nonideal advocates, Rawls acknowledged that there is an important 
role to play for nonideal theory in dealing with these practical issues (TJ, p. 8; see 
also Culp 2015, Simmons 2010).  
This does not mean, however, that ideal theory becomes unnecessary for 
reducing injustice in practice. On the contrary, Rawls considered that a sound 
ideal theory should always be practically relevant for the real world, not in the 
sense of offering immediate remedial strategies to reduce injustice but in serving 
as an encompassing frame throughout this endeavour. It is in this sense that 
Rawls presents ideal theory as the ‘fundamental part of the theory of justice’ 
although it is ‘obvious’ that the problems of nonideal theory are ‘the pressing and 
urgent matter… the things that we are faced with in everyday life’ (TJ, p. 9). Thus, 
in Rawls’ view, ideal theory has to be prior to nonideal theory for injustice to be 
effectively reduced (Freeman 2012, Simmons 2010). Rawls offers two main 
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reasons to support this claim. First, Rawls argues that ideal theory is a 
prerequisite because it ‘provides… the only basis for the systematic grasp of 
these more pressing problems’ (p. 9). That is, by providing a systematic 
framework of thought to assess, criticise and determine whether a state of affairs 
or a given practice is to be considered unjust, ideal theory is always action-
guiding—even if it does not result in ‘achievable and desirable’ recommendations 
(Stemplowska 2008; see also Freeman 2012, Simmons 2010, Gilabert 2008). 
This is what Stemplowska and Swift (2012) call the ‘urgency’ role of ideal theory. 
Rawls writes: 
Viewing the theory of justice as a whole, the ideal part presents a 
conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can. Existing 
institutions are to be judged in the light of this conception and held to be 
unjust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason… 
Thus as far as circumstances permit, we have a natural duty to remove 
any injustices, beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent 
of the deviation from perfect justice… Thus while the principles of justice 
belong to the theory of an ideal state of affairs, they are generally relevant 
[to nonideal conditions] (TJ, p. 246). 
To illustrate, we can think of the two examples used above (i.e. ethnic 
discrimination and domestic work). Besides pointing out the lack of effective 
guidance provided by Rawls’ ideal theory, one could argue that in both cases 
there is an underlying claim to action which is inferred from ideal theory and which 
is prior to the urgency of finding a remedy for the situation. We are concerned with 
their rectification because, on the basis of an ideal framework, there is certainty 
(assuming it is generally accepted) that discrimination and unequal work 
conditions are unjust. This illustrates the way in which ideal theory is action-
guiding via the urgency role. By systematically identifying injustice (even without 
giving details about how this injustice comes about), ideal theory also calls for 
political action to address these situations. The second way in which ideal theory 
is prior to nonideal theory for reducing injustice is that ideal theory ‘set[s] up an 
aim to guide the course of social reform’ (TJ, p. 245). That is, though not 
necessarily dictating how to proceed, ideal theory sets a target at which nonideal 
efforts should aim (Culp 2015, Stemplowska and Swift 2012). Thus, nonideal 
theory has the role of identifying ‘policies and courses of action that are likely to 




p. 60) in order to move in the direction of ideal justice. This is what Stemplowska 
and Swift (2012) call the ‘target’ role of ideal theory. In this sense, nonideal theory 
is strictly transitional, always to be seen as ‘secondary [to] and dependent’ on 
ideal theory (Simmons 2010, p. 10). 
In these two ways, by identifying injustice and providing an endpoint where to aim 
at, ideal theory is always action-guiding even if it ‘still leave[s] an enormous 
amount of work to be done by nonideal theory’ (Simmons 2010, p. 32)42. Thus, 
from this discussion, one can conclude that it is mistaken (a) to demand direct 
practical application from ideal theories and (b) to present ideal and nonideal 
theories as rivals. Rather, ideal and nonideal theories are to be seen as 
complementary, that is, as working in tandem for dealing with injustice here and 
now (see Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, Swift 2008, Gilabert 2008, Robeyns 
2008).  
This conclusion, however, can satisfy only the first group of critiques, i.e. those 
who rightly pointed out ideal theory’s misguidance for dealing with injustice. But it 
is not enough for dismissing those who endorse the extreme critique, i.e. those 
who reject ideal theory altogether. In their view, ideal theory is not necessary at 
all for making the world more just (e.g. see Wiens 2012, Sen 2006, Sreenivasan 
2007 cited by Simmons 2010)43. In this context, Amartya Sen’s work The Idea of 
Justice (2009) represents the most elaborate challenge to the assertion that 
nonideal principles are derived from ideal theory. In it, Sen claims that knowing 
what a perfectly just society is is futile for reducing injustice in the world. Having 
a detailed notion of his work will be crucial to evaluate the extent to which it 
succeeds (or not) in providing a real practical alternative to Rawls’ theory in order 
to orient justice-promoting action. In addition, the examination of Sen’s proposal 
is of first importance for this dissertation for several reasons: (1) in contrast to 
most critics in the nonideal/ideal debate, he does offer an articulated framework 
aiming to displace a Rawls-like ‘transcendental’ paradigm of justice; (2) it has 
been regarded as the most important work on justice since Rawls’ TJ; and (3) his 
work directly links issues of justice to real practical concerns of development, and 
since his previous work has been extremely influential for development thinking, 
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it is extremely relevant to examine what shift it may potentially represent in this 
direction.  
Sen’s main critique against theories of justice—from which Rawls is explicitly the 
main target—is their ‘transcendental institutionalism’ view of justice which is not 
appropriate to examine or remediate injustice. First, they are ‘transcendental’ 
because they are concerned with the identification of the nature of the just and as 
such these theories try to provide an account of the perfectly (and unique) just 
societal arrangement. But these theories, Sen argues, say little, if anything, about 
how to compare between different (other than the perfectly just) states of affairs 
as more or less just, nor do they provide a useful framework on how to achieve 
this transcendental ideal. That is, they aim to tell us what will make a society 
qualify as just but not how to attain it. Second, they are institutionalist because 
the primary concern of transcendental theories is to ‘get the institutions right’ and 
thus adequate attention is not given to individual behaviour or ‘in the actual 
societies that would ultimately emerge’ (Sen 2009, p. 6). Hence, for Sen, the crux 
of the matter is that ‘transcendental institutionalists seek to identify a set of 
perfectly just social institutions … [and] [f]or them, societies in the real world are 
unjust to the extent that they fail to exhibit such institutional perfection’ (Valentini 
2011, p. 299; emphasis in original). 
The second part of this critique (i.e. institutionalism) which is related to the 
conceptual framework that Sen proposes to reduce injustice will be further 
discussed in the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter is concerned 
exclusively with the first part of his critique, the ‘transcendental’ aspect of 
Rawlsian-like theorisation, which can be regarded as Sen’s point of departure. In 
this respect, it is precisely the search for perfection which Sen condemns as 
having a (negative) repercussion for the practical usefulness of theories of justice 
and not the use of idealisations or abstractions. Sen (2012) differentiates his 
argument from the ideal/nonideal debate in the following way. He writes: ‘An ideal 
theory need not be a theory of ideal states, nor does a nonideal theory be 
necessarily a departure from a transcendental approach’ (p. 330, footnote 37). 
Sen understands the feature of ‘transcendentalism’ as aiming for a perfect 
standard that cannot be ‘“transcended” (or “bettered”) by any other’ (Sen 2012, p. 
322). In strict terms, this means that the transcendental aspect of a theory of 
justice should not be equated only with ideal theory. Rather, transcendentalism 




(2009; IJ from now onwards) embraces the spirit of nonideal critiques but goes 
beyond these. He finds himself at odds with the mere notion of a perfectly just 
society. Sen asserts that we do not need to know or agree on what an ideal perfect 
just society is in order to address the most immediate and urgent cases of injustice 
that pervade the real world. This in turn directly questions the priority of ideal over 
nonideal theory44. 
 
3.2 Sen’s comparative framework: Beyond the transcendental 
approach? 
The problem with transcendental theories, Sen argues, is their starting point. 
Instead of trying to answer ‘What is justice?’ or ‘What would the perfect 
arrangement of society be?’, a real-world theory of justice should be concerned 
with making the world more just. Hence, efforts should concentrate in advancing 
justice rather than striving for the ‘perfectly just society’. We do not need an ideal 
theory to tell us that it is unjust for children to die from curable diseases or hunger; 
what we need to answer is how this injustice can be improved. That is, Sen urges 
us to take the unjust (nonideal) world as starting point and the removal of injustice 
as the main concern of justice theorisation. From this standpoint, a rectification of 
an injustice, for example, the ‘eliminat[ion] of widespread hunger, or remov[al of] 
rampant illiteracy … yield[s] an advancement of justice’ (Sen 2006, p. 217) even 
if it still leaves us far from a perfectly just world. For this specific task, he argues, 
what we need is a comparative framework to rank societal arrangements as more 
or less just, a task for which the transcendental approach is not suitable and not 
even helpful. In Sen’s view, there are two reasons why the transcendental 
approach is dispensable for this practical purpose: the feasibility and the 
redundancy constraint (IJ, pp. 10–17).  
The feasibility constraint expresses Sen’s scepticism about the mere possibility 
of finding a definition of a perfectly just social arrangement or a unique set of 
principles for justice that trumps all others. Therefore, Sen advocates for the 
acknowledgement and acceptance of several competing and plural reasons for 
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the feature of transcendental and the feature of ideal as roughly belonging to the same category 
since both take Rawls as their example par excellence. Later, this dissertation comes back to these 




justice. This complexity is meant to be practically captured with the example of 
three children (named Anne, Bob and Carla) quarrelling for a flute. Each of the 
children has a reason to claim the flute (where each of them represents a 
philosophical perspective). Anne considers that she should have it because she 
is the only one who knows how to play it. Bob says that he is the only poor person 
among the three and has nothing else to play with. Meanwhile, Carla claims that 
she deserves the flute because it is the product of her own labour. Who should 
keep the flute? To find a solution for this parable, we should not turn to Sen’s IJ; 
rather, he suggests that we should not expect any of them to have a final say 
upon the others.  
The redundancy constraint says that even if the identification of a transcendental 
conception of justice is somehow possible, it would be neither sufficient nor 
necessary for comparing between two states of affairs as more or less just. 
Sen argues that it is not sufficient because ‘[f]rom a transcendental … 
perspective, a society is either perfectly just, or it is unjust’ (Valentini 2011, p. 300) 
and thus it does not provide a framework to recognise partial merits of societies. 
On this point, Rawls considered the possibility of comparing between different 
societal arrangements depending on the distance against the perfect model (TJ, 
p. 246). But Sen rejects this option with a ‘firm no’ (2006, p. 219). Convincingly, 
Sen points out various difficulties which might well render this route impossible. 
For example, instances of injustice can take place within several distinct fields of 
departure from the ideal (e.g., liberties, resources, opportunities) and there might 
not be a satisfactory way to compare between them. Therefore, it might not be 
possible to determine which situation is closer to the ideal45. Consequently, Sen 
concludes that even knowing what the ‘best’ arrangement is does not give any 
information about the ordering of two (or more) other sub-optimal arrangements 
of society short of it. Sen (2006) explains this as follows: ‘the fact that a person 
regards the Mona Lisa as the best picture in the world, does not reveal how she 
would rank a Gauguin against a Van Gogh’ (p. 221; emphasis in original). 
Nor is a transcendental notion of justice necessary, because, according to Sen, 
the elucidation of the ‘best’ or the ‘right’ option is not necessary to compare 
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between two other non-best options. Relying on a similar exercise, Sen explains, 
when judging between two alternatives ‘a Picasso over a Dali’, there is no need 
to identify or invoke the ideal or ‘perfect picture in the world, which would beat…all 
other paintings in the world’ (Sen 2006, p. 222; see also IJ, p. 16). This position 
is also well captured by some authors such as Brown (2010) when he writes: ‘In 
practice, we measure one possible policy against another possible policy, and not 
against an ideal’ (p. 314). Alternatively, even if we should not go via the 
transcendental identification to make comparative judgements, Sen concedes 
that there might still be a place for the transcendental best in the ‘weaker form’ of 
necessity (Sen 2006, p. 222). This hypothesis questions whether systematic 
comparative assessments could lead to the identification of the transcendental 
best. Sen also rejects this hypothesis by acknowledging that it is unlikely that the 
conditions required for having a robust ‘“well-ordered” ranking’ are met (IJ, p. 
102). For example, even in the implausible scenario in which each individual could 
have a complete ordering in the ranking of all possible social arrangements, this 
does not guarantee an agreement between all the parties in a specific ordering. 
Consequently, incompleteness might be an inevitable outcome before arriving at 
the transcendental ideal.  
These constraints (the feasibility and the redundancy) of transcendental theories 
lead Sen to conclude that ‘the question “what is a just society?” is not…a good 
starting-point for a useful theory of justice’ (IJ, p. 105). If a theory of justice is to 
give practical guidance about how to make the world less unjust, then the 
transcendental route is conceptually flawed. In contrast, Sen insists that a 
comparative approach—having the notion of injustice as its starting point—does 
not need, nor does it attempt, to answer this transcendental question. Rather, it 
starts by asking ‘how would justice be advanced’ (IJ, p. 9). This task is foremost 
a comparative exercise that can be ‘undertaken without identifying, first, the 
demands of perfect justice’ (IJ, p. ix). Sen writes: 
What is important to note here, as central to the idea of justice, is that we 
can have a strong sense of injustice on many different grounds, and yet 
not agree on one particular ground as being the dominant reason for the 
diagnosis of injustice (p. 2, emphasis in original)… The diagnosis of 





By concentrating on the remedial actions needed rather than on the theoretical 
nuances of a ‘totalist’ approach (IJ, p. 103), a comparative framework is better 
suited for reducing injustice. The indeterminacy of ideal theories of justice does 
not block the possibility of arriving at an intersection of ‘partial orderings’ in a 
comparative exercise. Therefore, according to Sen, the transcendental and the 
comparative approaches are ‘analytically disjoined’ (IJ, p. ix); they are ‘quite 
distinct… neither approach, in general, subsumes or entails the other’ (Sen 2006, 
p. 216).  
It is through these rather definitive statements that Sen aims at displacing 
Rawlsian-like theorising for addressing ‘questions of enhancing justice and 
removing injustice’ (IJ, p. ix). Though related to nonideal critiques, Sen’s 
arguments are easy to distinguish from the previous nonideal criticisms. Sen is 
not only denouncing Rawls’ ideal theory for being impractical for the ‘real world’ 
but also advocating for a replacement of the transcendental approach for the 
purpose of advancing justice.  
To the extent that Sen is correct about the feasibility and redundancy (sufficiency 
and necessity) constraints, then, his comparative approach would strongly call 
into question the use of the transcendental paradigm and thus be one step closer 
to succeed in presenting an alternative route towards justice. Conversely, by 
failing to defend these constraints, Sen’s approach would face immense 
difficulties to present itself as a real alternative, at least one that can achieve what 
it sets out to do (i.e. provide a framework to reduce injustice without relying on a 
transcendental notion of justice). Therefore, before turning to the specificities of 
Sen’s comparative framework, the following section examines the arguments 
supporting the feasibility and the redundancy constraints. This would indicate 
whether there is still a fundamental role to be played by the transcendental 
approach for advancing justice. What is under examination, then, is the claim that 
‘a comparative theory of justice may be entirely viable and thoroughly usable 
without containing—or entailing—any answer to the grand question “What is a 





3.3 The inescapable necessity of transcendental justice 
From the ideas presented above, it is possible to capture the way in which Sen 
contests the absolute priority of ideal theory (over nonideal theory). In the absence 
of an ideal of justice, Sen suggests, it suffices that there is a shared understanding 
of something being unjust, even if for different reasons, to call for its rectification. 
For example, in the case of racial discrimination, some may consider it wrong due 
to its negative impact on economic growth (associated with utilitarian grounds), 
others because it violates people’s liberties and the principle of equal fair 
opportunities (Rawlsian), and yet other persons for other reasons. The shared 
understanding that racial discrimination is wrong would be sufficient to start 
remedying the injustice. Subsequently, as long as there is a consensus on a 
different state of affairs where discrimination is less frequent, this would illustrate 
that injustice can be reduced even if we do not agree on an ideal conception of 
justice and even if discrimination remains. Although at first sight this proposal 
might seem promisingly feasible, the following analysis will provide a more 
informed panorama for its evaluation and conclude that the transcendental 
approach is still necessary. 
 
3.3.1 Evaluating the feasibility constraint: A long-sighted view  
Sen suggests that rather than aiming at selecting a victorious ideal of justice over 
all other conceptions, we must acknowledge—and accept—the coexistence of 
‘plural and competing reasons for justice… which nevertheless differ from—and 
rival—each other’ (IJ, p. 12). In IJ, Sen repeatedly advocates for this plurality of 
reasons (e.g. ‘the principles that survive [reasoned scrutiny] need not be a unique 
set’ (p. 45); ‘There is no compulsion…to eliminate every reasoned alternative 
except exactly one’ (p. xviii)). This was reasonably defended with the example of 
three children quarrelling for a flute (above). Yet, although the general idea of 
plurality of reasons might be difficult to dispute, this section argues that it could 
also be a mistake to take it as an impasse with such ease instead of engaging in 
further reasoning about the implications of such a decision. Ultimately, although 
no solution to the plurality of reasons may be at hand, blind respect for plurality 




No doubt, Sen’s example of the quarrelling children has been accepted as an 
argument among some authors, admitting that ‘sometimes there is simply a 
plurality of “right” answers’ (Brown 2010, p. 313). Others, nonetheless, see Sen’s 
conclusions of the exercise as misplaced towards Rawlsian theorising or as a too 
precipitated conclusion to make or as missing the point of ideal theorising. For 
example, some authors remind us that Rawls himself (in his later work—1996) 
acknowledges that there is a plurality of reasonable conceptions of justice which 
can differ from his own proposal and as such his conception was only one of these 
options (Satz 2012, Gilabert 2012, Valentini 2011). As a result, it will be at odds 
to accuse Rawls of endorsing the view that there is a unique theory of justice while 
sentencing others as incorrect (Marjoribanks 2010). Still, Sen suggests that if 
there cannot be a unique solution to the transcendental question, then Rawls’ 
exercise was doomed to ‘get stuck at the very base’ (IJ, p. 11, p. 57). This is 
because, according to Sen, it is incoherent to accept non-uniqueness and yet 
continue the Rawlsian exercise of ‘justice as fairness’ as if there was indeed a 
‘complete agreement in the “original position”’ (2012, pp. 331–332).  
This in turn is presented as one of the strengths of the comparative approach 
because it does not depend on such uniqueness but on the ‘“intersection partial 
ordering”—the shared parts of the different rankings’ (Sen 2012, pp. 331–332). 
Because different ideals will tend to conflict with each other, Sen insists, ‘[w]hat is 
needed instead is an agreement, based on public reasoning, on rankings of 
alternatives that can be realised’ (IJ, p. 17). But one could still wonder whether 
Rawls’ theoretical exercise really is undermined just because there are other 
reasonable conceptions of justice aside from his. It is difficult to see what the 
problem is with offering substantial reasons for one conception and its 
implications over others. This is precisely one of the features of ideal theories, to 
offer reasons about possible ways to clarify the balance between competing 
conceptions (Swift 2008). It is because there are such disagreements that higher 
abstraction and grander theorisation are needed (Satz 2012, Robeyns 2012, 
Valentini 2011). Indeed, this is what Rawls’ work sets out to do, to present a 
reasoned discussion about why he thought his conception was the most 
reasonable given the ‘circumstances of justice’ and the conditions in the original 
position (Labude and Pogge 2010).  
Thus, what is important to note is that recognising that indeed many theories can 




sufficient reason to dismiss transcendental theorising altogether. For instance, 
going back to Sen’s example of the flute, one could also make the argument for 
the need to see beyond the non-solution of this exercise instead of being 
completely short-sighted about it. Would it not be fruitful to say that given the wide 
disagreement represented by the three children’s different claims (call them, own 
labour, equality, and virtuosity), additional theoretical discussion is needed to 
illuminate which of them may or may not be reasonably defended depending on 
the context? It seems that by ignoring this route, Sen underestimates the far-
reaching power of these ideal theories in the circumstances of people’s lives46. 
For there might be cases in which it is precisely the reliance on any of these 
theories in making social decisions that is or can be the main source of injustice 
(Heinze 2012), and it can be a deeply and well-grounded idea in society that may 
require transcendental theorising to destabilise it.  
For example, one can imagine that in highly unequal countries (like Mexico) there 
are simply too many things that influence someone’s chances in terms of job 
opportunities, such as whether the person has access to education, her social 
networks, and even how a person looks. One could argue that, under conditions 
of rampant inequality, the simple acceptance of a labour-rewarded arrangement 
of society could end up reproducing and enhancing inequalities. And yet this 
notion of a labour-rewarding arrangement might somehow be defended as a 
reasonable conception of justice by the majority of people so that it remains the 
dominant idea underlying the social decisions about how this unequal society is 
organised. This in turn sheds light on another critical issue, which emphasises the 
relevance of going beyond the uncritical acceptance of a plurality of reasons. This 
is the fact that the dominant conception of justice also informs the identification of 
an injustice and consequently the proposed solutions to rectify it (e.g. by 
influencing the design of policies, institutions and so forth). The problem is that 
these decisions may have further unintended impacts on other sectors of the 
population beyond the immediate injustice that was originally targeted. 
This can be further illustrated by Sen’s appraisal of the case of discrimination. As 
argued earlier, from Sen’s comparative perspective it would not matter that 
different persons may condemn racial discrimination on the basis of different 
principles. Now, let us assume that there was indeed a plurality of reasons behind 
this judgement, but for the sake of the argument, let us assume further that the 
                                                        




large majority judged discrimination wrong due to its negative impact on economic 
growth. This seems perfectly possible within Sen’s rationale. Racial discrimination 
was singled out as unjust even in the absence of an ideal of justice and this is 
sufficient to motivate action to remedy it. What is the caveat in this example? The 
problem with what seems to be an otherwise positive illustration of Sen’s ideas is 
that, amidst the plurality of reasons, there is a dominant underlying ethical 
framework (i.e. utilitarianism) for identifying the wrongdoing and thus for informing 
the way forward for rearranging society. (And it is utilitarian thinking that has 
motivated much of the discussion on social justice to begin with.) Moreover, the 
proposed solution to remedy it, besides affecting (positively hopefully) those 
directly vulnerable to discrimination, can potentially spill over (negatively) to other 
areas of society. As Simmons (2010, p. 22) claims: ‘[t]here is no reason to 
suppose in advance that justice in one domain is independent of justice in other 
domains’ (see also Boot 2012, Robeyns 2012, 2008). 
In other words, once an injustice is identified, there are good reasons to believe 
that the answer to the question why we should remediate it will invariably have an 
effect on the how to remediate it47. That is, it is not only about acknowledging that 
such and such a case is unjust but also about why is unjust (to paraphrase Swift 
200848). This line of argument explains why one could suggest that Sen’s account 
of the flute and his quick acceptance of a plurality of reasons can be short-
sighted—which is surprising since there is no doubt that Sen has taught us a lot 
about the importance of paying attention to the consequences. As such, one could 
argue that Sen’s conclusion is myopic in regard to the great significance of the 
transcendental exercise of presenting reasons in favour of one set of ideals over 
others. 
Although the discussion on this topic might seem somewhat misplaced (since 
Sen’s case was about the unfeasibility of arriving at a unique set of principles 
rather than suggesting that transcendental thinking was not valuable in itself), it is 
important to bear in mind that this is one reason (of the two) why he thinks 
transcendental theory is dismissible for the comparative exercise49. The argument 
                                                        
47 This relationship between the diagnosis of injustice and the remedies will be an important aspect 
to get the guidance of justice-promoting interventions right (chapter V).  
48 Swift (2008) writes: ‘as long as philosophers can tell us why the ideal would be ideal, and not 
simply that it is, much of what they actually do when they do “ideal theory” is likely to help with the 
evaluation of options …’ (p. 365; emphasis in original).  
49 Sen (2012) insists that he does not intend to suggest that transcendental theorising is redundant, 
all things considered. Rather, his point is that it is redundant for the comparative exercise. As this 




presented here might suggest otherwise. Of course, this does not imply that we 
can expect, at least in the near future, that it is feasible to have a unique 
conception of justice, as Sen suggests. Yet Sen’s feasibility constraint might not 
in itself undermine the intrinsic and practical value of the goal of ideal theorising 
on discussions about justice (and this is probably why Sen is sceptical rather than 
conclusive about the feasibility constraint). Nevertheless, although this brief 
discussion tentatively suggests that transcendental theorising might be relevant 
for the comparative exercise, this may not be enough to show that it is indeed 
expedient for the aim of reducing injustice. Indeed, Sen argues that, even if the 
identification of a transcendental conception of justice were possible, it would be 
insufficient and unnecessary for the comparative exercise. The next sub-section 
examines this claim. 
 
3.3.2 Evaluating the redundancy constraint: A reappraisal  
Sen makes two distinct practical judgements against the transcendental exercise: 
‘A transcendental identification is…neither necessary nor sufficient for arriving at 
comparative judgments of justice’ (IJ, p. 102). The (in)sufficiency of 
transcendental justice to provide an all-purpose framework to advance justice 
reaffirms the previous discussion on the ideal/nonideal debate. Sen’s arguments 
make clear that a transcendental identification is not all we want from a theory of 
justice because it does not tell us ‘how we should assess whether some social 
change would advance the cause of justice or hinder it’ (Sen 2006, p. 236)50. 
There is little opposition to this conclusion. But although the sufficiency argument 
may not be disputable, the claim that a (Rawlsian) transcendental theory is not 
necessary for comparative judgements of justice is what is problematic (e.g. see 
Boot 2012, Robeyns 2012, Stemplowska and Swift 2012, Simmons 2010, 
Marjoribanks 2010, Valentini 2012, 2011, Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, 
Schemmel 2011, Osmani 2010, Biondo 2010, Stemplowska 2008). It is simply not 
self-evident why we can, should, or must exclude transcendental principles from 
the evaluation of two other non-best alternatives. 
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alternatives can be extrapolated from Rawls’ theory. Still, the point that Sen is trying to make is that 
a transcendental theory does not intend to solve the problem of how to compare between infinite 





Sen argues that to compare two options there is no need to invoke or even know 
what the best of all options is. Reflecting further about this argument indicates 
that it may not be as straightforward as it seems. For instance, if we take Sen’s 
example of art as a real practical exercise, it is not at all clear why, when valuing 
between a Picasso and a Dali, it will make no difference to know which the ‘best’ 
of all existent pictures is. If that picture would set what—if possible—other 
paintings should strive for and why this is so, surely it would have a role to play. 
In fact, to arrive at an ‘intersection of partial orderings’, that is, to agree whether 
a Picasso or a Dali is to be superior, first we would have to know under which 
principles those paintings have to be evaluated. It is not irrelevant to know what 
we are striving for while ranking the two possibilities (e.g. precision, abstraction, 
aesthetics, or all of those and what weight each should have) (see Boot 2012 for 
a similar point). 
In his defence, Sen could assert (and this would be ‘an assertion rather than 
something that is established in any clear way’; Sen 2006, p. 225; IJ, p. 105) that 
there could be an agreement on both (principles and the choice between Picasso 
or Dali) after ‘public reasoning’. Note that the agreed principles to compare 
between the two paintings, however, would need to be for that specific exercise 
alone; otherwise, Sen would be suggesting that a transcendental identification of 
principles is possible via public reasoning (which is inconsistent with his own 
feasibility constraint). If this were the case, the problem is that these comparative 
improvements may also be short-sighted and hence might run counter to the long-
term goal of making the world less unjust. As stated before, there is simply no 
reason to assume that justice-enhancements ‘can be pursued “partially” or in 
piecemeal fashion’ (Simmons 2010, p. 22; see also Stemplowska and Swift 2012, 
Gilabert 2012, Pogge and Alvarez 2010). So what this exercise shows is that even 
if there is no need to identify the transcendental best picture of all, there is indeed 
a necessity to know which principle(s) will make a picture qualify as the best (or 
at least better than another). And this task to develop principles, integrate them, 
and give reasons to support them is precisely the territory of transcendental (ideal) 
theories (Boot 2012). 
This reasoning becomes even clearer in the mountains example that Sen 
presents. He says knowing ‘with great certainty, that Everest is the tallest 
mountain in the world…is neither needed, nor particularly helpful’ to compare 




we know which one is taller only because they are being compared in terms of 
height, and we know objectively what height is and how to measure it. But they 
could also be compared on the basis of a different criterion and the ranking 
between the two mountains could change (Boot 2012). Besides, contrary to the 
definition of height, the mere concept of justice is in dispute and it is not 
unidimensional51. Hence, even scholars who are sympathetic to Sen’s proposal 
concede that transcendental principles (rather than the distance from the ideal 
societal arrangement as a whole) can be useful ‘for the comparative evaluation of 
less than perfectly just situations’ (Osmani 2010; p. 606).  
It seems then that Sen’s rejection of the necessity argument might not be 
sufficiently supported. It should therefore not be taken for granted that his 
comparative framework could succeed in its task of advancing justice without 
relying on transcendental theories. Of course, in a strict sense, a comparison 
between two alternatives can be done without having any ideal in mind. However, 
it is hard to think that this is what Sen is trying to defend as this would mean that 
he is willing to leave the value of justice to the toss of a coin (i.e. whatever 
outcome emerged from the comparative exercise). Yet, not surprisingly, this 
interpretation of Sen’s work is not easily discarded. For example, Biondo (2010) 
writes:  
Following Sen’s argumentation it seems that any reason is relevant [to 
choose between alternatives]; what matters is to reach an agreement. The 
possibility to achieve an agreement seems to be the only valuable 
condition for a decision if, just as it seems, we do not have a shared ideal 
about what is to be considered good in that circumstance (p. 193; personal 
translation). 
In the following chapter, when scrutinising Sen’s conceptual framework, we will 
see that this might not necessarily be Sen’s position in reality. However, his 
reliance on partial agreements through public reasoning remains problematic. As 
will be explored, the problem is that an agreement under the messy 
circumstances of the ‘real world’ can hardly guarantee that the outcome will be in 
line with justice, as many historical events show (e.g. Hitler being considered the 
‘best’ leader by the majority of the German population). For the moment, one can 
conclude that, if one accepts the reasons presented here about the necessity of 
                                                        




transcendental theories, then Sen’s confidence in ‘partial orderings’ might not be 
able to escape transcendental theorising if he is committed to the aim of reducing 
injustice.  
From examining Sen’s arguments about the feasibility and redundancy 
constraints that transcendental theories face for the specific purpose of pairwise 
comparisons, one can derive the following conclusions. First, transcendental 
theorising has an intrinsic and an instrumental role for issues of justice regardless 
of the feasibility constraint—and even in ‘evident’ cases of basic justice. This was 
justified due to the interconnection between the grounds under which an injustice 
is identified (why to remediate it) and the implementation of the remedies (how to 
remediate it). Second, a comparative exercise necessarily involves taking into 
account—at least—some transcendental information such as its ideal principles. 
This is related to what was earlier called the ‘target’ role of transcendental 
theories. Thus, even in the presence of supposedly indisputable cases of 
injustice, such as racial discrimination, for which apparently the ‘urgency’ role of 
transcendental theories is unnecessary, a transcendental identification was 
deemed necessary for its ‘target’ role and for the ‘ground’ under which injustice is 
identified.  
One can therefore conclude that whereas the sufficiency argument shows that the 
transcendental answer to the question ‘What is a just society?’ is not all we want 
from a theory of justice, the necessity argument shows that the answer to ‘What 
makes a society just?’ (i.e. the principles of justice) is part of what we want from 
an effective approach towards advancing justice. From this, it follows that the 
question that Sen finds redundant is not ‘What is a just society?’ but rather the 
highly specific question ‘What is the perfectly just arrangement of institutions that 
guarantees justice regardless of the context?’ and this is something that Rawls’ 
ideal theory does not answer. That is, Sen wrongly misrepresents Rawls’ 
‘transcendental’ solution as being conformed by a unique universal set of perfect 
institutions (hence Sen’s labelling of ‘transcendental institutionalism’). But, as 
Valentini (2011) underlines:  
… on a Rawlsian view, the institutional arrangements which make a 
society just vary depending on the nature of the society in question, the 
character of its citizens and so forth… In short … there is no such thing as 




ordered principles (equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and 
the difference principle) which can be realized by a number of different 
institutional arrangements (p. 304; see also Freeman 2012). 
 
3.4 Sen’s Idea of Justice as a nonideal approach to justice? 
The previous section showed that transcendental (ideal) principles do have 
something to say in the comparative framework to advance justice. They are 
practically relevant not only in the ranking of alternatives by providing the 
principles of evaluation but also in partially determining the remedy (or the action 
needed) to rectify an injustice. At first, these inferences might sound as if a 
Rawlsian transcendental theory of justice is valuable solely for its usefulness to 
the comparative exercise. This conclusion is, however, better to be avoided. The 
features highlighted here make reference only to its input for the specific practical 
demands of comparative justice. The fact that a transcendental theory is more 
than just an aid to the comparative exercise may be clearer if we take into account 
two implicit ideas. First, by failing to demonstrate that transcendental theories are 
unnecessary for partial orderings, the comparative framework fails to be a real 
alternative to Rawlsian-style transcendental theories. Second, this shows that a 
comparative framework may not be able to be sufficient on its own for the purpose 
of reducing injustice. Ultimately, this analysis reaffirmed the previous conclusion 
that Rawlsian-like theories of justice function like an all-encompassing frame for 
justice-enhancing efforts. Similar to the ideal/nonideal debate, it seems thus that 
completely rejecting transcendental (ideal) theories is akin to failing to appreciate 
their non-negligible role for matters of practical justice, which in turn can be 
counterproductive.  
This indicates that Sen’s comparative framework might best be seen as a 
potential nonideal theory that can complement, rather than replace, the 
inescapable incompleteness of transcendental theories. Surely, that Sen’s 
proposal can be easily related to nonideal theories is not a big surprise as he 
constantly underlines his concern for being a practical and reality-grounded 
approach (‘the main use of the theory of comparative justice would be in making 
comparisons between feasible possibilities’ [p. 62, emphasis added]; ’if we are 
trying to wrestle with injustices in the world in which live…we also have to think 




As a result, consistent with the ideal/nonideal debate, this implies that a 
transcendental ideal theory of justice is to be seen as prior to nonideal theory, and 
it could be in the latter that the value of Sen’s approach lies. Indeed, it seems that 
Sen’s comparative framework fits well with the kind of complement that ideal 
theory necessitates (see also Pogge and Alvarez 2010). In Rawls’ (1993) words: 
Nonideal theory asks how the ideal conception of the society of well-
ordered peoples might be achieved, or at least worked toward, generally 
in gradual steps; it looks for policies and courses of action that are likely 
to be effective and politically possible as well as morally permissible for 
that purpose. So conceived, nonideal theory presupposes that ideal theory 
is already on hand. For until the ideal is identified, at least in outline, 
nonideal theory lacks an objective-a goal-by reference to which its 
questions can be answered. And while the specific conditions of our world 
at any given time—the status quo—do not determine the ideal conception 
of the society of well-ordered peoples, those conditions do affect answers 
to the questions of nonideal theory (p. 60). 
This quote and the analysis presented above do give the impression that it is this 
nonideal effort which Sen’s comparative approach takes on board. But we should 
not jump too fast in that direction. In order to consider Sen’s comparative 
approach as a nonideal theory, one first needs to show that it can be more than 
simply a comparative tool. Indeed, this chapter showed that, besides being 
concerned with the practical aim of reducing injustice here and now, nonideal 
theory has to show that it can go in the direction of an ideal of justice. For, as 
Rawls suggests in the above quote, without an ideal, nonideal theory lacks ‘an 
objective—a goal—by reference to which its questions can be answered’. That is, 
one could only expect that the principles (or the methodological content) that 
motivate a nonideal approach cannot but be in line with the principles of justice 
identified by a transcendental ideal theory. 
Thus, in order to assess Sen’s approach as a nonideal theory, it is important to 
conceptualise formally what exactly the role of a nonideal approach is for the 
purpose of advancing justice. This will illustrate further that ‘[n]on[ideal] theorising 




(Robeyns 2012 p. 160; emphasis in original)52. The following chapter expands on 
this in order to assess whether Sen’s methodological proposal is well suited as a 
nonideal theory for reducing injustice.  
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However, this is at odds with the way in which these terms are understood here. This dissertation 





IV. Sen’s transcendental nonideal approach 
 
The previous chapter established a more formal distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theory. After this conceptual clarification, demanding (full) practical 
guidance from ideal theories to reduce injustice as we experience it here and now 
seems to be misplaced. However, the pressing demand for practical assistance 
in the task of dealing with injustice remains. Theorising how to transform unjust 
situations is the embodiment of the urgent normative claim of nonideal theories 
(regardless of whether an ideal just society is assumed to be at hand or not). This 
is the territory in which nonideal theories are discussed and assessed. This 
chapter is concerned with the nonideal component of the comprehensive 
framework presented in the introductory chapter, its content, its specific role and 
its usefulness for the aim of counteracting the reproduction of injustice. 
Particularly, it evaluates Sen’s Idea of Justice (IJ) in such an endeavour. The 
previous chapter concluded that Sen’s critique failed in its attempt to displace 
ideal theorising, and reasons were presented to categorise Sen’s approach as a 
nonideal possibility to advance justice. This is precisely what is analysed here, his 
nonideal framework per se, what is referred to as his ‘methodological proposal’ 
(i.e. its conceptual framework to enhance justice). 
The chapter starts by introducing a formal (even if broad) understanding of what 
is expected from a nonideal theory. It then presents Sen’s methodological 
proposal in detail in order to evaluate to what extent it could be a useful proposal 
to deal with injustice in the world. In this process, it analyses Sen’s comparativist 
proposition in its original form, that is, as a self-standing proposal. The chapter 
spells out the non-negligible vulnerabilities of Sen’s approach, its highly 
demanding content for it to be practically useful here and now, and how an ideal 
theory can aid Sen’s methodological proposal in this task. The chapter advances 
two main conclusions: (1) it reaffirms the complementarity between ideal and 
nonideal theory, hence the need for a dual framework; and (2) it identifies Sen’s 
IJ as a transcendental nonideal theory. This implies that, even when connected 
to an ideal theory, it still needs further analysis of the extent to which it succeeds 





4.1 The nonideal level of justice 
In order to identify Sen’s approach as a nonideal theory, it is important to define 
what a nonideal theory is and what it should do. This section discusses a 
conceptualisation of nonideal theory and its role in developing a comprehensive 
framework able to orient justice-enhancing political action. Following the 
discussion of the previous chapter, it is possible to delineate the boundaries and 
the characteristics that nonideal theories must comply with. Broadly defined, the 
features of nonideal theories are the following: 
1) Feasible: the conceptual framework of nonideal theories is necessarily 
situated within the real (nonideal) circumstances of the world as we know 
it (i.e. the feasibility requirement). 
 
2) Transitional: nonideal theories deal with the identification of procedures, 
achievable policies, background conditions, concepts, and/or outcomes 
that best serve the aim of advancing justice/reducing injustice while 
leading towards the ideal (i.e. the transitional requirement). 
 
3) Morally desirable: nonideal theories are complementary and thus 
connected to ideal theory. As such, their propositions have to be in line 
with the demands of ideal theory; that is, they need to take into account 
the moral costs and moral benefits involved in the transition to the ideal 
(i.e. the moral desirability requirement). 
These features reiterate the point that the complementarity between ideal and 
nonideal theory is essential for reducing injustice. Nonideal theory is 
complementary because it deals with the question of how to advance justice once 
an injustice is identified; and it is transitional because it has to shed light on 
morally desirable courses of action that best serve the path towards the ideal, i.e. 
once we know what we should aim for and why (see Gilabert 2008 for a helpful 
discussion on this point). Therefore, a proper nonideal theory is one that 
simultaneously embodies these three requirements. These characteristics are 




their degree of fulfilment. But, generally, this nonideal level remains primarily 
normative53; it theorises about the best alternative to move towards the ideal. 
With this initial layout of nonideal theory, it will be possible to analyse Sen’s 
approach and his methodological proposal. Of course, as originally presented, 
Sen’s comparative framework does not see itself in these terms. Nevertheless, 
one should note that there is no fundamental restriction in his approach to 
foreclose this possibility. As with his previous well-known work on capabilities, 
Sen’s position is open to interpretation54. In relation to his capability approach, 
this flexibility is seen as one of its biggest strengths (Robeyns 2016, Deneulin 
2014b, Robeyns 2006); the question is whether this flexibility can also be a quality 
within his overall approach to justice. The analysis in this chapter will suggest that 
Sen’s attempt to assist in an effective way in the promotion of justice is better 
realised by recognising formally the nonideal condition of his proposal. Although 
this is something that Sen himself rejects, this chapter shows that it could be a 
much more fruitful understanding of his position. 
 
4.2 Sen’s methodological proposal to advance justice 
This section deals with the content of Sen’s framework (i.e. how injustice can be 
reduced). Consistent with nonideal theories, Sen’s primary concern is to propose 
a more practical framework closer to people’s lives and to actual injustice-
reduction policies. For this purpose, he proposes a comparativist method. Hence, 
what composes Sen’s methodological proposal is the conceptual framework that 
enables this comparative exercise to be put into practice.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sen expresses his critique of Rawlsian 
justice with the dual concept of ‘transcendental institutionalism’. The first of these 
concepts corresponds to his point of departure—which was demonstrated to be 
flawed—whereas the second part of his critique (institutionalism) is related to his 
methodological position. In essence, it calls for a shift of the subject matter of 
justice. Particularly, it calls for a view of justice that is ‘ultimately connected with 
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empirically based aspect. While acknowledging the significance of both aspects, the focus here is 
solely on the former: the nonideal level of theorisation. 
54  For instance, further development of his conception of public reasoning is needed. (For 




the way people’s lives go’ (IJ, p. x) and not merely with institutions (as in the 
Rawlsian conceptualisation of the basic structure of society). He refers to his 
approximation as a ‘realization-focused understanding’ (IJ, p. 7) of justice. With 
this move, Sen invites us to regard justice as a broader concept which, although 
involving issues about how institutions should be arranged, is more concerned 
with the kind of lives that people can actually lead within those institutions, what 
he calls ‘social realisations’. This distinction is further illustrated by the use of two 
Indian concepts which refer to different conceptualisations of justice: niti and 
nyaya. The former is concerned with the institutional organisation and its 
corresponding behavioural rules, whereas the latter (nyaya) is related to Sen’s 
own conceptualisation in which the scope of evaluation is the broader social 
realisation that ultimately emerges from the institutional base (e.g. see p. x, p. xvi, 
pp. 6–8, p. 18, pp. 67–69, pp. 82–83, p. 86). 
One could note, then, that Sen’s methodological core is the desire to connect the 
conception of justice with people’s actual lives by taking into account the actual 
outcome generated in a social context. At first, this acknowledgement places 
Sen’s comprehensive view of justice at risk of perfectionism and 
consequentialism. Indeed, his well-known capability approach—whose role is 
determinant in Sen’s IJ—can be interpreted in this way and has been interpreted 
in such a way before (e.g. Deneulin 2002; see also Robeyns 2016). However, 
Sen tries to avoid these charges by placing himself within the liberal perspective 
via the full content of his methodological proposal, i.e. the relevant aspects that 
form the toolkit which would guide the course of action of his proposal. In general, 
Sen’s comparative exercise to advance justice is possible via three aspects: 
reasoning, agency, and freedom as capability.  
 
4.2.1 Institutions as instrumental  
Sen’s IJ is concerned with something more than striving for a just ‘basic structure 
of society’. The reason, he claims, is that even if institutions could be perfectly 
arranged according to an ideal conceptualisation of justice, there is nothing that 
can guarantee either the complicity of individuals to such institutions or that the 
results would be successful in ameliorating people’s lives. These worries have 
two important implications. First, it implies that taking notice of actual behaviour 




society; second, it implies that outcomes are non-negligible in the evaluation of 
justice55. This line of reasoning can be summarised by the following quotes:  
There are crucial inadequacies in this overpowering concentration on 
institutions (where behaviour is assumed to be appropriately compliant), 
rather than on the lives that people are able to lead (IJ, p. xi). 
The nature of the society that would result from any given set of institutions 
must, of course, depend also on non-institutional features such as actual 
behaviours of people and their social interactions (IJ, p. 6). 
… institutions have to be chosen not only in line with the nature of the 
society in question, but also co-dependently on the actual behaviour 
patterns that can be expected even if—and even after—a political 
conception of justice is accepted by all (IJ, p. 69). 
In this way, Sen’s IJ asks us to see institutions as merely instrumental in the 
pursuit of justice, that is, as assistants in the promotion of justice rather than being 
treated as ‘good in themselves’ or as ‘manifestations of justice’ themselves (IJ, p. 
xii, 82–83). Attention should be shifted from the process of bringing justice where 
institutions are merely instrumental to the final result of what really happens to 
people. Using Sen’s own conceptualisation, the idea is that a just niti does not 
guarantee a desirable nyaya. For example, in Mexico, there are manifold of 
examples of formal institutions being insufficient to guarantee the desired 
behavioural outcome, such as non-discriminatory laws. But although this 
distinction is intuitively sound, one could also wonder what exactly a desired 
outcome means? Is Sen implying that the evaluation should be based on 
achieving the ‘right’ outcomes? In other words, is he advocating in favour of going 
back to a consequentialist mode of evaluation such as those which were strongly 
criticised by Rawls?  
Sen asserts that justice evaluations do have to focus on outcomes. But this is not 
in the sense of their usual conceptualisation, which is as merely ‘culmination 
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clearly states that individual behaviour has to comply with the requirements of justice identified in 
the original position and that the principles themselves make ‘room to build in sensitivity to 
behavioural’ concerns (IJ, p. 78). Still this acknowledgement might not be sufficient because Rawls’ 
primary concern was to define what would make a society qualify as just and thus what principles 
should be honoured and embodied in the basic structure of society (while assuming people’s 




outcomes’, meaning, simple end results that do not take into account any other 
relevant information about how those outcomes were achieved (IJ, p. 215). This 
is the kind of information that characterises consequentialism in the narrow 
understanding of utilitarianism. However, Sen argues, there is nothing that 
impedes including more important information into the evaluation of a state of 
affairs, such as issues of fairness, freedoms, and rights, which are extremely 
relevant aspects for questions of justice. Sen calls this broader understanding of 
consequentialism ‘comprehensive outcomes’. These are evaluations which take 
note of the process leading to a ‘culmination outcome’ (see also Sen 1999a, p. 
27). It is this notion of ‘comprehensive outcome’ which allows us to capture the 
notion of social realisations in the sense of nyaya where not only ‘culmination 
outcomes’ matter but also actions, relations and agencies matter as part of the 
process. This notion of paying attention to the end result as well as to the process 
leading to it is a chief part of Sen’s overall approach. For instance, it is crucial for 
understanding his conception of freedom and its importance for the comparative 
evaluation. 
 
4.2.2 Freedom as capabilities  
So far, according to Sen, justice has to be concerned with social realisations 
which account for what comes out as a result of a given set of institutions, and 
this in turn has to be appraised via comprehensive outcomes in which not only 
the result but also the process is taken into account. Yet, despite these 
clarifications, it is still not clear what form these processes and outcomes should 
take to be acceptable. That is, what would render any social realisation a good or 
a desirable social realisation? What would make a social realisation better in 
comparative terms than another? In this regard, it was pointed out earlier that 
Sen’s preoccupation goes beyond institutions as they fail to capture adequately 
what really happens to the people living within those institutions. Hence, in Sen’s 
account, what really matters for assessing social arrangements are individuals, 
specifically, ‘the freedoms that [individuals] actually have to choose between 
different kinds of life’ (IJ, p. 18).  
Thus, in line with Sen’s previous work on development (see Sen 1999a; see also 
1999b, 1990, 1985, 1980), enhancing people’s freedom is to be the ultimate 




Sen directly reconceptualises the notion of development as a matter of enhancing 
justice through the expansion of individual freedom. Freedom is seen as valuable 
in two ways: It is valuable regarding the real opportunities to choose between 
different kinds of life and ends as well as in the process itself of creating and 
obtaining those opportunities. Freedom therefore has two different aspects: the 
opportunity and the process aspect. This distinction is crucial for Sen’s 
understanding of what being free really means and thus for his whole approach, 
for three fundamental reasons: (1) It provides a broader scope for appraising 
different states of affairs, (2) it highlights the need to capture this understanding 
of freedom in the valuation of comprehensive outcomes through a certain metric, 
and (3) it emphasises individuals’ agency in both instances: in the states of affairs 
themselves to choose the life a person has reason to value and in the process of 
achieving a certain state of affairs56. 
To illustrate the relevance of both of these aspects of freedom, let us suppose a 
society, such as Mexico a few decades ago, where ethnicity affected the 
possibility of being educated since there were no schools near indigenous 
communities. Let us then suppose that rights and liberties for indigenous 
education were formally and institutionally settled so that schools were 
constructed in indigenous communities. However, despite having this formal 
possibility to be educated, this did not necessarily guarantee that indigenous 
children would attend school. According to Sen, this highlights the problem of a 
pure institutional focus, since it would assume that justice has already been done 
(though this is debatable from the Rawlsian approach). Yet, as Sen would rightly 
argue, this conclusion misses something important because this outcome 
(indigenous children not attending school) can be the result of other social 
processes and social relations which thwart their right and liberty of going to 
school. One possibility is that given their long history of repression and 
discrimination, or owing to high levels of poverty which push children into work, 
indigenous people might simply not exercise their liberties and in consequence 
they simply continue the uneducated lives they have led so far. 
From Sen’s perspective, the common ground in both of these alternative 
scenarios is that there is a lack of real freedom for indigenous people to choose; 
the opportunity in the formal sense to be educated exists, but they do not have a 
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real choice to be educated. Therefore, to understand this situation accurately, it 
cannot be reduced to either solely the process or solely the culmination outcome. 
This is because both—having the opportunity to be educated and having the real 
choice to do so—are critically important to evaluate a state of affairs in the light of 
justice. Consequently, having a certain way to adequately capture this situation 
cannot be but central to any framework aiming to advance justice or reduce justice 
in the real world57. 
Hence, if the latter situation is considered relevant from the point of view of justice, 
then the question which arises is: which kind of measurement best captures these 
aspects of freedom that Sen is concerned about (the real freedom someone has 
to achieve a valuable goal in real life)? The answer to this question is quite 
meaningful for a nonideal approach as it determines how justice is to be assessed 
in practice. (That is, whereas the ideal aspect of justice responds to ‘what should 
we aim for and why?’, an essential aspect of nonideal theory is to respond to ‘how 
do we assess justice improvements or fall backs?’) As such, it determines which 
specific information is considered pertinent to compare in order to judge whether 
a specific social or personal situation is more or less advantaged than another in 
terms of freedom. It also serves as a criterion for discerning between valid or 
invalid claims of justice in order to redirect political action in the relevant direction. 
In short, it determines the metric—or what is sometimes called the space of 
evaluation or the ‘informational basis’—of an approach to justice.  
In this regard, the two main contenders for answering the previous question and 
thus presenting a freedom-based metric are Rawls’ primary goods and Sen’s 
notion of capability58. Both are characteristically concerned with advancing human 
freedom but in a somehow different way. Sen makes the distinction between 
Rawlsian primary goods and his capability approach by contrasting a resource-
based and a freedom-based metrics respectively. As the name suggests, a 
resource-based assessment of justice is considered to direct its attention towards 
all-purpose means to freedom, whereas his own freedom-based assessment 
focuses directly on human lives themselves, on ‘what people can obtain from the 
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parts of the process aspect of freedom and thus of agency. 
58 Rawlsian primary goods are not very relevant to his ideal principles of justice, though they are 
very relevant to the nonideal aspect of his theory since they are considered his main metric for 
distributive issues. For further information about Rawls’ nonideal aspect, see, for example, Culp 




means…[or] the extent of the freedom that a person actually has’ (Sen 1990, p. 
115; emphasis in original)59.  
On the one hand, as briefly mentioned in chapter II, Rawlsian primary goods are 
considered to be means or resources that ‘every rational [wo]man is presumed to 
want’ (TJ, p. 62) to advance different life plans (i.e. ends/goals/objectives) along 
with the two moral powers that a person has (the capacity to rationally revise one’s 
ends and the capacity for a sense of justice). These primary goods include basic 
liberties, income and wealth, freedom of movement and choice of occupation, 
powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, and the social 
bases of self-respect (TJ, p. 62, 90–95). On the other hand, Sen argues that 
attention should not be bestowed to the means themselves but rather to what the 
person is actually able to do and be with those goods, that is, to the actual freedom 
someone has to achieve valuable doings and beings (e.g. being able to be 
educated, be healthy, walk, read, and spend time with family and friends). Hence, 
for Sen, a capability-based assessment focuses on the real opportunities 
someone has (i.e. freedom) to choose between different combinations of beings 
and doings that people have reason to value. Sen refers to the various (infinite) 
doings and beings as ‘functionings’ whereas the actual freedom (or the 
substantive freedom) to achieve them would be the corresponding capability. The 
distinction between functionings and capabilities can be further illustrated by 
referring to the distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive 
outcomes mentioned above. Whereas a focus on culmination outcomes would be 
akin to a focus on ‘functionings’, the concept of capability would be more akin 
(though not perfectly) to the notion of comprehensive outcomes (particularly to 
the opportunity aspect of freedom) (IJ, p. 232). Elsewhere, Sen has defined these 
concepts as follows: 
Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve 
alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to 
achieve various lifestyles)… While the combination of a person's 
functionings reflects her actual achievements, the capability set 
represents the freedom to achieve: the alternative functioning 
combinations from which this person can choose (Sen 1999a, p. 75). 
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[Capability is the] ‘actual freedom of choice a person has over alternative 
lives [functionings] that he or she can lead’ (Sen 1990, p. 114). 
Consistent with the discussion above, Sen maintains that it is in the capability 
space that a freedom-based assessment of justice should focus and not in the 
resources someone holds or in the functionings or achievements themselves. 
That is, it is not the actions or states of being themselves (being educated or 
healthy, walking, etc.) that matter to make interpersonal comparisons but the 
capability to achieve them (being able to be educated, being able to be healthy, 
being able to walk, etc.). 
The debate between Rawls’ primary goods and Sen’s capability approach as 
metrics of justice continues today but this dissertation does not engage with it 
(see Pereira 2013, Brighouse and Robeyns 2010, Robeyns 2009b, Sagovsky 
2006). Only the main arguments and those features considered to be relevant to 
the dissertation’s purposes will be discussed. Sen’s argument can be reduced to 
the assertion that, by focusing on the means to freedom and not on freedom itself, 
a resource-based metric does not capture the interpersonal variability to 
successfully convert such means into valuable ends adequately. For example, the 
ability to convert income and wealth into actual wellbeing (doings and beings), 
such as spending time with friends at night, will vary across people (e.g. if a 
society imposes more restriction to women than to men). In this respect, Sen 
identifies different sources for intersubjective variability in the conversion of a 
bundle of goods into actual functionings that people may value doing/being. 
These are generally referred to as ‘conversion factors’, which include personal 
factors (e.g. age, proneness to illness, physical conditions), social factors (e.g. 
social norms, public services, social valuations), and environmental factors (e.g. 
climate, geographical location) (Robeyns 2011, 2005; see also IJ, p. 255; Sen 
1999a, pp. 70–71)60. 
Rawls’ response to such criticism is signalling that focusing on a set of capabilities 
will promote a certain (fully or partial) comprehensive conception of a good life 
and thus fail to respect the plurality of conceptions equally61. Indeed, someone 
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could argue that implicit in Sen’s criticism of Rawlsian primary goods is a 
normative demand about what those ‘goods’ (liberties, opportunities, power and 
prerogatives, income and wealth, and the social bases for self-respect) have to 
do for people’s lives in order for them to be considered well used. 
Sen evades such a criticism by emphasising that someone’s capabilities reflect ‘a 
person’s freedom to choose between alternative lives (functioning combinations), 
and its value need not be derived from one particular “comprehensive doctrine” 
demanding one specific way of living’ (Sen 1990, p. 118; emphasis in original). 
Rather, Sen’s critique of primary goods is that they fail to recognise that persons 
are different and as such ‘equality in holdings of primary goods or resources can 
go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different 
persons’ (Sen 1990, p. 115) regardless of the comprehensive good they pursue. 
That is, even if two persons are guided by exactly the same comprehensive view 
or by a different one, a disadvantaged person (e.g. a person with a congenital 
illness or someone in special social circumstances) will always achieve less from 
the same amount of goods than others (see also Sen 1980). As the categories of 
conversion factors highlight, the point is that achievements can be affected by 
different personal, environmental, or social processes which are independent 
from any comprehensive notion of the good (see also Pereira 2013). In this way 
and by repeatedly emphasising that the focus is on freedom understood as 
capabilities and not in achievements themselves, Sen seems to avoid the charge 
of perfectionism (i.e. promoting a partial comprehensive view). For this reason, 
he argues, the metric of capabilities is to be superior to that of primary goods. 
Still, whether primary goods succumb to the conversion difficulties that capability 
scholars point out remains controversial. There are, however, some conclusions 
(even if partial) one can derive from this debate. In general, it appears to be fairly 
accepted that capabilities are better suited to appraise the real facts and the social 
circumstances that could facilitate or obstruct the freedom of individuals in real 
life. In other words, focusing on the real freedom that people actually have (i.e. 
capabilities) to be or do this or that, rather than focusing only on the resources or 
means available to people, shows more sensitivity to capture people’s real-life 
vulnerability to different social circumstances (Pereira 2013; see also Robeyns 
2009a, 2006, 2005). But since real people’s opportunities are also affected by the 
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resources that someone holds, it is safe to assert that primary goods are a subset 
of the capabilities required for someone to enjoy real freedom (Obregón 2014, 
Pereira 2013, Robeyns 2009b). The emphasis on ‘real life’ is obviously critical to 
distinguish one approach from the other but at the same time it naturally sets the 
underlying connection between the two. Whereas primary goods emerge from a 
thoroughly developed ideal theory, the capability approach tells us about the need 
to go beyond those primary goods when situated in real life. One could say that 
the capability approach is a nonideal extension of the ideal primary goods. In fact, 
this is recognised by Sen himself (IJ, p. 66, 234; see also Sen 1990, 1980).  
Yet, although Sen’s metric of capabilities is undeniably valuable as a metric of 
justice, there are still certain aspects that need further clarification to fully 
understand the conceptual framework on which Sen’s approach relies. 
Particularly, there are at least two issues related to the use of capabilities which 
are relevant for this dissertation. First, recognising that the capability space can 
be a better proxy to capture people’s real opportunity to do or be regardless of 
what they have reason to value does not tell us anything about which capabilities 
are to be promoted through political action. Ultimately, what this acknowledges is 
that the concept of capabilities captures well the opportunity aspect of freedom 
but not necessarily the process aspect of freedom (IJ, pp. 295–296). The latter 
(the process aspect) includes both the processes under which valuable 
opportunities themselves are generated and the processes under which the 
capabilities/opportunities considered relevant to be expanded are to be chosen, 
which in turn are critical for ranking alternative social arrangements. A second 
issue is that, although one may agree that Sen’s concept of capability itself avoids 
perfectionism, there is also the further question of whether the identification of a 
priority list of capabilities (either full or partial) can avoid the charge of 
perfectionism. Sen’s IJ tries to provide an answer to both of these concerns by 
underlining the last two features of his methodological framework: people’s 
characterisation as agents and the role of reasoning. 
 
4.2.3 Reasoning: The perspective of the moral person 
As seen in chapter III, Sen’s starting point is to recognise that in public life there 
are not only plural comprehensive views about how to live a good life but also 




of reaching a final say on what perfect justice entails. Yet he is positive about the 
possibility of achieving partial agreements between plural views of justice via the 
use of reason. Thus, for Sen’s methodological approach, reasoning between 
individuals is one of the most important features of his Idea of Justice. The large 
number of pages Sen’s IJ dedicates to the central issue of reasoning makes it 
clear that it and its exercise via public discussion are central not only to his work 
but also to the pursuit of justice in general (Deneulin 2010, 2011a).  
Hence, Sen, like Rawls, strongly relies on the use of reason as a non-negligible 
precondition for the discovery of what justice requires. Sen’s approach strongly 
relies on public reasoning for the purpose of advancing justice. In his proposal, 
public reasoning via active and inclusive participation is the mechanism that 
serves two relevant purposes: (1) the collective identification of valuable 
capabilities as well as the different weights they can take within specific contexts 
and (2) a collective decision about the justness of different states of affairs ranked 
in terms of the previously identified capabilities enjoyed by individuals. As such, 
this method of plural reasoning accounts for the process aspect of freedom and 
attempts to evade the charge of perfectionism. In this way, reasoning and freedom 
are the two central ideas through which Sen’s IJ ‘links development with justice’ 
(Deneulin 2011a, p. 788). 
A close reading of Sen’s work, however, reveals that there is a very special 
understanding of what the demands of reason entail and the purpose it serves. 
The form of reasoning that Sen advocates could be called something like the 
moral perspective of reasoning62. It is different from the narrow conceptualisation 
of selfish reason of the economic discipline and is also a departure from the 
Rawlsian characterisation needed from a social contract perspective. In essence, 
Sen’s moral perspective of reasoning can be reconstructed as containing at least 
three interconnected basic features: (1) it goes beyond the limited view of reason 
of the so-called Homo economicus, (2) it has to be objective (i.e. impartial) and 
have universal reach, and (3) it is conducive to morally desirable behaviour.  
(1) Reasoning beyond single-minded self-interest. Reason and rationality, Sen 
argues, cannot be equated with the narrow view of self-interest, because ‘human 
beings can easily have good reason also to pay some attention to objectives other 
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than single-minded pursuit of self-interest’ (IJ, p. 179). For instance, a person 
could decide to act in accordance with ‘self-imposed constraints of ‘decent 
behaviour’’ (IJ, p. 182) rather than the single-minded pursuit of one’s own self-
interest, and this would still be a representation of rationality. Therefore, a 
conceptualisation of rationality has to be broad enough to be able to 
accommodate these different types of reasons that can guide human behaviour. 
In order to do this, Sen argues, a conception of rationality has to include a 
connection between what would be rational for someone to choose and what the 
reasons behind that choosing are63. In Sen’s words:  
Rationality of choice, in this view, is primarily a matter of basing our 
choices—explicitly or by implication—on reasoning that we can reflectively 
sustain if we subject them to critical scrutiny… The essential demands of 
rational choice relate to subjecting one’s choices—of action as well as 
objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny… Having reason to 
do something is not just a matter of an unscrutinised conviction… Rather, 
it demands that we investigate the reasons underlying the choice and 
consider whether the alleged reasons survive searching and critical 
examination, which one can undertake if and when the importance of such 
self-scrutiny is understood… We can not only assess our decisions, given 
our objectives and values; we can also scrutinize the critical sustainability 
of these objectives and values themselves (IJ, p. 180; emphasis in 
original). 
(2) Objectivity of (plural) reasoning. The need for objectivity in the use of practical 
reason is further emphasised when making ethical judgements and pursuing 
justice. But more important for Sen is the recognition of the central role that public 
discussion plays in this task. Following Rawls’ contribution in his demand for 
establishing a ‘public framework of thought’ to recognise the objectivity of political 
demands (IJ, p. 42) but going beyond it, Sen advocates for a more direct kind of 
objectivity. Instead of relying on hypothetical scenarios, Sen relies on an 
objectivity situated in the real world: ‘thinking about right and wrong is, at the most 
basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, 
if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject’ (IJ, p. 197; see also 
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Gilardone 2013). Thus, it is an objectivity that is already immersed in the mere 
reasons presented to support one’s positions in public discussion. Sen considers 
that Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ is best suited as a foundation for the kind of 
reasoning and reasonable behaviour needed to advance justice in the real world. 
The device of the ‘impartial spectator’ asks us to use our reason to scrutinise 
whether what one thinks is just for oneself would also be just in the eyes of others 
and their communities. As such, Sen relies on an idea of individual reason that is 
able to transcend pure selfish individual rationality and is capable of considering 
other’s perspectives and interests in one’s own choices and points of view. In 
accordance with Sen’s view of comprehensive outcomes, individual’s claims, 
choices, and reasoned evaluation of states of affairs have to ‘take an adequately 
broad view of the realizations that would result, including the nature of the 
agencies involved, the process used and the relationships of people’ (IJ, p. 219).  
(3) Reason leads to just behaviour. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, Sen takes 
the power of reason into a more direct path, leading not only towards discovering 
the just but also to the necessary moral behaviour required. Hence, aside from 
being useful for critical reflection, reason can also shape our own behaviour in a 
way consistent with the normative requirements of just behaviour towards others. 
In Sen’s words in IJ: 
Lack of smartness can certainly be one source of moral failing in good 
behaviour… A person can have well-thought-out reasons other than the 
promotion of personal gain for acting in a socially decent way… Being 
smarter may help the understanding not only of one’s self interest, but also 
how the lives of others can be strongly affected by one’s actions (p. 32)… 
and help us to think more clearly about our social concerns and 
responsibilities (p. 33)… Reasoning can be concerned with the right way 
of viewing and treating other people, other cultures, other claims, and with 
examining different grounds for respect and tolerance (p. 46). 
It is this specific three-fold understanding of reasoning that Sen relies on for the 
advancement of justice. Hence, as in his other works, he recognises that 
reasoning has to go hand in hand with the exercise of people’s freedom via 




1999c) 64 . It is in this sense that democracy understood as ‘government by 
discussion’—where all voices from different quarters and different perspectives 
can be expressed—is to be one of the core features of Sen’s conceptual 
framework to advance justice (e.g. see Drèze and Sen 2013).  
 
4.2.4 Agency: The individual as an ethically responsible agent 
Underlying the previous discussion is a particular view of the human being. Sen’s 
emphasis on freedom—particularly the process aspect of freedom—reveals the 
view of individuals as active agents (rather than passive recipients)65. Agency has 
always been the counterpart of the notion of capability (i.e. wellbeing freedom) 
within Sen’s capability approach where both are seen as constituents of 
development (Sen 1985). ‘Greater freedom’—Sen writes—‘enhances the ability 
of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these matters 
are central to the process of development’ (Sen 1999a, p. 18). Sen has defined 
an agent as ‘someone who acts and brings about change, and whose 
achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives’ (1999a, 
p. 19) and agency as the person’s freedom ‘to do and achieve…whatever goals 
or values he or she regards as important’ (Sen 1985, p. 203).  
As such, individual agency is central to advance justice. Indeed, agency is an 
integral feature in Sen’s conception of individual freedom in both the opportunity 
aspect (which involves the choice of individuals in achieving what they have 
reason to value) and in the process aspect (through the active participation to 
bring changes about and in the determination of valuable capabilities and in their 
rankings). These aspects in turn are taken into account in IJ via the focus on 
capabilities and public reasoning respectively. However, this agency freedom that 
individuals enjoy also has a corresponding duty of ethical social responsibility (see 
Deneulin 2014a, Crocker and Robeyns 2009, Crocker 2008). The socially 
responsible person responds to the demands of moral objectivity in the use of 
reason.  
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An active citizen participates in public discussion, acts, thinks, and decides in 
consideration of the likely consequences of her choices not only for herself but 
also for others. That is, agency accounts for both self-regarding and other-
regarding motivations. Crocker (2008) defines Sen’s notion of agency as follows: 
‘Persons are agents to the extent that they are able to scrutinize critically their 
options, themselves decide (rather than have the decision made by someone else 
or some external or internal force), act to realize their purposes, and have [a 
positive] impact on the world’ (pp. 219–220). It is in this sense that Sen insists 
that we are agents ‘whose freedom to decide what to value and how to pursue 
what we value can extend far beyond our own interests and needs’ (IJ, p. 252). 
This notion of a responsible agent is also contained in the concept of capability 
(IJ, p. 270) because having the ‘[f]reedom in general and agency freedom in 
particular are part of an effective power that a person has’ and it is central ‘in 
understanding our obligations’ (IJ, p. 271).  
In sum, one could say that Sen’s conception of the individual is that of a 
responsible agent who is capable of understanding what is the ethical thing to do 
via the use of reason and who is driven to act in such a moral way.  
 
4.3 Assessing Sen’s nonideal proposal 
Bringing all the pieces together gives us a clearer picture of Sen’s methodological 
proposal to reduce manifest cases of injustice. Essentially, he proposes a 
comparativist method of reasoning to assess and rank social arrangements as 
more or less just in terms of individual capabilities through the lens of 
comprehensive outcomes, which in turn emerge from a process of public 
deliberation of impartial (objective) agents. In a nutshell, Sen’s comparativist 
method works as follows: 
(1) It starts from a shared recognition of an ‘evident’ case of injustice that 
can be remedied; 
(2) There is a public deliberation that takes into account all relevant 
information about processes, outcomes, and distribution of burdens and 




(3) This partial ranking and courses of action has to be carried out in the 
space of individual capabilities. 
This section critically analyses how these ideas would work in practice and 
whether they are helpful for the purpose of enhancing justice. It argues that there 
are enough reasons to question the way in which Sen’s methodology is presented 
to advance justice in this imperfect world. And it shows how these limitations can 
be addressed by associating Sen’s methodology with an ideal theory. 
 
4.3.1 Sen’s starting point—Manifest cases of injustice  
A starting query is whether what seems to be an unquestioned starting point—the 
‘manifest injustices that so severely plague the world’ (IJ, p. 263; e.g. Boot 2012, 
Stemplowska and Swift 2012, Valentini 2011, Robeyns 2008)—is indeed as 
evident as it first sounds. This section argues that, after further examination, it 
may turn out that what counts as a shared notion of ‘manifest injustice’ may be 
less straightforward than is assumed. For what can be a ‘patent’ case of injustice 
in a Rawlsian perspective might not be so in a utilitarian or Marxist or libertarian 
perspective. But, more importantly, if we take this assumption to the reality of 
actual people’s perspectives, there are very good (even if disappointing) reasons 
to be doubtful. For instance, according to Sen, arbitrary incarceration could be 
one of those injustices for which ‘we can have a strong sense of injustice [even if] 
on many different grounds’ (IJ, p. 2). But is it an ‘evident’ case of injustice? 
In Mexico, reality might indicate the contrary. Although the view is not officially 
accepted, there is indeed a lot of support from a portion of the population, 
including the educated population, to repress (even violently repress) public 
demonstrations when they disturb their daily lives66. In the context of one of the 
most emblematic incidents in Mexico (Ayotzinapa 2014), this fact became very 
visible. After the ‘arbitrary arrest’, kidnapping, forced disappearance, and—most 
likely—killing of rural students by the local police, one would expect that this 
simply cannot be considered anything else but a manifest case of extreme 
injustice. The reality is that it was not and still is not. For example, a report 
concluded that ‘[a]ll of the security forces in the area [state police, military base] 
were aware of the prolonged and coordinated attack against the students but did 
                                                        




not intervene to protect the students’ (Meyer and Smith 2015). But, more 
strikingly, what may reflect better the fact that it does not represent a shared 
notion of injustice is the public opinion of highly ranked public servants of the 
state. One illustration is the highly pejorative even quizzical comment of the 
deputy of scholarships of the National Council of Science and Technology, who 
wrote in a public platform: ‘It is a crime of “siblings”, brownish-shabby individuals 
killing other brownish-shabby individuals… well, it is then a brownish-shabby 
canicide’ (Hernández and Speed 2014; my translation)67.  
To be sure, this example does not negate that a large part of the population does 
find this event aberrantly unjust. The point is that on the other extreme a significant 
part of the population not only finds it acceptable but even justifies it. Nor does it 
deny that everyone might agree with the following comparative scenario: ‘a 
society in which people are arbitrarily arrested is obviously more unjust than one 
in which, all other things equal, they are not’ (Valentini 2011, p. 306; emphasis in 
original). This may be indisputable. What is being put in doubt is whether the 
comparative question would even arise in Mexico at all, given that there is not a 
shared agreement that arbitrary detention is necessarily unjust. Actually, it is 
much more common than this isolated example might suggest (chapter VI).  
Thus, although Sen is confident that a shared notion of what constitutes 
‘remediable injustices on which there is reasoned agreement…can be reached 
among people’ (2012, p. 323; emphasis in original), the latter example might 
question whether the majority of people really see it that way. Similarly, Drèze and 
Sen (2013) present various examples of supposedly evident cases of injustice 
that are in fact not evident at all for the whole Indian population. Therefore, 
whether other examples that Sen refers to (i.e. universal healthcare in the U.S., 
subjugation of women, elimination of torture, and racial discrimination) can pass 
the public test is inconclusive at the very least. For, as Rawls warns, ‘those who 
act unjustly often do so with the conviction that they pursue a higher cause’ or 
even that they are being just (TJ, p. 245). This does not rule out that there are 
indeed ‘manifest’ cases of injustice, but the painful realities of the ‘real world’ do 
make one wonder whether we are being too optimistic. Alternatively, Sen might 
mean not that every person should consider these atrocities unjust but rather that 
all ethical theories agree that these practices are unjust. If this is the case, then 
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we do need transcendental theories. These ideal theories not only take these 
obvious injustices as ‘fixed [starting] points which…any conception of justice must 
fit’ (Rawls 1999, p. 18) but also develop an integrated framework to further confirm 
these ‘convictions’ (Rawls 1999, p. 18) and justify why they are indeed unjust.  
In contrast, Sen’s IJ leaves unanswered very important questions since he is not 
clear about how to identify such manifest cases of injustice (Khoo 2011). Similarly, 
how the identification of these injustices is compatible with the principle of 
everyone having the freedom to live a life they have reason to value (where all 
comprehensive doctrines are considered equally reasonable) remains an open 
question (Pogge and Alvarez 2010). Even if there were indeed some cases 
deemed to be unjust by all actual people in reality, such as children’s premature 
death due to malnutrition68, one question remains: how far would Sen’s framework 
go in the identification of injustice? It seems as if this is not important at all, for 
what matters to Sen is that there is a partial agreement regardless of what makes 
something unjust.  
This discussion suggests that, despite claiming that it is ‘[a]n approach of justice 
that is particularly involved with the diagnoses of injustice’ (IJ, p. 389), Sen’s 
approach might not be so good at diagnosing injustice after all. Indeed, there are 
two non-trivial challenges in this specific matter. The first relates to whether Sen’s 
IJ is really apt to find common ground on shared injustices or whether it has to 
rely on transcendental ideal theories to identify injustices (even those said to be 
‘shared’). If manifest cases of injustice turn out to be more elusive than they might 
appear, his comparative method ‘would be hard to use (IJ, p. 57)… [it] would… 
get stuck at the very base’ (IJ, p. 11). In any case, one could therefore argue that 
a Rawlsian-like theory is necessary for the task of identifying cases of injustice—
especially beyond the ‘obvious’ ones (Stemplowska and Swift 2012, Robeyns 
2012, Satz 2012, Valentini 2011). This might therefore reiterate the usefulness of 
ideal theory for its ‘urgency’ role. The second relates to the question whether IJ is 
indeed fit for the adequate diagnosis of injustice. This is a crucial point since how 
injustice is conceptualised is ultimately related to the remedies proposed. Given 
the centrality of this second challenge for the purpose of this dissertation, which 
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is investigating the expediency of normative ideas of justice to orient political 
action, this topic will be addressed again in detail in the following chapter. 
 
4.3.2 Reason, individual’s agency, and the basic structure of 
society 
The previous chapter already pointed out some concerns with comparing states 
of affairs through public discussion without an ideal target. It argued that reference 
to ideal principles of justice was in fact necessary for ranking different social 
arrangements in order to promote justice. This section shall focus instead on 
Sen’s conceptual demands about the use of reason in public deliberation while 
integrating reasoning and agency into a single analysis. The reason is that it is in 
the public space that individual’s agency—mediated by reason—is discharged 
and becomes relevant for justice matters. Hence, the connection between reason 
and agency is fundamental for the whole exercise. The assumption, then, is that 
they are interrelated, even if imperfectly (IJ, pp. 176–178). Indeed, one can expect 
that reason—to a large extent—influences people’s agency and thus their 
behaviour. If this is indeed so, Sen’s total reliance on public reasoning as the 
ultimate source of justice-enhancements in the real world might therefore face a 
real difficulty.  
In this regard, the crux of the matter is the relationship between the wider social 
structure and reason itself. According to the literature on this topic, Sen’s 
instrumental view of institutions as mere facilitators/obstructers of individual 
freedom ignores the far-reaching effect of social structures on people’s own 
reasoning and on the way they evaluate and act in the world. Hence, the literature 
invites us to recognise that all human behaviour, choices, and reasons are 
immersed within a complex ‘collective framework of meanings that give [people’s] 
actions and decisions significance’ (Deneulin 2011a, p. 793; see also Taylor 
1994). As such, this wider social structure delimits and becomes the reality in 
which all individual actions take place. It becomes ‘the very support of individual 
reasoning’ and the mediator of all human behaviour and social interactions that 
take place within it (Deneulin 2011a, p. 793; see also Deneulin et al. 2006, Gore 
1997). The problem, however, is that these structures either can be favourable 
for the human conditions or can be unfavourable. If they become corrupted, 




unjust practices become normalised and thus no longer considered unjust. Within 
these structures, unjust individual’s actions and reasoning can be perceived as 
being in accordance with their apprehended sense of justice (see also Stewart 
and Deneulin 2002). A classic empirical illustration of this situation is the Nazi 
regime, whose success cannot be separated from the large support from a great 
deal of people within such structures. 
The claim is thus that injustice is more structural than what Sen is willing to 
recognise. Therefore, these critiques suggest that structures ought to be treated 
and evaluated as intrinsically important in pursuing justice and thus to discern 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ institutional framework (see also Stewart 2013). 
Although their ultimate objective may be at odds with the framework that this 
dissertation endorses, what is important to note is that these critiques contain a 
powerful underlying argument that goes directly to the core of Sen’s approach. 
What they are really questioning is the mere possibility of women and men 
reasoning in accordance with Sen’s strong demands of a responsible agent who 
is capable of objective reason. One should therefore question how significant this 
challenge is to Sen’s overall comparative framework. The answer depends on 
whether one wants to see it as a readily practical framework (i.e. ready to be 
applied as it is) or as a nonideal approach that reveals transcendental features 
(even if of a nonideal kind) itself69. If one argues that the first option might render 
Sen’s framework inexpedient for advancing justice, it is the second option 
(transcendentalism) which emerges from the argument. 
A weak response to this structural critique could be to argue that there is no such 
thing as a one-step institutional transformation. This is precisely one of the 
reasons for Sen’s departure of transcendental ideal theories and his focus on 
public reasoning to advance human freedoms via individual agency. This 
response, however, would ignore the real pressing point of the critique, namely 
the fact that ‘the extent of agency and the objectives that people value depend in 
part on the environment in which the individual lives’ (Stewart and Deneulin 2002, 
p. 67). To this more pressing objection, one could respond that even if he does 
not evaluate it directly, Sen does account for the profound effect of this wider 
social web of institutions on people’s lives. Indeed, he recognises that ‘individual 
freedom is quintessentially a social product’ (Sen 1999a, p. 31; see also, for 
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example, pp. xi–xii, 31, 142, 297). For example, Sen often recognises the effect 
of social norms on individuals, such as how they undermine women’s 
opportunities and their influence on women’s own distorted self-perceptions (see 
also Drèze and Sen 2013). In IJ, he further insists that the ‘concern with people’s 
ability to live the kind of lives they have reason to value brings in social influences 
both in terms of what they value…and what influences operate on their values’ (p. 
244; see also Sen 2002). In this way, Sen can reasonably conclude that his 
approach ‘provides a perspective in which institutional assessment can 
systematically occur’ (1999a, p. 142). 
Still, while acknowledging the social impacts on individuals, Sen would insist that 
‘their roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to 
[individual] freedom’ (1999a, p. 142). In this respect, Sen’s position is ‘ethically 
individualist’ in the sense that, even if sensitive to social constraints, ‘individuals, 
and only individuals, are the units of moral concern’ (Robeyns 2005, p. 107)70. 
This position is thus consistent with the Rawlsian notion that considerations of 
justice require the priority of the individual, but it nonetheless raises an important 
question: where does this acknowledgement of the deep social effects on 
people’s values, reasons, and choices leave Sen’s IJ insistence on public 
discussion for deciding questions of justice? Stated differently, if individuals’ 
reasoning and values can be distorted by power relations, social norms, wider 
structures, etc., how can justice be advanced through democratic processes? Is 
it not self-defeating? Not according to Sen. 
Sen is undoubtedly willing to accept these pervasive influences on individuals, 
but—and this is an important but—he still argues that, through objective reason, 
they can always be transcended. To illustrate his view, Sen draws on his carefully 
well-crafted understanding of ‘transpositional objectivity’ (IJ, chapter 7). It 
happens, Sen argues, that sometimes an unjust social arrangement may be 
similarly regarded as not unjust by individuals who view it from a similar position, 
but ultimately its unjustness can come to light and even be overcome if observed 
from a different position (see Gilardone 2013 for a thorough analysis on this topic). 
Precisely, in this context, Sen writes: 
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… [a] limitation applies to the range of our thinking process and to the 
broadening of our capacity to contemplate. Our very understanding of the 
external world is so moored in our experiences and thinking that the 
possibility of going entirely beyond them may be rather limited. All this 
does not, however, indicate that positionality cannot be partly or wholly 
overcome in ways that take us to a less confined view (IJ, p. 170). 
To overcome people’s sequestered reason by social influences, Sen suggests 
‘more public engagement on such a subject’ (IJ, p. 245), particularly from the view 
of the ‘impartial spectator’. The impartial spectator demands us to objectively 
reflect about ‘how things would look to “any other fair and impartial 
spectator”…[which] can bring in judgements that would be made by disinterested 
people from other societies as well—far as well as near’ (IJ, p. 125, emphasis 
added). Sen is thus confident that ‘bad reasoning can be confronted by better 
reasoning’ (IJ, p. xviii, 49). And, as previously discussed, according to Sen, aside 
from being useful for critical reflection, reason can shape one’s own behaviour in 
a way consistent with the normative requirements of what is just.  
Sen’s strong and coherent advocacy for democratic means and people’s agency 
in overcoming injustice makes for a forceful argument (see Sen 1999a, 1999c, 
Drèze and Sen 2013, Crocker 2008, Alkire 2006). But essentially what this comes 
down to is Sen’s confidence that through more inclusive public discussion—
through ‘impartial’, ‘disinterested’ individuals engaged in public deliberation, to be 
more precise—reason can ultimately overcome parochialism. This explains the 
fact that he can coherently concede that evolutionist processes as well as 
individuals’ social relations and institutions can influence someone’s ‘thinking, 
choosing, and doing’ (IJ, p. 245; see Stewart and Deneulin 2002) while reason 
itself can be relied on to achieve comparative justice. For, in Sen’s understanding, 
these influences do not really ‘invade the space for reflective reason’ of the 
individual (Obregón 2014, p. 126; my translation). As such, when they need to be, 
these social influences and corresponding behaviours can always be trumped by 
further reasoned scrutiny and transform individual actions.  
One can wonder, nevertheless, whether this theoretical solution is indeed a useful 
way to think about advancing justice in practice here and now—as Sen’s IJ 
aspires to do. Note that the whole exercise assumes the existence of ethically 




biases and who are ready to consider others’ points of view when interacting in 
public deliberation. Through the impartial spectator, ‘Smith constantly invokes the 
necessity for us to consider how our priorities would look to others’ (Sen 2012; p. 
325). Freeman (2012) summarises Sen’s method in the following words: 
[Sen’s method]… relies upon… a society of sincere and conscientious 
deliberators with moral sensibilities, all of whom adopt the point of view of 
the impartial spectator. They then engage in public reasoning and 
comprehensive consequential evaluation, which enables them to come to 
agreement upon, or at least public justifications to one another of, 
comparative rankings of the justice of alternative states of affairs (p. 189). 
What is ultimately at stake is the reliance on public discussion in the real world to 
deliver justice-enhancing social change in the absence of such demanding 
assumptions and in the presence of very opposite realities 71 . In contexts of 
extremely deficient democracies with high inequalities and powerful elites, the 
notion of objective unrestricted public reasoning for determining ‘justice-
enhancing’ change—even if desirable—is a very demanding idea to say the least. 
Who would the real public be in the ‘public’ discussion from which a partial ranking 
of a more just society would emerge? Can we really expect individuals to be able 
to reason beyond the unjust structures from where the very same reasoning finds 
it support? In fact, under realistic conditions, one could argue that—perversely—
it is through ‘democracy’ that injustice—not justice—is advanced72. Even in less 
burdened and more democratic societies, we see more radical political proposals 
on the rise, along with more social polarisation, racism and xenophobia. 
On these grounds, the ‘real world’ idea of justice promoted by Sen, its total 
reliance on public reasoning, and its outcome presented as a legitimate 
advancement of justice can thus be questioned. Moreover, even without 
considering the presence of real-world distortions to democracy, the previous 
chapter already raised serious doubts about the idea that pure comparative 
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note of the different proposal, likely consequences, etc.), the amount of complexity and abstraction 
of a comparative exercise would be very similar to a transcendental one.  
72 For instance, Crocker (2008) mentions that the United Nations Development Programme’s 2004 
report on Latin American democracies shows that since shifting to democratic regimes ‘the regions 
exhibit worsening poverty and inequality’ and that ‘[i]n unjust conditions, economic and political elites 
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judgements could guarantee justice-enhancing orderings without reference to an 
ideal theory. 
Should one then conclude that Sen’s IJ and democratic means are not 
appropriate ways for thinking about advancing justice? Certainly not, as Sen 
(1999c) compellingly argues, ‘[a] country does not have to be deemed fit for 
democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy’ (p. 3; emphasis in 
original). Similarly, despite the shortcomings of democracy, Crocker (2008) 
presents powerful ideas to say that ‘[the] cure…for the deficiencies of democracy 
is…more and better democracy’ (p. 320). However, he also recognises that this 
response can be ‘too glib’ in circumstances where there is ‘less good will…[and] 
severe inequalities’ (p. 321). There is no doubt that dismissing democracy would 
be the wrong conclusion to make. Rather, what these difficulties reveal is that 
Sen’s powerful defence of public reasoning is a strong normative demand in 
favour of broadening the public arena for inclusive public deliberation. In this 
respect, Sen’s remarks are highly relevant and illuminating (see IJ, chapter 7), 
though they ultimately rely on the ‘good will’ of individuals (Crocker 2008) and 
their being ‘open-minded about welcoming information and through reflecting on 
arguments coming from different quarters, along with undertaking interactive 
deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues should be seen’ (IJ, p. 
43). That is, it nevertheless requires ethically responsible and objective agents to 
prove useful for reducing injustice.  
Thus, it seems that Sen advances not a prescription that is readily applicable to 
the ‘real world’ but a coherent description of what a broadly perfect standard of 
public reasoning to advance justice would look like. It is in this sense that Sen’s 
comparative method starts to look like a transcendental (not readily applicable) 
nonideal theory. Otherwise, Sen’s framework may not prove expedient for what it 
is supposed to produce as a matter of justice: capability-enhancing changes.  
 
4.3.3 Capabilities for justice 
The weaknesses of the whole exercise of public reasoning in IJ have several 
implications. According to Sen’s position, public discussion determines not only 
the partial ordering of states of affairs but also which capabilities ought to be 




complete reliance on public reason in the real world may be at odds with his 
commitment to justice. Therefore, it briefly considers whether the specification of 
a list of valuable capabilities can offer an alternative solution for the purpose of 
advancing justice. It then presents reasons to show that, whereas Sen’s strategy 
fails for being unspecified, the strategy of Nussbaum (who has being the leading 
advocate for a list) fails to be really pluralist and respectful of people’s agency. 
That is, despite the similarities between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s approaches, their 
divergent paths counteract each other’s position in this respect73.  
The selection of relevant capabilities has prompted a significant area of 
discussion within the larger literature of the capability approach. For this reason, 
some scholars have proposed alternative criteria for selecting relevant 
capabilities (e.g. Robeyns 2003b, Alkire 2002, Anderson 1999; see Robeyns 
2011, 2006 for other references) though it is generally accepted that the relevant 
capabilities ‘would be different…in different normative exercises’ (Robeyns 2011, 
section 3.2). This section does not engage directly with this related literature. 
Instead, by analysing Sen’s and Nussbaum’s positions, it suggests that, for 
considerations of justice, the demarcation of relevant capabilities would have to 
be justified in relation to ideal theory. 
In this context, the problem with Sen leaving his approach unspecified in its 
content is that freedom can take absolutely any form and simply adapt to the 
capability language. In this respect, any advancement on utilitarian, perfectionist, 
libertarian, liberal egalitarian, or any other grounds that gain the support of people 
(in one way or another) can be accepted as just if it complies with two requisites: 
(1) it is the outcome of ‘public reasoning’ and (2) it can be expressed in terms of 
capabilities (and there is enough evidence that capabilities can encompass all). 
For instance, going back to the example of the labour reform, if we place ourselves 
in the context of Mexico where all indicators of social and income inequality 
(CONEVAL 2013, World Bank 2012), corruption, and discrimination (CONAPRED 
2012) are worryingly high, where only 8.8% of workers are part of labour unions 
(Martinez 2013) and whose leaders are co-opted by the leading party (Obregón 
2013), one could wonder about the efficacy of the kind of ‘public discussion’ that 
actually takes place in such a situation. Within such circumstances, the outcome 
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of ‘public’ reasoning could easily be presented as indicating that Mexican people 
value more the capability for flexible employment as opposed to the capability for 
decent and long-term employment. What is most problematic in this case is the 
recognition that Sen’s approach could have not only reproduced the same 
utilitarian-inspired result but also legitimised it as just (Biondo 2010). Surely this 
result would be at odds with Sen’s overall extensive writings against utilitarianism, 
though his approach of justice does not rule out this possibility in any way. Putting 
Sen’s IJ to work in real life goes with the real risk of imposing the view of the 
powerful as the outcome of ‘public reasoning’.  
If one extends the discussion about the fragility of relying on public reasoning 
under conditions that do not meet Sen’s requirements of the use of reason and 
responsible agency, it seems inappropriate to classify whatever comes out of 
such a situation as being justice-enhancing. It is in this respect that one can 
question Sen’s decision to leave the path of justice to public discussion as long 
as it is expressed in one of the many forms that the notion of capabilities can take. 
Following this line of reasoning and exemplifying the malleability of the notion of 
capabilities, Nussbaum has long advocated for the need to specify a list of 
valuable capabilities whether under perfectionist ideals or under ‘liberal’ ideals. 
Her final goal has been, and still is, to promote a list of ‘central human capabilities’ 
as a matter of justice. Her list consists of 10 categories: Life; Bodily health; Bodily 
integrity; Senses, imagination and thought; Emotions; Practical reason; Affiliation; 
Other species; Play; and Control over one’s environment (see Nussbaum 2011a, 
2003, 2000, for the specification of the content of each capability). 
Nussbaum asks us to recognise that not all kinds of freedoms are consistent with 
the advancement of justice. Some are trivial and other freedoms are simply bad 
(see Nussbaum 2003). Similarly, Alkire and Deneulin (2009) mention that the 
specification of ‘valuable’ capabilities via public discussion faces the risk of either 
omitting important capabilities or including some capabilities which are the result 
of distorted preferences due to unjust structures, or of endorsing those imposed 
by the powerful. Hence, Sen’s apparent extreme underspecification may not be 
justified when justice is considered. But there are problems with Nussbaum’s 
strategy of setting a list of capabilities to solve Sen’s indeterminism for issues of 
justice. One problem is that it transgresses the process aspect of freedom of 
individuals, that is, their agency to determine the freedoms they have reasons to 




adapting, and implementing the proposed list. Still, this transgression to individual 
agency does not seem to be a matter of embarrassment for Nussbaum, for, she 
argues, it offers an alternative to the equally problematic insensitive defence of 
the notion of freedom regardless of the content it takes. On this point, however, 
Nussbaum does not fare well. The formulation of such a list completely isolated 
from public deliberation and from the mere individuals who are to be affected by 
it seems to violate the basic understanding of treating people as agents and as 
ends in themselves (see Crocker 2008, chapter 6; Sen 2004, Robeyns 2003b; 
and Robeyns 2005, 2006 for other references).  
Another problem is about how Nussbaum presents her list. Despite her efforts to 
place her list within the realm of political liberalism (after being previously 
presented as a ‘thick vague theory of the good’), it is not clear that the list does 
not continue to be a partial comprehensive doctrine of the good (and simply 
spiced up with the ‘choice’ option ‘if you want it’) (see Deneulin 2002 for a similar 
conclusion; see also Crocker 2008, chapter 6). As a result, Nussbaum’s attempt 
to present an alternative theory of justice within liberalism could also fail in its most 
basic feature, that of showing equal respect for different conceptions of the good 
and of respecting equally individual dignity (Robeyns 2016). In fact, even if it is 
initially justified on the grounds of Aristotelian ‘internal essentialism’ and then of 
being the object of an ‘overlapping consensus’ (see Deneulin 2013b), various 
scholars suggest that her list is ultimately based on her own partial reasoning, 
which in turn is presented as the exemplification of reflective reasoning par 
excellence (see Clark 2013, Kleist 2013, Hicks 2006).  
This means that the difference between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s positions can be 
traced back to the role of public reasoning in each of their approaches. Whereas 
Nussbaum sees public reasoning as instrumentally important to mould her 
specific list, Sen sees the role of public discussion as central. For him, the 
specification of a ‘totally fixed’ list is problematic since it ‘den[ies] the possibility of 
fruitful public participation on what should be included and why’ (Sen 2004, pp. 
77–78). Yet Nussbaum does have a point about the doubtful position of totally 
relying on public discussion in real contexts of injustice and thus the need to 
specify a list. To be sure, Sen has reasonably justified his position to leave the 
capability metric open to use for different ‘practical purpose[s]’, each of which may 
require different items on the list and different weighting (Sen 2004, p. 79; see 




and for the specific purpose of assessing justice-enhancements, leaving the 
notion of capability completely open to public discussion can also be an important 
limitation. 
Finally, against both, once a list or group of capabilities is endorsed (whether by 
the philosopher or by a group of people or by the whole public), it could still be 
accused of perfectionism (Robeyns 2009b). This is because once a list is 
specified, it is those capabilities, and not others, which would be recognised as 
the most reasonable freedoms to be promoted for a dignified life. Additionally, 
they would have priority as valid claims of justice over other capabilities—even if 
there are others which may be equally reasonable. Arguably, aside from the 
agency claim, not specifying any list of valuable freedoms is Sen’s way to escape 
the charge of perfectionism. At least in this way the charge cannot be directed to 
him and hence his position remains truly liberal, in theory. Still, in practice, one 
could argue that, on this account, both Sen and Nussbaum remain problematic 
for matters of justice. 
To summarise this section, the flexibility of the metric of capabilities may be 
undeniably useful for a variety of concerns (Deneulin 2014b, Robeyns 2016, 
2003b), but, as the above concerns show, the flexibility of the capability metric 
might not be easily welcome for a practical approach to justice—at least not if a 
selection of capabilities is independently justified from an ideal theory since, if 
underspecified, it can produce and legitimise injustice. In contrast, once 
specified—in practice—the metrics of capabilities cannot but be teleological (i.e. 
having the purpose to lead towards a valuable end) (Deneulin 2002). This does 
not imply, however, that the metric of capabilities is inadequate for a theory of 
justice concerned with human freedom. Rather, what it indicates is that the 
selection of capabilities would have to be warranted on the basis of, and thus 
bounded by, an objective already identified by an ideal theory. Hence, under this 
understanding, promoting capabilities becomes what Pereira (2013) describes as 
a ‘teleology heavily subordinated to a deontology’ (p. 56) where the telos 
constituted by an ideal theory (independently justified) guides nonideal efforts to 
advance justice. Put another way, this means that the overall outcome of public 




promote (that is, be transitional towards) the aim identified by ideal theory (which 
in this case is illustrated by Rawlsian principles)74.  
 
4.4 A dual framework of justice: ideal theory and nonideal theory 
In IJ, Sen presents his comparative method as a framework for ‘wrestl[ing] 
injustices in the world in which we live’ aiming at ‘advanc[ing] justice through 
enhancing the liberties and freedoms and well-being of people who live today’ (p. 
81, emphasis added). On a theoretical level, the latter discussion raised serious 
doubts about the ability of Sen’s conceptual framework to deliver its promise, i.e. 
advancing justice in the real world without the necessity of a transcendental (ideal) 
theory of justice. On its own, Sen’s methodological approach may struggle to 
identify injustice beyond those extremely obvious cases. It also fails to secure 
justice-advancing outcomes of public reasoning in the imperfect world75. As Rawls 
rightly points out, ideal theory is a prior necessity for a practical theory of justice: 
it provides a framework to systematically identify the core of injustices, a task for 
which nonideal theories are not well equipped, and it provides an objective without 
which a nonideal theory is nothing more than a ‘castle made out of sand’ (Pogge 
and Alvarez 2010, p. 574; my translation). 
Consequently, this chapter’s discussion implicitly suggests that one could also 
recognise that Sen’s idea of justice remains entirely a normative nonideal theory 
which identifies the kind of reasoning, procedure, and metrics that the approach 
requires to be useful for the real world. Under this reading, Sen’s framework 
cannot avoid the transcendentalism that he himself condemns. This 
transcendentalism, however, is of a different kind than that of Rawls. It is a 
nonideal transcendentalism that determines the perfect standard about how 
justice can be advanced in the real world. For it to be useful, however, such 
transcendentalism still needs to be connected to an ideal theory. Hence, this 
dissertation argues that, to overcome Sen’s difficulties, his framework has to be 
coupled with an ideal theory. For example, it can be connected to Rawls’ ideal 
theory. The argument that Rawls’ and Sen’s approaches can be complementary 
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is supported by several authors either explicitly or implicitly (e.g. Gilabert 2012, 
2008, Campos 2011, Pogge and Alvarez 2010, Osmani 2010, Robeyns 2009b). 
As recognised above, Sen himself acknowledges that the focus on capabilities is 
only an extension of the primary goods advanced by Rawls and thus that there is 
no foundational departure from his theory of justice (IJ, p. 234). But even more 
revealing, elsewhere, Sen accepts that he does not dispute Rawls on other issues 
such as ‘the priority of liberty’ which requires ‘giving personal liberty some kind of 
a real priority (though not necessarily in the extremist lexicographic form chosen 
by Rawls [in nonideal circumstances—it should be added])’ (IJ, p. 299). Likewise, 
he asserts that liberty ‘is a central concern both in a person’s freedom…and it is 
also a basic necessity (e.g. in the form of freedom of speech) for the practice of 
public reasoning’ (IJ, p. 63) (see also Freeman 2012). Implicit in this recognition 
is the fact that Sen also takes from Rawls the idea that development policies and 
justice have to take individual freedom as a priority and not anything else. Finally, 
it is also evident that they share the Kantian root of relying on reason to discover 
the nature of what is to be considered just. Whereas Rawls believes that the 
original position is necessary to guide people’s reasoning, Sen takes a leap of 
faith and believes that (public) reflective reasoning itself can do the job. 
Ultimately, with the added umbrella of Rawls’ ideal theory, it is possible to make 
sense of Sen’s nonideal nature and make it satisfy the three nonideal 
requirements identified in the first part of this chapter: feasibility, moral desirability, 
and transitionality. Sen’s emphasis on public discussion has the quality of 
respecting people’s freedom and agency in both the process and its generated 
outcomes in terms of capabilities. This in turn complies with the nonideal demands 
of feasibility (it does not demand unthinkable capacities beyond human and 
institutional possibilities) and moral desirability (it respects the moral demands of 
Rawls’ ideal theory, i.e. treating individuals as ends in themselves and individual 
liberty). Likewise, the idea that public reasoning has to consider the processes as 
well as the outcomes (i.e. comprehensive outcomes) in comparative assessments 
would require that both instances be judged from the moral bounds of an ideal 
theory76 . This assumes that there is a telos to which the outcome of public 
reasoning is in transition towards. This is what Pereira (2013) calls ‘the 
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teleological guidance for application’ of ideal theory (p. 59)77. As such, Sen’s 
nonideal framework can be feasible, transitional, and morally desirable with 
respect to Rawls’ ideal theory.  
Without these connections to ideal theory, Sen’s IJ would simply be a self-
defeating approach full of contradictions (surprisingly, this is Sen’s own assumed 
position). For example, one could not make sense of Sen’s insistence on the 
acknowledgement of a plurality of reasons and the need for public reasoning and 
his unembarrassment in relying on human freedom as the ultimate goal—a goal 
which, in his approach, does not need further revision. Yet Sen offers no system 
of justification for such a strong position. This is why this chapter has argued that 
a more fruitful understanding of Sen’s approach emerges when its nonideal status 
is acknowledged and is properly linked to an ideal theory (in this case, to Rawlsian 
theory). 
So far, this dissertation has maintained that, for reducing injustice in practice, the 
complementarity between ideal and nonideal theory is essential. In this sense, 
both of these theories intend to be action-guiding. Whereas ideal theory has an 
urgency and a target practical usefulness (by answering what makes a society 
just), nonideal theory has a remedial and transitional practical usefulness (by 
answering how injustice can be reduced and how to move towards the target). 
The remaining two chapters of this dissertation critically examine whether this 
dual framework (ideal/nonideal) is sufficient to address injustice in the real world. 
Chapter 5 will analyse what the coming together of a Rawlsian ideal and a Senian 
nonideal theory implies for thinking about reducing injustice. It then analyses to 
what extent such coupling succeeds in guiding political action to effectively reduce 
injustice in the world. This analysis in turn will reveal the insufficiency of a dual 
approach in practice. By critically reflecting on the translation of normative ideas 
into action, this dissertation will emphasise the need for the last but not least level 
of theorisation, namely a ‘ground’ idea of injustice. It argues that this understudied 
level could provide some alternative possibilities to offer effective remedial action 
towards the objective of a more just society. 
  
                                                        
77 The next two chapters illustrate that, in the absence of such an ideal, Sen’s framework could be 
reduced to a remedial theory of social improvements rather than being a transitional approach to 


















The starting point of this dissertation was the question of whether theories of 
justice could provide useful practical guidance to counteract injustice in the world. 
The first part argued that moving towards a more just society requires both ideal 
and nonideal theorising of justice. Both assist in the identification and 
understanding of different aspects of the same trajectory towards more just 
societies—what I have called ‘levels’ to distinguish their different ground of 
theorising. Whereas ideal theory sets a telos of ‘what’ we ought to strive for, 
nonideal theory identifies necessary paths about ‘how’ best to promote that telos. 
This nonideal path is at the same time restrained and guided by the ideal. 
Therefore, if one takes the complexity of injustice seriously, one should not take 
either ideal or nonideal theory of justice on its own as an all-purpose theory of 
justice. For when either is taken alone, they both remain insufficient for furthering 
justice (even if for different reasons). Hence, the dissertation argued for seeing 
them as mutually dependent for the specific task of advancing justice. It showed 
that Rawls’ and Sen’s respective theories can be coupled for this purpose. This 
second part of the dissertation analyses whether this strategy is sufficient in 
practice. Would a dual approach of Rawlsian ideal and Senian nonideal theory 
suffice to remedy injustice in the real world? 
In order to assess such a dual (ideal/nonideal) framework, this part of the 
dissertation moves away from scrutinising the conceptual aspect of theories 
themselves and instead shifts its focus to the kind of normative guidance that they 
can offer. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this reflection is often 
neglected in theories of justice by simply assuming that these nuances will be 
‘context-dependent’. Therefore, this exercise is usually relegated to the social 
scientist whose job is to specify and implement these normative ideas. However, 
the following chapters will show that there is still an important role for theoretical 
reflection about these concerns before normative ideas materialise in specific 
contexts. For instance, what does operationalising Sen’s IJ actually imply? Which 
are appropriate ways to enhance public deliberation in Mexico? What counts as 
justice-enhancing change? How should the expansion of capabilities be 
accounted for? Does the answer to these questions change depending on the 
purpose at hand? If what we aim for in the long run is a society that honours 
Rawlsian principles, how ought capability expansion be translated in practice?  
These are important questions to ask and it is the job of a development ethicist to 




these questions by examining Sen’s nonideal theory. In doing so, it adds an extra 
level of theorisation that borrows strongly from a distinct philosophical tradition, 
namely critical theory. This in turn suggests that contrary to how different 
approaches to justice understand themselves as being mutually exclusive, these 
perspectives complement each other. True rivalry between philosophical ideas 
obviously does exist and intellectual effort to clarify disputes is often required, but 
at times rivalry between distinct perspectives is more of appearance than 
substance. It might well be the case that disputes between ‘opposing’ 
perspectives are different angles of the same phenomenon and ultimately 
complement each other. In this sense, this dissertation advocates for greater 
intellectual cooperation between distinct perspectives. One does not have to 
entirely dismiss Rawls’ principles of justice simply because in practice they fail to 
guide political action adequately and sometimes result in the justification of 
injustices which are contradictory to his Theory of Justice. Similarly, one does not 
have to choose Sen’s capabilities alone knowing that his framework has the risk 
of legitimising injustices (for example, by acknowledging that public reasoning 
processes are not immune from the dominant group determining the telos or 
‘valuable capabilities’ of all members of society).  
The aim of part II is to show that a dual framework between ideal and nonideal 
theory is necessary but still insufficient to reduce injustice. Consequently, it needs 
to be further complemented by a ‘ground’ from which to depart, for which liberal 
theories of justice are not well equipped to account. This is what this dissertation 
will call the ‘grounding’ role of injustice. It asks for a greater understanding of the 
way in which the unjust status quo persists. And it takes this unjust status quo as 
the actual subject of revision of any approach to justice, for it is the actual unjust 
ground which is questioned at any level of theorising and thus in need of 
transformation. Hence, if there is no success in its alteration for the better, then 
there is little practical gain from the enlightening work of many outstanding 
philosophers (regardless of their immense value elsewhere). 
Part II is thus an attempt of moving one step closer in that direction by insisting 
on the relevance of paying attention to the (unjust) contextual level of justice, its 
theorising, and its role in the overall project of reducing injustice. This dissertation 
understands the grounding level of injustice as the context from where the 
operationalisation of theories of justice departs, for just as nonideal theories need 




In sum, this dissertation insists that to reduce injustice effectively we need to be 
able to pay more attention to how the unjust context is maintained in order to 
diagnose injustice adequately. The persistence of the mechanisms through which 
injustice is reproduced demands more than ever a comprehensive understanding 
of injustice and its dynamics. This requires a higher commitment to take the 
practice of justice seriously at every level (ideal foundation, nonideal processes, 





V. Adding the ground of injustice to ideal and 
nonideal theories of justice 
 
The first part concluded that if development is concerned about justice, then 
Rawls’ ideal theory and Sen’s nonideal theory provide an answer to the what we 
should aim for, and how we should get there, and advocated for their coming 
together. This chapter argues that while a dual framework provides a stronger and 
more coherent approach to deal with injustice in theory, it remains transcendental. 
Hence, this chapter moves away from foundational concerns to focus on the 
practical relevance of this dual framework in terms of the kind of guidance it can 
command in practice. It highlights that owing to its inability to appraise injustice 
adequately a dual framework remains insufficient to inform useful political action 
to rectify it. This in turn emphasises the need to conceptualise justice as 
something different from simply the lack of justice and, in particular, the need to 
understand it in a more dynamic and relational way. This broader understanding 
and scope of what injustice entails will prove to be non-negligible for neutralising 
its transmission and thus for really advancing in the construction of a more just 
society. 
This analysis, however, continues to take place at an abstract conceptual level. 
As such, it does not deal with the more empirically charged issues of political 
feasibility or actual guidelines of implementation. Although these are clearly 
important issues, they do require more in-depth empirical and anthropological 
immersion, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, following some 
core ideas within critical theories, this chapter examines the conceptual 
deficiencies of a dual framework for accurately examining injustice, which in turn 
reduces the scope of political remedies to counteract it. This level of theorising 
remains important for engaging with the practical issue of making theories of 
justice useful for remedying injustice in the real world. This engagement brings 
out the necessity of theorising about the adequate way to materialise normative 
demands in real contexts of injustice. This chapter deals with the third component 
of the three-level approach to justice proposed in this dissertation: the grounding 
level or an idea of injustice. The rationale for adding this level, it will be argued, is 




injustices. Ultimately, this implies the further complementation of ideal and 
nonideal theories with a broader conceptualisation of injustice capable of 
examining the unjust status quo and its perpetuation. 
 
5.1 The transcendental nature of a dual framework  
Preceding chapters showed that both Rawls’ ideal and Sen’s nonideal approach 
were not sufficient on their own to counteract injustice in the real world. As a result, 
the previous chapter suggested that these two approaches can, in principle, be 
paired. But this still leaves out the critical question of whether a dual framework 
offers sufficient guidance for reducing injustice. In theory, this particular dual 
framework would be formed by the Rawlsian ideal principles (equal liberties, equal 
fair opportunities, and the difference principle) setting the objective of ‘what’ we 
are aiming for (i.e. the telos), whereas Sen’s comparative method (public 
reasoning, individual agency, and the metrics of capabilities) would be the—
morally and feasible—strategic ‘how’ to bring about those ideals gradually. 
Under perfect conditions, the practice of a dual framework would be as follows. 
First, a case of injustice would be identified at the ideal level according to Rawlsian 
standards. For instance, the labour reforms in Mexico were not in accordance with 
a basic structure of society that honoured the principles of justice, nor did these 
reforms seem to be a transition in that direction. Second, once injustice has been 
identified, it would then be up to inclusive participation via public reasoning to 
assess different feasible courses of action in terms of the capabilities that each 
possible social arrangement promotes (Sen’s comparative framework). However, 
once these approaches are combined, the set of possible capabilities would be 
constrained by the ideal. In this case, the different courses of action as well as the 
‘valuable’ capabilities that emerge from public discussion would have to be 
weighed in relation to how well they serve the ideal of justice. That is, public 
reasoning would have to consider the moral desirability of its outcome as well as 
the processes to bring about those results (i.e. comprehensive outcomes 
bounded by an ideal).  
This connexion between ideal and nonideal theories already provides an 
improved framework to advance justice in comparison to each approach 




shortcomings while maintaining their own strengths. It acknowledges that 
Rawlsian ideal theory does not necessarily provide adequate guidance in the 
imperfect world and thus is complemented by Sen’s nonideal method to rank 
courses of action. And it constrains the possibility frontier of capabilities within 
public reasoning in the sense that only those that are transitional to the ideal can 
be reasonably defended. It is thus aware of path dependence (see Pogge and 
Alvarez 2010). One could say that the synergy between these theorisations of 
justice already provides a better-suited theoretical framework to deal with real 
cases of injustice such as the Mexican labour reforms. What is still not clear, 
nonetheless, is whether these improvements would actually translate into a less 
unjust world in practice.  
Evidently, we simply cannot know what the actual Mexican labour reforms would 
look like had it followed a Rawls/Sen dual framework. Would the outcome of such 
deliberation be different from the actual legal reform? Even granting the possibility 
that the emergent labour reform would be similar to the one enacted in Mexico, 
there are still good reasons to defend a dual framework because (1) the actual 
labour reforms would be the result of treating people as agents rather than as 
means, (2) they would have the aim of constructing a more just society (not only 
a wealthier one), and (3) since all would be part of the deliberation, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the resulting policy would be less biased against 
workers’ rights and their labour security. Yet, although this sounds sensibly 
reasonable in theory, it remains far from being a useful practical approach to 
reduce injustices in the real world. 
The reasons are as follows. As was discussed previously, the kind of public 
reasoning that the approach requires is absent in most if not all societies, 
therefore making it vulnerable. Likewise, people’s actual—as opposed to 
desirable—behaviour may not be in line with Sen’s demands. Although Sen 
criticises Rawls’ ideal assumption of full compliance with the demands of justice, 
ironically the same critique also applies to Sen’s own framework. He also 
assumes that reason alone will prompt individuals to engage in public deliberation 
with others as equals and then to honour with their behaviour what was agreed 
as a result of it. In the real world, it is precisely the issues of noncompliance which 
lie at the heart of a fractured democracy. This assumption goes against everyday 





These reasons, however, do not make Sen’s nonideal theory useless for assisting 
justice-enhancing political action. Neither do they discredit the value of public 
discussion widely promoted by liberal and non-liberal scholars alike. On the 
contrary, this goes well in line with scholars who suggest that justice should be 
about ensuring that all citizens can participate in public dialogue in the first place 
(Pereira 2013, Fraser 2000, 1997, Anderson 1999). Hence, what this discussion 
attempts to illustrate is that, even when coupled with an ideal theory, Sen’s 
framework remains transcendental, not in the sense of defining what justice is 
(like ideal theory) but in stipulating what ought to be in place to advance justice. 
In doing so, it provides a sound ethical justification for redirecting justice-
advancing actions towards the goal of enhancing people’s capabilities as well as 
their agency to participate in public deliberation. 
Yet, coherent as this conclusion may be, there is still the question about how 
these demands can be advanced in contexts of injustice78. There is no real 
practical guidance about how these normative ideals can be translated in specific 
unjust social realities. This implies that although Sen’s approach calls for a more 
practical conception of justice, it itself falls short of doing just that. There is still a 
gap between a dual framework and the practice of reducing injustice in the real 
world. This means that in order to assess the practical usefulness of a dual 
framework, further analysis about how its conceptual framework translates into 
action in a specific contextual reality is required. 
 
5.2 A dual framework in practice and the context of application  
To reflect about the kind of practical guidance that such a framework can provide, 
we can represent Rawls’/Sen’s dual framework in terms of the following guiding 
structure:  
 (Rawls) Ideal Just Society: We should construct a society where the 
basic structure of society allows everyone to enjoy equal rights and 
liberties, equal fair opportunities and where inequalities are accepted only 
                                                        
78 Some authors even suggest that nonideal theories seem to reject an ideal of justice only to 
replace it with another utopian end (i.e. democracy) (see Erman and Moller 2013). In this respect, 
one could argue that although nonideal theory mediates the distance between the ideal (Rawlsian) 
end and the social world, this advancement takes us only half way. If the issue with ideal theory is 
that it does not tell us how to achieve that ideal, then including Sen’s nonideal approach only pushes 




to the extent that they are for the benefit of the worst off so that everyone 
can pursue their life plan freely. 
 
 (Sen) Nonideal Justice: We should pursue justice by promoting human 
freedoms and respecting people’s agency so that everyone can participate 
in inclusive public reasoning. 
Under these structuring conditions, it is Sen’s nonideal justice that (primarily) 
provides guidance about how to reduce injustice in the here and now—even if 
bounded by ideal justice. Its results ought to be judged from the perspective of 
comprehensive outcomes (where outcomes and processes are viewed from the 
perspective of how well they serve ideal theory). Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that one cannot obtain any practical guidance from Rawls’ ideal justice (e.g. Boot 
2012, Valentini 2011), though this is not its main role. Nonetheless, any political 
action inspired by it would also be restrained by the condition of nonideal justice 
(i.e. the process needs to respect people’s agency and the outcome has to go in 
the direction of ideal theory). As such, these conditions constitute a synergetic 
dual model between Rawls’ ideal and Sen’s nonideal theory. However, given the 
difficulties of successfully translating ideal theory into practice (chapter III), one 
could say that it is Sen’s nonideal justice that normatively orients social and 
political efforts to reduce injustice. Although deriving a fully sketched principle to 
inform action is beyond this dissertation, one could say in very broad terms that 
this dual framework aims at guiding political action under the following 
encompassing nonideal guiding principle:  
(P1) Political action should enhance all relevant capabilities (including an enabling 
institutional context) that enable people to be active agents in public 
deliberation, as well as any other relevant capabilities that people have 
reason to value as long as they promote the goal of ideal theory, while 
respecting individual’s agency throughout, to the largest possible extent79. 
This guiding principle is in line with the overall objective of the dual framework 
and highlights the two main aspects of Sen’s nonideal theory (capabilities and 
                                                        
79  Considering the ideal of ‘democratic equality’, Anderson (1999) proposes a broad rule to 
demarcate the necessary capabilities to participate as equals in society. In her view, the relevant 
capabilities are those that ‘enable [people] to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social 
relationships’ and those that are ‘necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state’ 
(p. 316). Arguably, one could say that these rules for selecting capabilities overlap with the guiding 
principle [P1] identified above. This chapter, however, goes further by critically reflecting on the 




agency for public discussion). Similarly, in line with Sen’s writings, it emphasises 
that violating people’s agency in the name of greater justice is to be avoided. 
Precisely, this is what makes it morally desirable (as it treats individual as ends in 
themselves). It also means that, in the process of enhancing capabilities, 
individuals should be engaged as active agents rather than passive beneficiaries 
(Sen 1999a). But the phrase ‘to the largest possible extent’ indicates that in 
certain circumstances one state of affairs may be more just than another even if 
it comes about as a result of a less inclusive process (see Gilabert 2008). This 
can be in line with the notion of ‘comprehensive outcomes’. 
Once we know what kind of guidance a dual model (i.e. Sen’s nonideal theory 
bounded by the ideal)80  can provide, the question which remains is whether 
promoting such capabilities can prove to be useful to counteract injustice in real-
life unjust contexts. This would depend on how the guidance it provides translates 
into more grounded injustice-reducing actions. That is, all previous theoretical 
work along with the guiding principle derived from it is a step forward, but it is not 
enough to assess its expediency in practical terms. The point of this chapter is to 
emphasise that one still needs to think about, for example, what it would mean in 
practical terms to promote a capability to ‘function as an equal citizen in a 
democratic state’ (to use Anderson’s phrase) or what a good strategy for political 
action in order to successfully achieve these goals would be. This chapter 
attempts to develop these points from the perspective of a Rawls/Sen dual model. 
In-depth thinking about these concerns is rather limited among theories of justice. 
In general, there is almost no theoretical reflection (even if in very broad terms) 
about how these normative ideas can/ought to be translated into practice to 
remain true to their intention. Sen himself, for example, explicitly avoids providing 
any guide for action to reduce injustice. To the questions of ‘How can individuals’ 
capabilities be enhanced?’ and ‘How can people’s agency be enhanced?’, Sen 
advises that this would vary along with the specific circumstances. Consistent with 
his commitment to respect people’s freedom (opportunity and process aspect), 
his framework is open for each contextual reality to decide what kind of political 
actions are best suited for each situation (Deneulin 2014a). The actual form that 
social or political actions take to enhance capabilities would have to account for 
                                                        
80 From this point forward, when referring to the guidance that a dual framework offers, the chapter 
uses ‘a dual framework’ or ‘Sen’s nonideal theory’ interchangeably to mean the connection between 
ideal and nonideal theory identified above. This delimits the range of capabilities and thus it is 




different values, local interpretations, people’s agency, the specific issue at hand, 
and so on. That is, the translation of his normative demands into a specific social 
reality has to be context-dependent. Hence, there seems to be a vacuum that 
separates these abstract philosophical ideas from the context where they are 
meant to be relevant. The separation between these two, nevertheless, might be 
stopping too early and it might be indicative of missing too much.  
Although the reasons for not stipulating specific rules for action are obvious and 
there is no intention to dispute its basic tenet, there still might be good reasons to 
further revise the relation between normative ideas and the social context. For 
once we accept that normative demands still need to be translated within specific 
social circumstances, we also have to accept that those social circumstances 
become highly relevant in the pursuit of justice. Thus, we must also be wary that 
in (rightly) seeking to be sensitive to contextual realities, we do not end up going 
too far in the opposite direction, namely conceding too much to the particular 
dynamics of the context. This might be especially true in countries such as Mexico 
where the distance between the contextual reality and the transcendental 
demands of justice is abysmal. In these situations, by simply relegating the 
context to a secondary level of importance, normative ideas of justice might face 
a bigger challenge to prove useful to rectify injustice.  
One problem with stating that the practical matters of justice ought to be context-
dependent is that it gives the mistaken impression that there is nothing beyond 
that claim worthy of academic theorisation. It assumes that a sound theoretical 
justification of a conceptual framework of justice will—by extension—provide 
equally sound guidance in practice. It implicitly treats the social context as a mere 
recipient of justice. But if development is about making the world more just—in 
the sense that this dissertation has discussed it should—then this position may 
not be fully justifiable. It overlooks that there can be a huge mismatch between 
the intentions to advance justice and the kind of political action that is actually 
implemented in its name. It is in this sense that we still need to critically reflect 
about the kind of guidance that Sen’s nonideal theory is likely to inspire in practice. 
Only then may we come to realise that the analytical detachment between its 
normative framework and the context of application may turn out to be 
problematic. To build this argument, this chapter draws on some core ideas of the 
critical theory tradition that directly sheds light on the practical issues of reducing 





5.3 Rearticulating the critique of critical theories 
The beginning of this chapter argued that the practical value of a dual framework 
should be judged not by its direct application in the real world but by the kind of 
guidance it can command to rectify injustices. This section examines a 
strengthened version of Sen’s framework (i.e. as part of the dual framework) in 
this endeavour. Following the critical perspective, it will argue that by failing to 
adequately grasp the unjust social context where it is meant to inform political 
action, the guidance it offers remains restricted in its scope and thus vulnerable 
to particularities of the unjust context itself. Specifically, it shows that Sen’s 
conceptual framework risks putting outside of its direct normative scope some 
aspects which may be crucial to remedy injustice, namely the social dynamics of 
the unjust status quo. This in turn will have important implications for a dual 
framework. The analysis will suggest that it requires an additional component to 
be practically useful. In doing so, this chapter reinterprets critical theory in such a 
way that it can further complement a dual framework for rectifying injustice in 
practice.  
 
5.3.1 Insights from critical theory 
Critical theories are usually discussed in relation to Rawlsian-like ideal theories. 
Moreover, far from being a simple critique, critical theories usually conceive of 
themselves as ontological positions that are fundamentally opposed to ideal 
theories. This may seem to jeopardise the intention of uniting critical theory with 
a dual framework that already contains Rawlsian ideal theory. This dissertation 
does not engage directly in this debate. Rather, to the extent that their critiques 
can be related to the shortcomings of ideal theories in practice and thus are similar 
to the discussion on ideal/nonideal theories (chapter III), this dissertation assumes 
that one does not need to take this strong ontological opposition81. Moreover, only 
some core ideas of critical theories, as opposed to a whole theory, will be 
borrowed to advance the argument of this chapter. This in turn might offer a 
distinct possibility to deal with what are often viewed as two irreconcilable 
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positions. Thus, ideas presented here are deliberatively selected for the purposes 
of this chapter and as such are not intended to capture the wide diversity and 
richness of different critical theories at length. 
Critical theories argue that a conception of justice can emerge only from the 
realities and experiences of injustice embedded in specific social settings (Pereira 
2013, Young 1990; see also Schwartzman 2006, Fraser 2012). From this 
perspective, ideal theories of justice are seen as inherently flawed for countering 
injustice in the world in two different ways: (a) in the kind of abstraction which they 
rely on and (b) in the distributive remedies proposed. On the first issue, they argue 
that by idealising away certain characteristics in their theorising (i.e. race, gender, 
ethnicity, and so on), they automatically render invisible these types of injustices 
along with the specific ways in which they are experienced by the members of 
such groups in real life. Consequently, ideal theories legitimise and contribute to 
the perpetuation of injustice for some—so-called—minorities82. This is because 
these theories completely disregard already-existent social dynamics of 
discrimination and oppression within actual institutions and practices (e.g. Mills 
2005, Young 1990). 
The second concern poses a strong challenge to the ‘redistributive’ means 
through which Rawlsian-like theories could respond to injustices83. The problem, 
critical theorists argue, is the way in which these approaches understand 
someone’s advantage or disadvantage purely in terms of the amount of 
holdings—of whatever is deemed valuable from the point of justice—that an 
individual possesses in relation to another. Subsequently, the solution to rectify 
an injustice from the point of view of these redistributive theories is by transferring 
a certain amount of the specific currency of justice (such as Rawlsian primary 
goods) to those affected. Critical theorists condemn this form of remedy because 
it ends up reducing the scope of justice only to tangible things that can be divisible 
between people. And at the same time, it tends to reify wrongdoings that happen 
through social relations (including cultural, symbolic and communicative 
processes) as well as the institutional context in which injustices are experienced 
(Young 1990, pp. 27–30). As a result, these theories of justice can contribute to 
                                                        
82 For instance, they highlight injustices to ethnic, racial, gender and religious groups, among others. 
See Meer et al. (2012), Eskelinen (2011), Thompson (2006), Anaya (2004), Fraser (1998a, 1997), 
Taylor (1994).  
83 This point follows Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990). This point is related to 
the metrics of justice employed and, as such, will be relevant when analysing Sen’s nonideal 




maintaining or even worsening the way in which individuals experience injustice84 
(see also Fraser 1997, 1995; Koggel 2013). 
The main idea, then, is that focusing on the distribution of ‘goods’ is simply not 
enough for neutralising the kind of injustices suffered by many individuals, 
especially those members of historically disadvantaged ‘minorities’ such as the 
ones mentioned before. This is well captured by Fraser’s (1998) example about a 
black man on Wall Street who could not get a taxi on his way home from work for 
no one would stop to pick him up, presumably because of the colour of his skin. 
In this case, his disadvantage could be neither explained nor rectified by a focus 
on liberties (in the formal institutional sense), opportunities to access a position 
(as he was clearly working on Wall Street, although from the example one could 
not know whether he faced other obstacles in getting the job in the first place), or 
income. Rather, she suggests, the injustice to which he is subjected is of a 
different kind. It is the result of a cultural or symbolic order that devalues certain 
particularities of the individual in question (in this case, skin colour). Thus, 
accounting and redressing transgressions to these aspects of life—what is usually 
called ‘recognition’—should be no less relevant than redistribution to respond to 
injustice effectively (see Fraser 1998a, 1998b, 1997; Honneth 2001, Taylor 1994, 
Young 1990)85.  
Underlying these two critiques are some common features that can be drawn for 
the purposes of this dissertation. In broad terms, critical theory could be 
understood as a group of theorists who share three main points. First, they see 
their approach to justice as being entrenched in a specific understanding of the 
social world—primarily about the nature of injustice in the real world—which in 
turn informs their specific conceptualisations of justice. Notwithstanding their 
different approaches, they all consider the understanding of people’s experiences 
of injustice in reality as essential to develop useful guidance to overcome it86. 
                                                        
84 Some scholars, however, consider that liberal theories of justice can take into account at least 
some of these demands in a satisfactory way without having to renounce their distributive criteria 
(e.g. Kymlicka 1995).  
85 There are, of course, important differences between critical theorists and their understanding of 
these injustices. Not all of these scholars would be equally represented by this depiction. For 
instance, instead of using the term of ‘recognition’, some present their critiques under the notion of 
difference of identity. (See Bird 2004 for a critical discussion of the difficulties of relying on the 
concept of identity.) However, they are all presented here as a group for the sake of analysis.  
86 Distinct theories understand this feature differently which in turn shapes their own theory. For 
example, some conceptualise these vulnerabilities as a disparagement in status (Fraser 2000) or 
distortions of identity (Honneth 2001, Taylor 1994) or forms of oppression (Young 1990). For a 




Second, they consider that injustice happens in intersubjective relationships and 
hence that the relevant space for action must include relational features. Finally, 
they consider that liberal notions of justice are not helpful to understand these 
vulnerabilities correctly and as such that their remedies are limited.  
Although there are several important critical theories that advance these points, 
this dissertation does not attempt to defend or endorse a particular theory. 
Instead, the intention is to capture what can be viewed as a shared ground of all 
of them in order to set the stage for analysing the practical limitations of the 
guidance provided by a dual framework. For this purpose, the main insight taken 
from critical theories is the overarching social and relational nature of injustice as 
being the main determinant for developing appropriate social and political 
reforms. It is on the basis of this core aspect that the next section examines the 
dual framework and its expediency on its stage of application. 
 
5.3.2 Assessing Sen’s nonideal theory from a relational lens 
Considering previous chapters, one could wonder to what extent these critiques 
apply to either Rawls’ theory or Sen’s framework as they have extended their 
focus of justice to a point that only with great difficulty do they relate to these 
criticisms (e.g. see Pereira 2013, Laegaard 2005, Robeyns 2003a). In response 
to these objections, this dissertation has argued that Rawls’ ideal theory already 
provides an adequate basis to condemn as unjust the mere fact that gender, race, 
ethnic, or other differences amongst people are key determinant for people’s 
unequal liberties, unequal opportunities, and unequal standards of life. It provides 
a moral call for striving for the equality of status of individuals regardless of their 
different identities such that those differences become morally costless for 
people’s lives. Similarly, some scholars argue that Rawls’ whole corpus already 
takes into account at least some of the issues of recognition that critical theories 
emphasise (e.g. Laegaard 2005, see also Pereira 2013). But, although one may 
concede these points about Rawls, they miss the mark nevertheless. For the 
issue at hand is not whether his theory can encompass these issues but whether 
it can offer adequate guidance to remedy such injustices. As discussed previously 
(chapter III), it is on that practical matter where Rawls fails. So the real question 
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is whether a dual framework where Sen’s nonideal theory is the one orienting 
political action through the guiding principle (P1) is well suited to do that.  
The first thing to point out is that, in orienting practical action, Sen’s normative 
body (P1) can be reduced to a focus on people’s capabilities. It is true that Sen’s 
strong emphasis on public reasoning can usefully direct our attention to the quality 
of the political structure to ensure that it is as inclusive as possible (Deneulin 
2014a). However, given that his position on public reasoning remains extremely 
vague, entirely normative, and disconnected from the social context where is 
supposed to inform action, it still leaves us far from the right place from where to 
reduce injustice. It does not tell us anything about what would make a public 
discussion acceptable or what kind of actions would improve it87. According to 
critical theories, to be in a position of providing valuable guidance would require 
information about the ways in which some people experience political exclusion, 
why they are excluded, in which ways they can be excluded, and by whom they 
are excluded. This involves taking into account a relational view of the way in 
which income inequality, power dynamics of society, and different intersubjective 
mechanisms curtail the liberties and opportunities of some individuals to 
participate in public life88. As Hutchings (2010) puts it, to inform adequate policies 
requires us to answer ‘what is unjust to whom and how’ (cited by Martineau and 
Squires 2012, p. 530) and this is something on which Sen’s framework does not 
offer much detail. 
To this last objection, Sen might reply that these nuances are context-dependent 
and that what matters is that the reasoning process in these situations are 
evaluated from the point of view of individuals’ real opportunities to participate and 
the kind of life that people are able to lead. For example, arguably, Drèze and Sen 
(2013) come very close to meeting the demands raised by critical theorists. In An 
Uncertain Glory, they analyse ‘Democracy, Inequality, and Public Reasoning’ 
(chapter 9) in detail for the context of India. They identify the pros and the cons of 
the democratic institutional context, those who are consistently excluded from 
representation, and the potential reasons for this exclusion in which the media, 
interest groups, and inequality play a major role. Although the analysis is certainly 
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of what is called ‘deliberative democracy’. 
88 See Fraser (1997, chapter 3) for examples about the kind of difficulties that a notion of public 
reasoning faces. See also Martineau and Squires (2012) for other references. See Koggel (2013) 




insightful, it is much less meticulous in the solutions it proposes, which are limited 
to more public discussion, protests, and especially more political representation 
of the deprived. And in order to achieve this, ‘individuals must be individually 
capable of participating in public deliberation’ (Kelly 2012, cited by Sen 2012, p. 
334). That is, even when assessing the failures and the accomplishments of the 
institutional web in which public reasoning is embedded, this assessment ought 
to be in relation to individual capabilities. One could argue, then, that the primary 
guiding action of Sen’s nonideal theory is that of expanding people’s freedoms 
(including the agency freedom to participate). Therefore, the relevant concern is 
whether focusing on enhancing capabilities is likely to promote effective political 
action to reduce injustice in the broader sense that critical theories demand.  
In this regard, the metrics of capability seems promising at first. The notion of 
capability is exclusively developed to account for the myriad types of 
vulnerabilities that individuals face in the pursuit of their life plan. By paying 
attention to what people are really able to do and be, it recognises the urgency to 
connect normative demands of justice to people’s contextual realities; it 
acknowledges ‘the interconnectedness and complexity of kinds of injustices and 
the need for a detailed, contextual account to capture them’ (Koggel 2013, p. 149). 
Similarly, by emphasising interpersonal variations to convert resources into actual 
freedoms, the capability space is able to accommodate the intersubjective 
phenomena of recognition stressed by critical scholars (Pereira 2013, Robeyns 
2003a). This is achieved by recognising that social and relational circumstances 
can be some of the factors affecting the real freedom that individuals enjoy. As a 
matter of illustration, one could say that, other things being equal, the capability 
set that one member of a particular ethnicity enjoys is greater (and thus more just) 
if she lives within a social arrangement where the symbolic order does not devalue 
her particular ethnicity, and thus does not suffer from these social transgressions. 
In this way, the notion of capabilities can capture institutional deficiencies in 
cultural and symbolic issues against specific characteristics, such as race, 
gender, and so on, that inhibit a person’s ability to be and do what they have 
reason to value (Robeyns 2003a). The capability approach, then, can broaden 
the scope of the metrics of justice to understand someone’s disadvantage as it 





For example, let us take the social context of Mexico, in which not only do 
indigenous people have fewer opportunities for education, health, good quality 
jobs, and participation in public, but also their physical appearance and the way 
they dress and talk are constant targets for shame and humiliation (e.g. see 
PNUD 2010, Méndez 2016). A capability-based evaluation is able to capture both 
of these infringements of justice, including the cultural injustice that critical 
theories underline. In fact, for these reasons, even some critical scholars find in 
the capability approach a better metric for their own concerns (Pereira 2013, 
Anderson 1999). Yet one could still argue that, although this might prove that the 
notion of capabilities can be a powerful metric of justice for capturing the different 
ways in which people’s freedom may be thwarted, this does not prove its 
usefulness to inform the kind of political action which is likely to counteract them. 
One must not assume that just because the concept of capability can easily be 
stretched to account for a variety of capability inputs (e.g. resources, institutional 
web) and other relevant factors (e.g. environmental, social, personal) (Sen 1999a, 
Robeyns 2005), it is automatically qualified to influence policy in the right direction 
to successfully overcome injustice on its own. Here, the focus would be on the 
actual practice that can emerge from Sen’s nonideal theory and on analysing its 
normative scope for action. In this respect, Alkire (2008) distinguishes between 
what can be called the ‘evaluative’ role of a capability framework and the 
‘prospective’ role—what this chapter referred to as guiding action or guiding 
principle. This section focuses on the latter, i.e. on the role associated with 
‘policies, activities, and recommendations…likely to generate’ the desired 
outcomes (Alkire 2008, p. 30). This practical emphasis, nonetheless, has to be 
distinguished from the previous part related to the theoretical justification of the 
dual framework89. 
This means that, as in the debate about ideal/nonideal theory, it will also be 
important to make a distinction between: 
(A) the theoretical soundness of the dual framework (i.e. being morally and 
desirably justifiable) and  
                                                        
89 Alkire (2008) seems to reduce the prospective aspect only to studies involving empirical analysis. 
In strict terms, this responds to the fact that the appropriateness of solutions would vary according 
to the context. However, there is no reason to believe that no refinements can be made to the notion 




(B) the kind of guidance it commands to rectify injustice in practice. 
Although these two aspects may be serially related (i.e. if aspect ‘A’ is rejected, 
then ‘B’ does not take place), they are independent from each other. This means 
that failing in aspect ‘B’ does not imply that a theory also fails in aspect ‘A’. This 
chapter is thus concerned only with aspect ‘B’ (i.e. the guiding action). It assumes 
that Rawls’/Sen’s dual framework already covers aspect ‘A’. Therefore, what 
remains to be demonstrated is whether it can deliver guidance to make a society 
less unjust. The following analysis will show that it is in this precise respect that 
the usefulness of the notion of capability may not be as straightforward as it first 
appears.  
 
5.3.3 The capability misinterpretation of injustice 
Sen affirms that his framework aims at guiding political action, in which case the 
‘evaluative becomes prescriptive’ (Ballet et al. 2014, p. 16). Therefore, the 
information that is included as part of the notion of capabilities and the precise 
way in which this information is understood become highly relevant for the kind of 
action that it can command to redress people’s disadvantage. It is in this 
guidance-oriented analysis of the capability metric, or prospective analysis (as 
opposed to the evaluative-oriented), that there are at least two caveats. These 
are closely related to the way in which injustice is constructed as capability-
deprivation, which in turn confines the scope of actions taken to rectify it. 
This analysis follows the two above points raised by critical theories, namely (1) 
the importance of social dynamics within actual social contexts and (2) the 
importance of intersubjective mistreatments. The analysis presented here will be 
a valuable exercise to start demarcating (even if at a general level) between 
desirable and non-desirable ways to operationalise capabilities in practice. Or at 
least, it can minimally be seen as a reminder of what ‘advancing capabilities’ 
should not be reduced to.  
The status quo of injustice 
The first issue is related to the inability to direct attention to ‘social structures and 
institutional contexts under evaluation’ (Young 1990, p. 20). This critique worries 




disregard the social processes of the unjust status quo in which individuals 
function and its perpetuation. Indeed, for Sen, these are treated only as 
instrumentally relevant for people’s freedom and thus are kept somewhere in the 
background but no real judgement is directed at these processes. In Sen’s (IJ) 
words: 
Ultimately, it is individual evaluation on which we would have to draw, 
while recognizing the profound interdependence of the valuation of 
individuals who interact with each other…In valuing a person’s ability to 
take part in the life of society [or any capability for that matter], there is an 
implicit valuation of the life of the society itself, and that is an important 
enough aspect of the capability perspective (p. 246, emphasis added). 
In admitting that there is only an implicit valuation of social life, there seems to be 
also an implicit acknowledgement that the metric of capability can go only that far 
in passing judgement on structural phenomena. As a result, current behaviours 
and actions that contribute to the persistence of such structures could risk being 
overlooked by a capability-informed policy. This concern is well known within the 
capability approach and was briefly introduced in the previous chapter when 
referring to Sen’s ethical individualism (e.g. see Stewart 2013, Leßmann 2011, 
Alkire 2008, Deneulin and McGregor 2010, Deneulin 2008, 2006, De Herdt and 
Deneulin 2007, Robeyns 2005, Hill 2003). In this respect, some capability 
scholars also demand wider recognition of the social nature of structures. They 
urge us to recognise that, although the existence of such structures depends on 
individuals’ behaviours, they cannot be accurately understood as individuals’ 
property alone. For instance, they identify that a purely individual focus does not 
appraise correctly the structural nature of social power and democratisation, the 
background of norms and values underlying the meaning of individual actions, the 
preference formation of individuals, and so on (e.g. Stewart 2013, Deneulin 2008, 
2006, Hill 2003, Gore 1997). They argue that these social structures are 
indispensable to understand and promote individual functionings. 
To illustrate, paraphrasing the example from Deneulin et al. (2006, pp. 6–7), one 
can conceive of a society such as Mexico where corruption is rampant and 
institutionalised at all levels. Imagine one person who detests corruption and 
values an honest life. However, one day she loses her job. Her mother, who is 




better opportunities to her own children. Soon, she realises that in order to get the 
initial permit to start her business, besides the regular quota, she has to pay a 
bribe to a bureaucrat—who also has to pay his immediate boss—if she does not 
want to wait more than a year or two to get the permit. She knows that not seizing 
that opportunity would hurt the opportunities of her children, so even if she does 
not want to contribute to a culture of corruption, she feels that she has no other 
choice. As Deneulin et al. (2006) put it, ‘[s]uch a person is forced into wrongdoing 
[s]he has not chosen and of which [s]he disapproves—but that has been imposed 
on [her] by an unjust structure. [She] can neither change the situation [herself] nor 
escape it’ (p. 6). The point of this story is to suggest that one must direct attention 
to the social processes themselves to fully understand the person’s situation.  
This example explains why the capability scholars who support this view advocate 
for including social structures as an intrinsic aspect of the evaluation of state of 
affairs along with individual capabilities. By insisting on including this aspect as a 
unit of moral concern, however, their position includes a more demanding aspect 
since it involves differentiating between good and bad structures which they see 
linked to good and bad individual choices. For instance, in the example above, 
they would mainly focus on the wrongdoing that the person is forced to do. In this 
section, in contrast, it suffices to acknowledge these injustice-generating 
processes90 and the unfitness of the action-guiding principle that a capability 
metric may inspire to address them successfully. For this purpose, one can 
endorse the content of the critique raised by capability scholars but not their 
conclusions. It is not necessary and it may not be fully compatible with a notion of 
development and justice that has individual freedom at its core (see Alkire 2008). 
As will be shown, one can recognise the importance of redirecting political action 
towards certain social mechanisms and, at the same time, place the individual as 
the relevant unit of moral concern (Robeyns 2005).  
From this stance, what the critique really captures is that a capability perspective 
would (inadequately) conceptualise this kind of situation only in terms of ‘end-
state patterns’ (Young 1990, p. 18). That is, it would focus only on what individuals 
are able (or not) to do and be, while not properly accounting for the processes 
that generate the resulting situation in the first place. To illustrate, let us go back 
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the person was also contributing to sustain an unjust system that disadvantages the poor who have 
less opportunity to participate in the economy since they are less likely to have the money to set up 




to the example of indigenous people in Mexico who, as mentioned, perform worse 
in several functioning domains and who are discriminated against. The real 
problem is that, from a capability perspective, the assessment of their situation 
would be conceptualised only in terms of the capability-deprivations that 
individuals have. However, this obscures the individual actions, attitudes, 
behaviours, symbols, and so on that continuously construct being indigenous in 
a devalued way as well as those that continuously affect their opportunities to live 
well. Therefore, a capability perspective may fail to direct political attention to the 
ex ante processes and mechanisms that lie behind the kind of lives that 
indigenous people in Mexico can live today. As Alkire (2008) acknowledges: 
[The evaluative aspect of capability] refer[s], ultimately to information on 
how people’s capabilities expanded or contracted. Because of this focus, 
information on causal chains only enter insofar as they affect endstates… 
the primary evaluative focus is whether capabilities have expanded [or 
decreased], rather than how and why such expansion [or decreasing] 
occurred (Alkire 2008, p. 32).  
As a result of this limitation, the scope of a pure capability-informed action 
guidance may be considerably reduced. This worry is well captured by Deneulin 
(2011c), who states that by ‘separating the evaluation from the analysis of the 
political economy and power relations which are responsible for the states of 
affairs may risk reinforcing the status quo and perpetuating injustice’ (pp. 3–4) 
(see also Hickey 2014, Koggel 2013, Fraser 1997, 1995). Moreover, it risks 
portraying the (unjust) status quo as if it were a neutral (i.e. not unjust) ground 
(see also Young 2011)91. Hence, to reduce injustice adequately, political action 
would have also to pay attention to the institutional rules, to how people’s ‘doings 
and havings are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their 
positions, and how the combined effect of their doings has recursive effects on 
their lives’ (Young 1990, p. 25)92. 
Injustice as relational 
                                                        
91 Pogge and Alvarez (2010) make a similar argument from a global perspective. However, their 
argument is presented more as a theoretical criticism of Sen’s comparative framework, in 
comparison with the more practical focus of this section. 
92 This is what Fraser (1995) refers to as the ‘underlying generative framework’ (p. 82; see also 




A second difficulty relates to the way in which relational injustices of recognition 
are prone to be interpreted and to the limited political response that a capability 
metric can command. Although this issue has received much less attention, it can 
be seen as interrelated to the previous one. It is also associated with the 
individualist understanding of the capability perspective but in a different way. 
Here, the idea is that even if it does acknowledge that individuals are social 
animals embedded in social realities, a capability metric would still judge a state 
of affairs solely in relation to the freedom that individuals have or lack (see 
Deneulin 2008, Gore 1997). As such, the focus of the metric is only on the 
freedoms of individuals while constructing any other relational phenomena as an 
object that either facilitates or obstructs such individual freedom. Therefore, 
strictly speaking, its conception of individual freedom remains essentially ‘asocial’ 
in the sense that a person may be a ‘player’ in society but ‘s/he is not involved in 
any [social] interaction’ (Ballet et al. 2014, p. 21). 
To illustrate and expose the implications of the latter, let us take again the 
example of the intersubjective mistreatment that indigenous people in Mexico 
experience. The previous chapter mentioned that it is not uncommon that 
people—including highly ranked public servants—mock the way indigenous 
people speak, look and dress (e.g. see El Economista 2015, Tourliere 2015). 
Consider now an even more telling and more direct example of mistreatment that 
indigenous people are subjected to every day. This is the case of a famous 
indigenous poet who was about to travel to present at a public event. Because 
she was dressed in a typical indigenous gown, she was arbitrarily detained, 
harassed and humiliated in an airport by a member of the federal police (Juarez 
2015). What is at stake in this case is not whether a capability perspective can 
capture these social phenomena (it can); rather, the problem is about the kind of 
guidance it can provide to remedy it. This crucially depends on how this relational 
phenomenon is conceptualised within the space of capabilities, as only 
instrumentally relevant to individual freedom or simply as a conversion factor that 
an individual has. 
Importantly, the argument is not against the idea of conversion factors as such 
but about how to deal with them in order to advance justice. To illustrate how the 
idea of conversion factors work in practice, consider Sen’s example of a person 
with physical deficiencies (a personal conversion factor) which inhibit her ability 




(rightly) point to the fact that the person might require more food (or more 
resources) in order to achieve adequate nutritional levels. This type of example is 
similarly applied to personal differences and other conversion factors such as 
environmental factors, age, and so on (see Sen 1999a, chapters 4 and 5). These 
examples show that the idea of conversion factors can be a very valuable concept 
to adequately deal with such problems. But, although this may be a sensible 
response to these types of conversion factors, one must be wary of treating those 
conversion factors associated with social factors in the same way—even if Sen 
sometimes seems to imply that they can be treated in the same way.  
By treating them as conversion factors, Sen’s framework would fail to understand 
relational injustices properly (e.g. a racist comment, a misogynist attitude, 
humiliation to indigenous people). Instead of conceptualising these as a relational 
interaction between two persons exercising their agency, Sen’s capability 
framework can reduce the agency of the perpetrator (person B) to an object that 
either facilitates or thwarts the capability of person A. Thus, although a capability 
perspective can identify the injustice, it misinterprets it. Rather than being 
appraised as the result of the exercise of someone’s agency, it is at best taken as 
a conversion factor, as it could be the weather or someone’s age or someone’s 
disability. Consequently, the scope of remedies may be reduced to compensatory 
action to restore the downgraded capability while leaving the source of the 
injustice (i.e. other’s agency) intact93. This is implicitly suggested in the literature: 
Established patterns of behaviour in a community may also substantially 
vary the need for income to achieve the same elementary functionings (IJ, 
p. 255). 
For the assessment of individual capability sets…one would carefully 
scrutinize the social, environmental and personal conversion factors… If 
one of those conversion factors can be argued to lower the conversion of 
income (or other primary goods) into valuable capabilities, then this could 
possibly provide a claim for either extra resources, or other social policies 
or public goods’ (Robeyns 2009b, p. 409).  
Although Robeyns, in contrast to Sen, leaves room for various solutions aside 
from ‘extra resources’, it is not clear at all that the capability metric on its own 
                                                        





could prompt guidance other than enhancing a person’s own individual 
capabilities or her own agency—probably through improving her opportunities of 
education, health, resources, or something else. Certainly, there are very good 
reasons to promote such actions, yet if that is the only course of action taken, it 
would still obscure the intersubjective nature of the injustice. That is, a capability-
informed guidance may end up reifying non-material factors by conceiving them 
as immutable instead of conceptualising them as a ‘function of social relations’ 
(Young 1990, p. 16). In this narrow view, the metrics of capabilities would be only 
an improved version of the type of ‘goods’ that need to be redistributed to rectify 
injustice.  
After analysing these two points of concern (the social nature of the unjust status 
quo and the relational nature of injustice), one has reason to be sceptical of the 
kind of guidance that a capability metric can command on its own. Even if it can 
successfully identify the forms that injustice can take, it misdiagnoses it. It 
constructs all social phenomena as an object that affects people’s conversion of 
resources into wellbeing, while potentially excluding them from direct intervention. 
In doing so, it minimises the significance of distinct cultural phenomena, people’s 
values and identities, power dynamics, structural injustice, among other 
phenomena, and brings them to a lesser role than the one they might actually 
play. That is, the particularities of the social context are seen as being somehow 
external to, and separated from, matters of normative justice and injustice. As a 
result, it leaves out the possibility to analyse further whether some of these 
contextual features are essential—at least partly—to better understand the 
injustices that are called for remedy. Paradoxically, in attempting to respect the 
social context, it goes too far in the direction where the unjust context and the 
mechanisms that reproduce it can remain unchallenged. In this way, the context 
becomes nothing more than the filter through which normative ideas ought to be 
passed; it becomes a recipient of justice rather than a ground of injustice that 
needs to be dealt with. 
This position is almost explicit in Sen; while his approach departs from a notion of 
injustice, he also considers it irrelevant to scrutinise the origin of such injustice 
(see also Hickey 2014). By being inherently symptom-oriented, he disregards the 
mechanisms that produce and maintain the illness of injustice. Consequently, the 
treatments that this approach could originate would be limited to the symptoms of 




sensitive, a capability metric can also be quite disdainful and not considerate 
enough of social reality. Essentially, this means that the urgent task of developing 
a systematic framework for guiding effective socio-political action to counteract 
injustice remains unfinished. Dealing with these worries cannot be but 
fundamental to a political project concerned with constructing a more just society. 
This is precisely the main motivation of the next section, namely to critically reflect 
about the way in which the normative ideas of a dual framework ought (or at least 
ought not) to be translated in practice in order to fulfil its promise of orienting 
justice-enhancing change. This will imply broadening traditional 
conceptualisations of injustice. 
  
5.4 A relational ground of dynamic injustice 
The previous section showed that, by analytically detaching its normative 
demands from the unjust context where it is meant to be relevant, Sen’s nonideal 
framework restricts its scope for socio-political action. Although this limitation 
does not discredit the theoretical soundness of a dual framework or the practical 
guidance that one can obtain from it, it does reveal its incompleteness and its 
insufficiency to transform the context of injustice. It stressed that focusing on 
advancing individual capabilities remains too narrow to be promising for the 
prospect of building a more just world—in the sense of Rawls’ ideal theory. Sen’s 
nonideal guiding principle for informing action (1) fails to adequately appraise the 
kinds of injustices that individuals experience from other people’s doings as a 
result of, or in the form of, cultural, symbolic, or communicative phenomena and 
(2) forecloses the possibility to examine, and thus criticise, the dynamics of how 
injustice occurs in interaction and how it is transmitted. Any remedial action that 
fails to take these into account would remain insufficient and thus, in the worst-
case scenario, may end up reproducing injustice. 
This is precisely where the real contribution of critical theory lies for the purposes 
of this dissertation, in convincingly showing that actual people’s behaviour and 
interpersonal interactions are a constitutive element of the existence of injustice. 
‘For many aspects of social structure and institutional context cannot be brought 
into view without examining social processes and the unintended cumulative 
consequences of individual actions’ (Young 1990, p. 30; see also Young 2006, 




plays a significant role in the reproduction of injustice, a critical perspective 
exposes that the problem with a dual framework is not solely an issue of 
misguidance. It is foremost about the more fundamental problem of 
misinterpreting injustice which is, arguably, the underlying reason behind its 
shortcoming in implementation. It exposes that, for Sen’s nonideal theory, in 
practice, injustice comes to mean nothing more than the lack of justice, i.e. 
capability-deprivation94. As such, it disregards the overarching social nature of 
injustice. 
The tragedy of this interpretation of injustice is that it can give us the wrong idea 
that injustice is something static, an unfortunate situation in which one simply finds 
herself95. Either a person is in a situation that needs more public engagement or 
more ‘informed and enlightened agency [of the individual]’ (Drèze and Sen 2013, 
chapter 8) or some individuals have a capability-deprivation that needs to be 
enhanced. But, as argued before, injustice is not a condition that simply emerges 
from an unexpectedly external factor making someone’s situation unjust. Injustice 
is not natural, it is human-made. And even if injustice becomes institutionalised, 
injustice always depends on human actions to be maintained. It can be the 
outcome of the cumulative of indirect actions of individuals ‘minding their own 
business’ (Young 2011, p. 63; see also Deneulin 2011c). Or it can be the result 
of social practices or intersubjective interactions (or both) that continuously 
degrade, disrespect, ignore or stereotype others and maintain and reproduce 
oppressive structures that invariably favour some and disfavour others (e.g. see 
Young 1990, Taylor 1994, Honneth 2001, Fraser 1997). Similarly, Deneulin et al. 
(2006) show how ‘personal wrongdoing’ reproduces unjust structures which in 
turn ‘constrain individual’s actions’ to act unjustly (p. 6; see also Deneulin 2011a, 
2011b). 
The relevant point is that, from a critical perspective, neither (formal) institutional 
reforms nor capability expansions or the two together would be able to surpass 
social differences in terms of liberties and opportunities unless the social 
processes, individual actions, and intersubjective relations that generate such 
                                                        
94In TJ, however, Rawls does identify the origin of injustice in the basic structure of society. But, 
given its ideal nature, he does not deal with the social processes adequately (Young 2006) and thus 
it is not free from tensions (Mckeown 2014, chapter 4). In a more practice-oriented view, 
nevertheless, because there cannot be a one-step transformation, the urgency is to reflect about 
ways in which positive changes can be brought about, as this chapter does. 
95 This is meant to capture the fact that Sen’s primary focus is on end-states without sufficiently 
accounting for the generative social processes. Thus, it does not suggest that it falls within 




differences are altered. In this sense, by failing to adequately appraise the social 
context where it is meant to inform action, Sen’s normative recommendations 
remain highly vulnerable to the particularities of the unjust context. Its political 
guidance remains superficial (Fraser 1998a, 1997, 1995; Hickey 2014) and thus 
not effective to reduce injustice96. With these arguments, critical theories expose 
the deficiencies of the guiding strategy that a dual framework can advance. In 
contrast to ideal theory but complementarily at the same time, critical theories 
urge us to realise that, in order to transform unjust realities, one must generate 
(rather than assume) the conditions of equal dignity/status from where ideal 
theory departs. To do that, they insist, we need to look at how people relate to 
each other and the way in which these interactions impede these conditions of 
equality. 
It is in this way that critical theories expose that injustice is not simply the lack of 
justice. And by enlarging our conception of what the unjust context entails, they 
reveal that a dual framework must be further supplemented to render it fitter for 
practical purposes. That is, what a dual framework is lacking is a clear notion of 
the unjust situation where it is meant to inform political action. This conception will 
obviously vary depending on the particular context, but for the purpose of this 
dissertation, it suffices to adopt a broad general understanding of injustice that is 
able to take into account those social processes that generate it. To this end, in 
analogy with ideal theory that departs from the question ‘What is a just society?’ 
in order to identify what makes a society just, this dissertation takes the question 
‘What is an unjust society?’ as an appropriate starting point to examine what 
makes a society unjust. The broad answer that this dissertation proposes to this 
question is: 
What makes a society unjust is people’s actual behaviour, the cumulative of 
actions and interactions, which reinforce a social structure that maintains and 
reproduces different doings and beings that do not lead to a just society.  
This is what can be called the ‘grounding idea of relational injustice’. It provides a 
‘ground’ of injustice from where the scope of injustice-reduction political action 
must depart. It emphasises that social relations and the real agency that 
                                                        
96  For example, Fraser (1997, p. 23) differentiates between ‘affirmative’ and ‘transformative’ 
remedies to distinguish those that leave the processes and dynamics that generate injustice 
unchallenged from those that call for the transformation of that ‘underlying generative framework’. 
Whereas the former involves increasing the amount of inputs disposed by individuals, the latter 




individuals exercise cannot be detached from the kind of society that ultimately 
emerges, i.e. from what people can, or cannot, do and be. It conceives injustice 
in a dynamic way, i.e. as a human-made process in constant reproduction that 
results from people’s actions and interactions. That is, it recognises that the unjust 
context and its perpetuation are—to some extent—dependent on what people 
actually do and are, whether in the form of direct interaction (e.g. mistreating 
indigenous people) or simply the cumulative of individual actions that ultimately 
restrain people’s capabilities. (For a rich example of this kind, see Young 2011; 
see also Deneulin 2014a, 2013a, 2011a, 2011c.) In short, this ‘grounding idea of 
relational injustice’ highlights that besides individual capability-deprivation, 
injustice is also about the relational context that perpetuates it as well as the 
interactions in which such deprivations are experienced. For it is by looking at 
intersubjective interactions that one can determine whether an unjust structure is 
being further reinforced or destabilised.  
The practical implication of this relational level of injustice is to underscore that 
socio-political action needs to identify two distinct aspects of injustice: (1) lack of 
capabilities and (2) the dynamic aspect that maintains and reproduces the status 
quo. Hence, it requires distinguishing between actions needed to advance justice 
through expanding individuals’ capabilities (in the narrow sense) and actions that 
aim at destabilising the mechanisms and relations that work to perpetuate 
injustice. That is, to transform unjust social realities, political action has to 
enhance individuals’ capabilities and at the same time that it has to undermine 
injustice-generating interactions. Together, these two aspects can be seen as 
providing a refined (prospective) capability guiding principle to construct a more 
just society.  
The following figures illustrate this argument by means of graphical 
representation. They distinguish between: 
(a) a narrow conception of injustice understood as individual capability-
deprivation (i.e. lack of justice) informed by the narrow (evaluative) 
capability aspect and  
 
(b) a broad conception of injustice (i.e. capability-deprivation + dynamic 





Figure 5.1 presents a graph that already contains the two aspects of injustice 
(capability-deprivation and dynamic relational injustice) in order to explain their 
distinct effects within an unjust context. The horizontal axis represents the narrow 
(evaluative) metric of individual capability. The vertical axis represents the 
inverted effect of the dynamic relational aspect of injustice. That is, the top of the 
axis represents a point where an individual is not harmed by current social actions 
and interactions. Conversely, the bottom of the vertical axis represents the worst-
off situation for an individual, meaning someone who bears all the burdens of 
dynamic relational injustice. In this graph, for example, a slave (e.g. basically with 
no individual capabilities, no institutions to protect her, mistreated in her 
interactions and where people’s behaviour reinforce such social structure) would 
be positioned very near the origin of the graph where the two axes intersect. As 
will be shown later on, different individuals can be positioned in different points in 
the graph. For illustrative purposes, the graph starts with two polarising positions. 
Imagine that point ‘A’ represents a typical individual who is disadvantaged in 
terms of capabilities and also by social and intersubjective practices. Point B, in 
contrast, represents a situation that allows a person to live the life they have 
reason to value. 
 






Figure 5.2 embodies case (a) (i.e. narrow conception of injustice). The 45⁰ line in 
green represents an understanding of the world where injustice is equated simply 
with a lack of justice. Following the discussion above, this would be the case of a 
dual framework which is guided in practice by the narrow notion of individual 
capability on its own. In this case, the guiding action to promote justice for the 
person situated in point A who is currently disadvantaged both in terms of 
capabilities and in relational terms would be focalised towards promoting only her 
own individual capabilities, e.g. through access to more resources, education, 
health, participation, and so on. In this simple model, the underlying assumption 
is that by increasing the individual’s capabilities she will eventually be armoured 
against dynamic relational injustice and hence she would ultimately move 
upwards along the green line from point A towards point B. The problem is that 
for this to be the case, one would have to misconstrue all social phenomena as 
an object (and thus as not dynamic) that either obstructs or facilitates individuals’ 
freedom. That is, in this view, all ‘dynamic’ relational injustice becomes completely 
dependent on people’s possession of individual capabilities.  
 






For instance, this simplistic perspective would assume that a previously 
uneducated individual—e.g. an indigenous person in Mexico—who is now 
educated would be less likely to be discriminated against when applying for a job 
and therefore would keep climbing up along the green line or that, once 
opportunities are created for indigenous people to be included in public 
discussion, their point of view would be taken into account without prejudice. 
Similarly, it would implicitly suggest that providing access to education and health 
for poor indigenous women would make a difference in the community’s beliefs 
of women’s inferiority, including men’s beliefs that they can dispose of a women’s 
body as they please. One could object that this is an extremely simplistic way to 
put it. There are at least two things that can be objected to. First, one could say 
that, even if in a limited way, people are nonetheless better off as a result of these 
individual improvements. Second, it can be said that a capability perspective 
(even the narrow evaluative version) would still be able to capture those other 
kinds of unfreedoms that each of those individuals continues to suffer. This is 
because one could acknowledge that the persons in the previous examples still 
do not have the real opportunity to do and be what they have reason to value. 
Starting with the second objection, it is true, as previously acknowledged, that the 
ability to capture people’s distinct vulnerabilities is the approach’s greatest 
strength. Yet the problem would be that in all of the previous examples, individuals 
will never enjoy real substantive freedom unless the relevant other(s) grant(s) it 
to them in interaction (Pereira 2013). At this point, and returning to the argument 
previously made, the weakness of the narrow view of the capability metric is that 
it is unclear the extent to which it can orient political action beyond that of 
increasing individuals’ capabilities—while leaving the actions of others 
unchanged. As for the first objection, it is a valid one which would be hard to deny. 
All of these examples continue to be a demonstration of the valuable social 
improvements that a capability metric promotes and that cannot be neglected. 
The point that critical theories would raise is that focusing only on improving 
individuals’ capabilities may present a distorted reality that can shift attention 
away from the social mechanisms that generate (ex ante) those patterns of unjust 
distribution. It also forecloses the possibility that the kind of dynamic injustice that 




against her to the point that it nullifies her previous improvements (this will be 
illustrated in Figure 5.3 below)97.  
Moreover, in order to validate any of these situations as an actual advancement 
in justice—in the Rawlsian ideal sense—the person would actually have to move 
upwards and to the right towards point B. According to the issues raised earlier 
by critical theories, this may not be necessarily the case if social practices are not 
brought into question. In this respect, Figure 5.3 provides a better way to illustrate 
the difficulties that arise once the relational processes are taken seriously into 
account, thus embracing the broad grounding level of injustice (i.e. point (b) 
above).  
 
Figure 5.3. Broad relational injustice 
 
 
Figure 5.3 adds an extra line (i.e. the red curve). It aims at capturing the fact that 
once the dynamic relational aspect is acknowledged, political action focusing on 
expanding individual capabilities alone would tend to produce a social trajectory 
                                                        
97 In fact, there are various situations that would not be adequately appraised under the narrow view 
of focusing on increasing individual capabilities alone. For instance, it would not allow us to see that 
person A, a victim of dynamic relational injustice, can also be a perpetrator of such a social structure 




similar to that red line. What the red curve shows is that a minimum level of justice 
(e.g. institutions, liberties, resources) does indeed protect those individuals at the 
very bottom of the social scale from the most extreme social practices such as 
slavery, genocide or apartheid. But this improvement goes up only to a certain 
point A, in which these individuals are clearly better off than in the bottom (i.e. the 
origin of the graph) but also clearly worse off than those high up in the social scale 
(point B). This brings the situation to the one of Figure 5.2, where point A 
represents a disadvantaged person and point B represents a desirable point for 
individuals where they are free to live the life they have reason to value.  
The added value of this red curve is that it captures the profound impact of the 
social mechanisms that generate and perpetuate the unjust status quo on 
individuals’ lives. This red curve implies that beyond point A, the net effect of 
increasing individual capabilities will tend to be significantly minimised by existent 
social and relational interactions to which she is subjected. As a result, this 
change in individual holdings does not reflect a substantial change in her social 
position within this fractured society (e.g. the example of the educated indigenous 
person presented above). In the worst-case scenario, as the little black arrows try 
to show, it might even be the case that the effect of dynamic injustice can be as 
profound as to completely neutralise the positive effect of increasing someone’s 
capabilities. This can happen because of the augmented negative image 
constructed around those individuals who benefit from social programmes and yet 
do not succeed in improving their life chances (see Fraser 1997). This could be 
the case, for example, of a recently educated individual who does not succeed in 
finding a decent job because of the current social mechanism of discrimination 
against her appearance. This situation can lead to even more frustration which 
may make the individual think that her capability is useless. Without obtaining any 
tangible returns from her education, other disadvantaged persons may not fully 
appreciate the benefits of being educated and hence may discourage their 
children from education. At the same time, current social processes that 
stigmatise them as stupid and lazy may continue to reinforce their disadvantages 
or lack of capabilities. 
As suggested above, this analysis may indicate that advancing individual 
capabilities might not be ample enough to reduce concrete situations of injustice. 
Indeed, one could draw on several situations in the world today that may be well 




captured in Figure 5.3. By way of illustration, one could point to the black 
community in the U.S. whose individual capabilities have expanded significantly 
in recent decades and yet the social and relational practices continue to put them 
at a disadvantage to their white counterparts. Consider, for example, the case of 
Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, who was arrested ‘on suspicion he was 
breaking into a house that turn[ed] out to be his own home’ (Pilkington 2009). This 
phenomenon of black people getting arbitrarily detained and sometimes even 
killed by the U.S. police has become a recurrent headline in U.S. news. This and 
other social realities might be better explained by taking the approach of Figure 
5.3. 
This does not mean, however, that all the cases would be equally represented by 
point A and point B in the graph. There are different individuals whose 
disadvantage would be better represented by a different point along the red line 
(or on the whole graph as a matter of fact). Though expanding on these other 
possibilities in the graph is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it might be worth 
mentioning one of the important points that the graph highlights. This is the case 
of the dotted space on the red line which tries to capture the fact that even when 
the promotion of individual capabilities may be successful, this narrow view of 
advancing justice may only get to a limited point (C) and this is because 
individuals who might be advantaged in terms of personal capabilities (education, 
health, job, etc.) can still be harmed by dominant social practices and patterns of 
interactions; for example, one could think of ethnic minorities, women, or 
members of the LGBT community (e.g. see Young 1990, Fraser 1997). In these 
specific cases, the obstacles that these individuals face to move from point C to 
point B might lie beyond increasing even further individual capabilities. Instead, it 
might require intersubjective means to overcome them. To illustrate, let us recall 
the case of the successful indigenous poet who was detained and humiliated in 
an airport by the police. Regardless of her level of individual capabilities, that 
woman may not enjoy equal liberties and equal fair opportunities to do and be 
unless dominant social practices exercised by others change. Only then would 
she be able to live free from harassment, for example.  
Although this graphical representation remains exploratory, Figure 5.3 captures 
and helps illustrate the main argument developed in this chapter, namely that a 
dual framework may not be sufficient on its own to successfully reduce injustice 




much more to be done in view of a more just society. The analysis presented here 
aims at advancing one more step in that direction. The graph depicts that in order 
to produce meaningful justice-enhancing change (by gradually moving along the 
green line), political action must also consider, in addition to individual capabilities, 
the dynamic and relational aspects that act in such a way to perpetuate the unjust 
status quo. Contra Sen, this implies that enhancing individual freedom should not 
be the only means by which development and a more just society are attained. 
Indeed, if people’s substantive freedom within a just world is the goal being 
pursued, then enhancing individual capabilities falls short of that goal if they are 
dragged away by everyday social dynamics. Consequently, precisely because the 
person’s freedom is the ultimate moral concern, reducing injustice demands that 
the capability expansion of disadvantaged individuals be accompanied by the 
transformation of those social actions and interactions that sustain and reproduce 
people’s lack of real opportunities.  
 
5.5 A comprehensive framework to advance justice: ideal, nonideal, 
and the ground level of injustice 
This chapter has argued that when we move from theoretical foundations to the 
practical aim of counteracting injustice in the real world, a dual framework ought 
to be further supplemented by a notion of injustice. The main raison d’être of this 
ground level of injustice is that the success of political action is fundamentally 
dependent on an adequate diagnosis of injustice. Thus, in its absence, theories 
of justice do not have a sufficiently well-established scope where its normative 
demands ought to be relevant in practice. That is, just as nonideal theories need 
an objective where to aim at, they also need a ground from where to depart. 
Following critical theories, this chapter developed a ground level of relational 
injustice which encompasses two aspects of injustice: the lack of individual 
capabilities and a dynamic conception of injustice which broadens the starting 
point of injustice-reduction action. It distinguished between measures for 
advancing justice through enhancing individual capabilities and measures for 
reducing dynamic injustice by exposing and targeting people’s actual doings and 





It is important to reiterate that the role of this additional level is complementary to 
the dual framework. It does not discredit the theoretical underpinnings of a dual 
framework, nor does it call for its revision. Instead, in line with Alkire (2008), this 
ground level of injustice can be seen as providing a general conceptualisation of 
the prospective role of the capability metric. It aims at orienting action (at a general 
level of abstraction) in such a way to better realise its aim of generating justice-
enhancing social change. As such, this additional level can be seen as a re-
calibrator of the normative guidance provided by a dual framework (i.e. Sen’s 
nonideal theory). It redirects its scope to the practical objective of making the 
world more just. 
In other words, just as nonideal theory does not threaten the validity of an ideal 
theory, the ground level of injustice does not threaten the nonideal conceptual 
framework. Both of these extra levels (nonideal theory and the ground of injustice) 
have the common goal of assisting in guiding political efforts to reduce injustice 
in the world. This means that these three distinct components are necessary and 
complementary to construct a more just society. It shows not only that 
counteracting injustice depends on knowing what we are aiming for (ideal justice) 
and how to evaluate comparative success (nonideal) but fundamentally that it 
depends on an adequate diagnosis of the relationality of injustice. 
From this perspective, the focus on social practices and interactions does not 
intend to determine what counts as a ‘good’ structure and is not directed to 
regulate behaviour towards a specific way of living. It is not about defining a 
standard of good behaviour to be embodied and enforced upon citizens. But it 
does call for scrutinising the specific behaviours that reinforce the current unjust 
status of the world once an injustice is identified. Thus, individual behaviour and 
social interactions become relevant only when they go against the ideal of justice 
in which all can pursue their life plan under fair conditions of equality or when 
these act as barriers or obstructions for reducing injustice. This is concordant with 
a transitional focus of justice that starts from the urgency of removing injustices 
(Pereira 2013). It is a natural implication of placing the individual as the ultimate 
unit of moral concern (Robeyns 2005) while acknowledging the profound impact 
of the social structure on her real opportunities to do and be. 
In theoretical terms, this focus on social mechanisms and relational interactions 




outcome. It would mean that public discussion on alternative rankings of social 
arrangements, besides accounting for the processes as well as the outcomes, 
should also include information about the social dynamics that bring injustice 
about. In practical terms, it tells us that reducing relational injustice and advancing 
justice are two different sides of the same coin to find our way to a more just 
society. On the one hand, advancing justice is forward-looking, remedial, 
symptom-reducing, and capability-building. On the other hand, reducing (the 
reproduction of) injustice is better identified with such concepts as transformative 
looking, preventative action, and transmission reduction.  
Thus, the main argument that this chapter has advanced is that a dual framework 
is purely forward-looking, and as such an extra level of theorisation is required for 
reflecting about their translation into practice. This is where this dissertation 
places the contribution of critical theories to further complement the dual 
framework, in providing the basis for a broader relational conception of the unjust 
context where a framework of justice ought to prompt action. Together, these 
three levels provide a better-suited comprehensive framework to construct a more 
just society in practice (see Table 5.1; arrows indicate mutual interaction between 
the levels).  
Table 5.1. A comprehensive (three-level) framework to reduce injustice 
 
The next chapter draws on the context of Mexico and its main poverty-reduction 
social programme called Oportunidades to illustrate the theoretical discussion of 
this dissertation. It will show the difficulties that Sen’s approach faces when 
translated in practice in the absence of an ideal of justice and in the absence of a 




VI. Assessing injustice-reduction interventions 
from a three-level framework of justice: The case of 
Mexico’s anti-poverty programme Oportunidades 
 
This dissertation argued that development policies could not be detached from 
discussions about justice. Consequently, previous chapters examined the 
guidance that a dual framework of justice could offer to orient development policy. 
They showed that, for the practical purpose of reducing injustice, both approaches 
were best when working in tandem. A dual approach was, however, still not 
sufficient, as they remained silent about the way in which their normative ideas 
could best be translated into social realities, thus compromising their ability to 
transform unjust realities. To fill this gap, the previous chapter argued that a dual 
framework needed to be further complemented by a relational perspective of 
injustice to provide a ground for their recommendations in practice. This implied 
broadening the scope of injustice-reduction actions in order to address not only 
the symptoms, namely the individual capability-deprivations, but also the social 
and relational mechanisms through which injustices were reproduced. This 
chapter aims to illustrate this theoretical discussion by analysing the context of 
Mexico, in particular, its main social programme for reducing poverty. It will show 
the difficulties that Sen’s approach faces when translated in practice in the 
absence of an ideal of justice and in the absence of a more relational 
understanding of injustice.  
Two remarks of caution, however, need to be made beforehand. First, this 
dissertation does not claim that a connection between theories of justice and 
actual social policies in Mexico—or anywhere in the world—can be 
straightforwardly established. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that 
normative theories do influence social policies (Hickey 2014, Flores-Crespo and 
de la Torre 2007, Deneulin 2006). For example, when this normative theorisation 
directly questions the ends and means of development, it provides an alternative 
benchmark for judging states of affairs or social policies or both. Second, the 
chapter does not offer an extensive analysis of social policy in Mexico, its socio-




is to analyse the main political efforts of the country to counteract injustice in the 
light of the arguments developed in previous chapters.  
The chapter starts by introducing a short historical account of the context of 
development in Mexico and provides a rationale for selecting Mexico to illustrate 
the theoretical discussion. Then, it presents the largest anti-poverty policy in 
Mexico of the last 20 years, namely the ‘Human Development programme’ 
Oportunidades. It assesses to what extent the programme fulfils the normative 
demands discussed in the theoretical part of this dissertation. By providing an 
overview of Mexico’s development achievements in the last 30 years, it argues 
that despite Mexico’s success in enhancing people’s capabilities, these social 
improvements have not translated to a more just society. It points out the failure 
of the programme to account for the social/relational reproduction of injustice and 
concludes by arguing that this explains, at least partially, its poor performance in 
transforming people’s realities.  
 
6.1 Brief historical account of Mexico 
Mexico is an upper middle-income country marked by profound social inequalities 
that have proven to be resilient throughout the country’s recent history. This 
includes two major historical events—Mexico’s independence in 1810 and its 
revolution in 1910, both triggered by sentiments of (in)justice—as well as recent 
conscious efforts to reduce poverty and inequality in recent decades.  
Mexico achieved independence in 1810. But the 19th century in Mexico can be 
very broadly summarised as a failed attempt to establish liberal democracy—
which was seen as the way forward to solve the hierarchical and unequal society 
inherited from colonial times. Although the right to vote was formally established 
in 1824, this right and other rights were usually the privilege of elite minorities 
(Soto no date). After 300 years of Spanish colonisation, the century was 
characterised by economic and political instability due to external and internal 
conflicts. For instance, it went from political struggles between powerful minorities, 
sporadic dictatorships, to a new liberal constitution (1857) which included civil and 
political rights, up to a period of foreign mandates. The century concluded with a 
30-year dictatorship by Porfirio Díaz which lasted until 1910. Although the 




it was achieved at the expense of the poor, forced displacements, and constant 
repression (Krauze 2013). Thus, the living conditions of the majority of the people 
continued to be deficient. Measures of poverty and inequality remained at levels 
similar to those of the previous century (Sales 2010). For instance, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, 0.2% of the people working in the agriculture sector 
owned 87% of all land while 91% where landless (Scott 2008), 80% of the 
population was illiterate, infant mortality rate was 25%, and life expectancy was 
30 years (Human Development Report Mexico—PNUD 2011).  
The discontent of the majority of the population engendered the emergence of 
rebellious groups who, reappraising liberal ideals of the independence movement 
and previous constitutions, started the Mexican revolution (1910) under the 
banner of democracy and social justice. Although interpretations and demands of 
these groups varied, ultimately all of these to some extent influenced the content 
of the (third) Mexican constitution of 1917, which is still in force today. Arguably, 
this constitution marked the beginning of a welfare state and it was the first time 
that indigenous people were recognised as right-holders (Riesco 2007). In 
addition, the constitution emphasised the liberal ideals of individual rights and 
moral equality under the law, and it was also concerned with the distribution of 
wealth, the protection of workers and the worst off of society as well as the socio-
economic and institutional conditions necessary to guarantee these mandates 
(Riesco 2007, Sales 2010). In contrast to the previous ones, this constitution had 
a profound social character. It was the first constitution in the world to include 
social prerogatives as fundamental rights (CONAPRED 2012). The aftermath of 
the revolution, however, was characterised again by political instability, social 
unrest and civil turmoil in the search of enforcing the promises written in the 
constitution.  
This period led to the formation in 1929 of the political party that is now called the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)98. It was not until the presidency of Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934–1940)—still the most highly regarded president the country has 
ever had—that Mexico established some form of institutionalisation and achieved 
some social stability. This period provided the basis for a more equal development 
by establishing the foundations of some formal social provision and by carrying 
out a massive redistribution of land (Scott 2008, Riesco 2007). Unfortunately, this 
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did not last. Leaders of workers and peasants groups were soon formally co-opted 
by the PRI, and this led to the beginning of a corporatist political structure 
(Obregón 2013), which in turn enabled the coordination between government and 
interest groups and facilitated social consensus. In this period, a major agreement 
led to the adoption of an import-substitution strategy as the favoured model for 
the industrialisation of the country and to the reduction of the social programmes 
that protected workers and peasants (Riesco 2007). The import-substitution 
model was successfully extended until the ’80s and it was a period characterised 
by high economic development. Real wages and social spending increased 
significantly (from less than 2% of the GDP in 1960 to 9% in 1980), leading to a 
massive reduction of extreme poverty (see Scott 2008, Cárdenas 2009, Obregón 
2013). 
Despite its economic success, this rapid industrialisation did not benefit everyone 
equally (Sales 2010, Riesco 2007). In fact, at early stages of this period, some 
identified this process of development as the death of the values of the Revolution 
(Cosio 1947). It was a period of increasing inequality and violent repressions of 
any social protest against the government—of which the massacre of students in 
196899 was the most emblematic. Moreover, the social spending pretending to be 
‘universal’ in education, health, and social security systems was in reality ‘highly 
regressive’ (Scott 2008, p. 16), though IMSS (Mexican Institute of Social Security) 
and ISSTE (Institute of Social Security for Workers of the State) were created in 
this period. However, close to 60% of the population was without any social 
security (Sales 2003). On average during the 1970s, the richest 20% of the 
population held more than 50% of total income (Cortés 2000 cited by Bayón 2009; 
see also Sales 2010).  
Eventually, the import-substitution model became unsustainable at the beginning 
of the ’80s because of the country’s enormous fiscal deficit acquired throughout 
the ’70s (the national debt went from $3 billion in 1970 to $80 billion in 1982) and 
thus it became incapable of coping with external shocks (the oil crisis and 
increasing interest rates) (Obregón 2013). Its collapse in 1982 and the crisis it left 
                                                        
99 On 2 October 1968 (now a commemorative day), a group of students, intellectuals and professors 
of two of the most important universities in the country (UNAM and IPN), along with members of the 
general public (about 10,000), gathered in the streets to protest the government’s censure of 
dissenting voices, corruption, and social and income divisions. On the orders of the president 
(Gustavo Díaz Ordaz), the protest was violently supressed; the federal military and other 
government’s security groups began shooting indiscriminately from different fronts, killing more than 
400 persons (unofficial information). Until today, no one has been charged for this event. See 




behind gave rise to a radical change in the political and economic system of 
Mexico. In 1983, in line with the market-oriented liberalisation model supported 
by international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, the country 
embarked on a series of structural reforms which included a strong fiscal 
contraction, economic deregulation, trade liberalisation, openness to foreign 
investment, financial liberalisation, and privatisation (Cárdenas 2009). This model 
continued throughout the ’90s and was further consolidated when the country 
joined NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994 (Sales 2003). 
According to this view—as expressed by Pedro Aspe, Mexican Finance Minister 
from 1982 to 1994—‘modernisation’ through a liberal market was the best way 
not only to promote economic development and opportunities but also to fight 
poverty and achieve a more just society (see Aspe 1993).  
The consequences of these reforms, however, were not as expected. After the 
first 12 years of implementation, the poor social, political, and economic 
performance—exemplified by the uprising of the Zapatista movement and the 
devastating financial crisis in 1994—facilitated the first political alternation in 
Mexico’s history. In 2000, the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) won the 
presidential elections after 71 straight years of PRI governance. Yet the two 
consecutive presidential terms in charge of PAN did not bring any substantial 
change to the model of market liberalisation as the means to promote 
development and justice (Medrano 2011, Bayón 2009, Riesco 2007), which 
opened the door to PRI’s return to power in 2012.  
In sum, this market liberalisation has defined the trajectory of Mexico for the last 
three decades and continues to shape its social and political model today. During 
this period, Mexico has been somehow successful in ensuring macroeconomic 
stability and building a relatively strong economy. Today, Mexico is the 12th 
largest economy in the world (The World Factbook 2014100) and the second 
largest in Latin America (after Brazil). Thus, while acknowledging some of its 
important challenges, forecasters generally perceive Mexico’s future in positive 
terms (OECD 2015a, 2012). It is considered a ‘regional powerhouse’ with growth 
expectations ranging from 2.9% to 3.5% in 2017 (World Bank 2015101). Yet, 
notwithstanding these achievements of a liberal market strategy, Mexico has not 
                                                        
100 Available at  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html. 




been able to keep its promise of a social arrangement able to provide better and 
more equal opportunities for people to thrive. More importantly, this strategy has 
been somehow disappointing in achieving the country’s historical demand for 
social justice and thus in enabling the majority of people to pursue their life plan 
under conditions of equality (section 6.3).  
Putting aside political, historical, and other external circumstances, this chapter 
considers that this failure can also be related to theoretical debates about justice 
(see also Sales 2003), specifically the theoretical guidance to confront unjust 
situations. It illustrates this failure in the light of the specific strategy favoured by 
the Mexican government to deal with one of the enduring challenges that it still 
faces, namely widespread poverty, and in particular in the light of Mexico’s largest 
anti-poverty programme, Oportunidades, which is considered an international 
success in this endeavour. Oportunidades will serve as an ad hoc example to 
illuminate and assess Sen’s comparative framework of justice. 
Rationale for case study 
For at least three reasons, Mexico is a very interesting case to illustrate the 
normative theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. First, the historical 
context of inequality and persistence of poverty that prevails in Mexico poses a 
real challenge for successfully translating normative demands of theories of 
justice into specific political action. It questions whether a more just society can 
be attained through the narrow view of individual capabilities while rendering 
invisible the mechanisms that underlie the unjust contexts that are meant to be 
transformed. Second, as described above, the country’s recent history has been 
shaped by liberal ideals and an explicit commitment to social justice, both of which 
are enshrined in the country’s three constitutions (1824, 1857, 1917) (Sales 
2010). Moreover, throughout these periods, there have been different 
conceptualisations, different ways of evaluating it, and different routes taken in 
the pursuit of a more just Mexican society. For instance, there have been attempts 
at universalising social services, ensuring minimum levels of income, or procuring 
opportunities through the market (Sales 2003). Thus, in this context, theoretical 
discussions about justice are indeed highly relevant. Third, despite the varying 
understandings of justice in Mexico, there has always been a constant call to 
provide some form of protection to the most vulnerable. In this regard, in recent 




to fight poverty and exclusion via its main social programme, Oportunidades. In 
fact, owing to its success, similar Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes 
have been replicated throughout the world. Consequently, examining Mexican 
efforts towards fighting poverty from the perspective of social justice can 
potentially be of relevance to other contexts well beyond the context of Mexico. 
 
6.2 Reducing injustice: The case of Oportunidades and Sen’s idea of 
justice 
From the previous section, one could interpret Mexico’s recent history as a 
continual search for an adequate approximation of justice and development which 
then to some extent determines the kind of political action taken towards that end. 
In this regard, theoretical discussions about what justice entails and how it can be 
achieved are of fundamental importance for Mexico’s construction of a more just 
society. This dissertation is concerned with how injustice can be reduced. 
Particularly, it is concerned with analysing the practical guidance that conceptions 
of justice can offer for this purpose. Therefore, the focus of this analysis is not 
about the justness of Mexico’s overall social and institutional arrangement but 
about the kind of actions taken to remedy injustice and, more importantly, about 
how these actions can be improved according to the theoretical framework 
developed earlier.  
 
6.2.1 Oportunidades and Sen’s idea of justice 
On average, the percentage of people living below the national poverty line in 
Mexico over the last 30 years is 52.7% (World Development Indicators). In this 
respect, the human development programme Oportunidades has been the 
government’s main response to the massive challenge of endemic poverty in 
Mexico for more than two decades102. 
                                                        
102 Anti-poverty programmes during the market liberalisation initiated in 1988 under the name of 
PRONASOL whose targeting, selection, and delivery method were later improved and replaced by 
the programme called PROGRESA in 1997 (see Scott 2008, Levy 2006). In 2002, maintaining the 
main tenets of the programme but expanding its coverage, Oportunidades replaced PROGRESA 
(Cárdenas 2009). Consequently, the programme is sometimes referred to in the literature as 
Progresa/Oportunidades. However, the programme changed its name in January 2015 to 




Oportunidades is considered an archetype and one of the most successful 
examples of the now widely spread CCTs around the world (Tucker 2010, Levy 
2006). It reached 6.1 million families in 2015, which is equivalent to around 25% 
of the population, and accounted for 30% of total social expenditure in 2010 
(INEGI). Moreover, it plays a key role, along with other policies, in the second 
national goal: ‘An Inclusive Mexico’ of the 2013–2018 National Development Plan. 
The main objective of Oportunidades, similar to that of other CCTs, is to reduce 
poverty in the present as well as in the future through a system of shared 
responsibility, which implies engaging ‘poor families directly in overcoming their 
difficult circumstances’ (Levy 2006, p. 12). This is achieved by an integrated 
approach of co-responsibility in which income transfers are given to the families 
on the condition that they comply with certain requirements and investments in 
relation to education, health and nutrition. The amount of money provided, health 
check-ups, in-kind transfers as well as other provisions vary according to people’s 
heterogeneities (age, gender, etc.)103.  
This innovative method of fighting poverty has been praised worldwide and its 
replication has been supported by international organisations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2011, 
Medrano 2011). Today, similar programmes have been implemented in several 
countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia. But more importantly, this programme 
also changed the way in which poverty has been understood in Mexico. In this 
sense, market liberalisation transformed not only the interpretation of the 
egalitarian sentiments embodied in the 1917 Mexican constitution but also how 
injustice was to be understood and thus how it could be reduced. From this 
perspective, strategic interventions of the government were reduced to being 
primarily about respecting ‘the initiatives of the community and to promote 
individual achievement’ (Aspe 1993, p. xi). As such, the governments of the last 
three decades have been concerned solely with the endowment of equal 
opportunities, which in turn are seen as being better realised through an adequate 
economic environment. In this context, direct assistance has been justified only 
to those who cannot help themselves. As the deputy minister of finance from 1994 
to 2000, Santiago Levy, puts it, to the ‘…undernourished [who] are more 
vulnerable to disease, are at risk of developing anthropometric deficiencies, are 
                                                        
access to financial services, and more education. This chapter, however, refers to the programmes 
Progresa/Oportunidades.  





at times lethargic and, in general, are less able to lead a healthy life with sufficient 
energy to satisfactorily perform tasks in the labour market and/or participate in 
educational activities’ (Levy 1991, p. 7). Meanwhile, the moderately poor (i.e. 
those who lack basic needs but are still able to participate in the labour market) 
‘can best be helped by [indirect] policies that widen the set of opportunities to 
them’ (Levy 1991, p. 8).  
Thus, reducing poverty was no longer about transferring resources to the poor but 
was mainly about expanding people’s opportunities and investing in people’s 
nutrition, health and education on the eve of ‘a future that is built on the direct 
participation of poor households in overcoming their conditions’ (Levy 2006, p. 
viii), as World Bank President James Wolfensohn described it in his foreword to 
Levy’s book. In other words, in line with Sen’s framework of justice, Mexico’s main 
anti-poverty programme identifies the poor in terms of ‘the deprivation of basic 
capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes’ (Sen 1999a, p. 87). Thus, 
its main goal has been about expanding people’s capabilities and respecting 
people’s agency. In fact, the operational rules of the programme explicitly refer to 
‘expanding the capabilities of nutrition, health, and education of people…in order 
to contribute to their quality of life as well as increasing their productive capacity’ 
while conceiving persons as active citizens who are ‘agents of their own 
development’ and who can ‘overcome poverty through their own efforts’ 
(SEDESOL 2015 104 ; see also Levy 1991). Therefore, the basis upon which 
Oportunidades operates is indeed in accordance with Sen’s notions of capability 
and agency.  
The chapter does not suggest that Oportunidades is the quintessential 
embodiment of Sen’s approach in practice or that the capability approach is 
indeed the conceptual framework behind it. Certainly, there were different socio-
political and economic circumstances within the country that also influenced the 
creation of Oportunidades (Levy 2006). Moreover, Flores-Crespo and de la Torre 
(2007) suggest that the adoption of the language of ‘capabilities’ and ‘Human 
Development’ within Oportunidades is rather vague, as apparently it can be more 
closely related to the idea of ‘human capital’105. Similarly, the use of the notion of 
                                                        
104 Available at  
http://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/45627/ROP_2016_PROSPERA.pdf. 
105 The idea of human capital, however, is not in opposition to the notion of capability. Rather, the 
former is contained within the latter (Sen 1999a, pp. 292–296). As such, an investment in human 




responsibility and agency seems to have a gender bias against mothers 
(Molyneux 2006), whose own capabilities are not appropriately taken into account 
(Agudo 2010). But despite these pertinent caveats, it is certainly the case that 
Oportunidades is in line with the intention of expanding the main dimensions 
favoured by a capability-based approach and it is in accordance with the way 
these achievements are usually measured. Ultimately, it does focus on enhancing 
the capabilities and the agency of the worst off of society. As such, to the extent 
that this expansion is successful, it would also be in line with Sen’s comparative 
framework, which is concerned with advancing justice through the expansion of 
capabilities106.  
 
6.2.2 Sen’s notion of ‘advancing justice’ in the context of 
Oportunidades  
One can easily be seduced by Sen’s pragmatic framework. It convincingly argues 
that the wellbeing of individuals can be improved, and thus justice advanced, 
without having to identify a perfectly just arrangement. At first sight, 
Oportunidades seems to prove Sen right. 
Oportunidades has been extremely successful not only in promoting people’s 
capabilities but also in promoting public discussion. In fact, one of the features 
that made it innovative when it first started as a CCT, and what made it successful 
thereafter, has been that it is openly evaluated on a regular basis by internal as 
well as external bodies, such as the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) (e.g. Debowicz and Golan 2013, Skoufias 2005, Skoufias and McClafferty 
2001; see also Cruz et al. 2006)107. In addition, there is a sizable literature about 
Oportunidades and its impacts in different domains (e.g. Adato and Roopnaraine 
2010, Agudo 2010, Agudo 2012, Behrman et al. 2007, Handa et al. 2007, 2009, 
Molyneux 2006, Todd et al. 2010, Debowicz and Golan 2013). Using different 
methodologies, all of these studies analyse to what extent Oportunidades 
facilitates, thwarts or affects people’s lives in one way or another and how the 
quality, effectiveness and scope of the programme can be enhanced. Among all 
                                                        
106 This is further confirmed by Drèze and Sen (2013), who see CCTs generally as a positive way 
to promote people’s freedom (see chapter 7). 







evaluations, there is a large consensus about its positive impact in its stated 
objectives of reducing poverty by improving people’s lives within the domains of 
income/consumption, health and education. 
For instance, there is evidence that Oportunidades increases school enrolment 
for both rural and urban populations, and especially girls, in junior high school and 
high school108; it reduces the incidence of mortality of mothers and children; it 
increases voluntary health clinic visits; it increases food intake, healthier diets, 
and nutrition of household members; it increases children’s height and reduces 
the proportion of obesity; it reduces the incidence of diseases in adults as well as 
new-born children; and it improves reproductive health of beneficiaries (see Cruz 
et al. 2006, Skoufias 2005). Similarly, according to a special UNDP report on 
south-south cooperation (2011), Oportunidades has boosted beneficiary 
households’ food intake by 22% and secondary school enrolment by 11% among 
girls and 7.5% among boys, has increased enrolment for secondary school by 
11% for girls and 7.5% for boys, has increased health visits by 30% to 60% for 
children under 5 years old, has reduced the incidence of diseases by 12% in 0- 
to 2-year-old children, and has reduced the proportion of malnourishment among 
children by 17.2%. Furthermore, all of these findings are confirmed by a ten-year 
evaluation of the programme (Saucedo 2012) as well as by qualitative studies 
(Molyneux 2006). 
These results are important social achievements in themselves, and to the extent 
that they improve people’s lives by expanding the real opportunities of what 
people can do and be, one can easily concede that they account for an 
advancement of justice in Sen’s own terms. That is, from a pure comparative 
perspective where a social arrangement is considered to be more just if there is 
less capability-deprivation than in another, the situation in Mexico is more just with 
Oportunidades than without it. A Mexico where fewer people suffer from 
malnutrition and starvation and more people are able to be educated is more just 
even if there is no agreement about the right principles that ought to regulate 
Mexico’s social arrangement and even if poverty has not been completely 
eradicated yet. In this way, poverty-alleviation in Mexico seems to be a successful 
illustration of Sen’s framework being able to reduce injustice on its own: 
                                                        
108 Mexico’s school system is composed of six years of primary school, three years of junior high 




(1) First, there is a social agreement about assisting the worst off of society. 
Even if the reasons underlying it might vary across different actors, the 
agreement is enough to motivate action to remediate it.  
(2) Second, the identification of the poor is informed by a capability 
understanding of poverty. 
(3) Third, Oportunidades is rooted in an understanding of individuals as 
agents of their own development and it expands people’s basic 
capabilities (and agency).  
(4) Finally, the programme is subject to external and internal evaluations in 
order to improve it; that is, it facilitates public discussion about how best 
to remediate the situation.  
At first sight, it seems hard not to be excited about this social advancement. Sen 
does seem to offer a framework that is pertinent to situations of injustice that 
pervade the world. But is Sen’s IJ really constructing a more just society? This 
dissertation argues that while acknowledging and supporting the social 
achievements that Sen’s nonideal framework is likely to promote, these positive 
signs of hope can obscure other relevant aspects which are of first importance for 
any action aimed at constructing a more just society.  
 
6.3 Assessing Sen’s IJ from an ideal perspective 
Leaving aside technicalities and corrections of the programme itself, to assess 
adequately the potential reach of Sen’s framework in promoting justice, one has 
to recognise that this evaluation is inextricable from the very conceptualisation of 
justice itself. Certainly, Sen’s own position is that there is no need to identify what 
justice entails, and this is why a capability-enhancement of the sort occurring in 
Mexico represents a success (even if limited) from his perspective. In fact, this 
accomplishment is echoed by many academics and international organisations. 
For example, aside from the World Bank and the IMF, the OECD considers 
Oportunidades to be one of the ‘important examples’ about how societies can be 
better off (2015b). But although the case of Oportunidades in Mexico may nurture 
the illusion of the possibility of advancing justice even in the absence of an ideal 
conception of justice, one cannot ignore the fact that this ‘reduction of injustice’ 
takes place within a particular understanding of development and justice, namely 




and productivity, and where assistance to the worst off of society is used merely 
as a tool for legitimising the political and economic system (see Bayón 2009, 
Riesco 2007, Levy 1991). Hence, one cannot disassociate Oportunidades from 
this larger structure which may or may not be in the direction of constructing a 
more just society. It is in this sense that this dissertation has argued that one 
cannot separate the practical aim of advancing justice from a conception of what 
justice entails. 
If justice has to do with respecting people’s dignity and rights equally and treating 
people as ends in themselves, one would expect that moving in the direction of 
justice would necessarily entail that, in the long run, ‘advancing justice’ would be 
associated with social improvements of this sort. That is, creating a more just 
society is not solely about promoting social arrangements where individuals have 
fewer deprivations but also about creating the conditions that enable all 
individuals to be regarded as equals and where each can exercise their rights in 
order to pursue their life plans. Although these two ideas may go together, they 
are not exactly the same. Whereas a more just society in the broader sense of 
equal rights and liberties within a context of fair opportunities necessarily involves 
reducing people’s deprivations, the reverse is not necessarily true. That is, 
achieving fewer deprivations may not automatically be an indication of a more just 
society.  
 
6.3.1 Mexico’s development from 1980 to 2014 
This section shows that, despite Mexico’s economic capacity and some important 
achievements in the social realm, the liberal market strategy of the last 30 years 
and Oportunidades have failed in keeping its promise of building social 
arrangements able to provide better opportunities and a more just society for 
people to thrive. The liberalisation project adopted by Mexico since 1983 signified 
a whole restructuring of the role of the state and its relationship with the mode of 
production. The state was no longer seen as a guarantor of people’s welfare but 
as the problem. Modernisation required deregulating the economy, 
macroeconomic stabilisation and less state intervention. The former finance 




We know that a bigger state is not necessarily a more capable state… The 
stabilization of the economy through realistic budget management, the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, fiscal reform, economic 
deregulation, financial reform, the liberalization of trade, the renegotiation 
of the external debt, and the strengthening of land tenure rights is the new 
way in which the people of Mexico are carrying out an ambitious reform of 
the state. We are facing the challenge of making the transition to an open 
economy and an open society. In abandoning its role of proprietor, the 
state has taken on greater solidarity with the needs of the poor (Aspe 
1993, p. xii). 
From this perspective, the state was to a large extent responsible for the 
economic, political and social failures of the past. Hence, the solution to the 
problems generated by the previous state-led development model was to be 
found in the market. But despite some advancements in some key social 
indicators, the results have been disappointing overall (Obregón 2013, Cárdenas 
2009).  
Income measures 
Even on a narrow measure of income per capita, Mexico’s progress has been 
insufficient throughout the last three decades (Obregón 2013). As Table 6.1 
shows, the decade of the ’80s was first heavily affected by the crisis, resulting in 
an overall negative effect in GDP per capita, averaging −0.2% from 1981 to 1990. 
It then recovered during the ’90s despite the far-reaching impact of the financial 
crisis of 1994 (−7.6%), and although it has decelerated (mainly due to the world 
financial crisis in 2008), from 2011 to 2013, income-per-capita growth continued 
to be positive. 





In general terms, seen from a long-run perspective (Table 6.2), growth in income 
per capita in Mexico has been very modest. In 2014, it was only 18% higher than 
what it was in 1982, which is very low in comparison with the achievements of 
other Latin American countries in the same period, such as Colombia (95%) or 
Chile (185%), and was below the average growth in Latin America (43%). 
Similarly, Obregón (2013) shows that, in 1980, Mexico’s income per capita was 
54% higher than in South Korea and 20% higher than in Taiwan but that, by 2008, 
Mexico produced per person only 41% and 38% of what each of these countries 
was producing by then.  
Table 6.2. GDP per capita (1982–2013) various countries (constant 2005 
USD) 
 
Human development measures 
One of the major contributions of Sen’s work has been its influence in 
understanding development from a human-centred approach. In this respect, the 
Human Development Index (HDI) presented by the UNDP measures 
development in three dimensions of life with four indicators: education (expected 
years of schooling and mean years of schooling109), health (life expectancy at 
birth), and standard of living (gross national income [GNI] per capita). With an HDI 
value of 0.756 in 2013, Mexico belonged to the high development group and was 
ranked 71 out of 187 countries. 
 
                                                        
109 Expected years of schooling is ‘the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age 
can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout 
the child's life’; mean years of education is ‘the average number of years of education received in a 




Table 6.3. Human Development Index of Mexico (1980-2013) 
 
Table 6.3 shows Mexico’s historical trend in each of the HDI indicators since 1980. 
It shows that, despite its deficient progress in GDP per capita, Mexico has been 
successful in increasing people’s opportunities to live a long and healthy live, 
access knowledge, and have a decent standard of living. In little more than 30 
years, life expectancy increased by 10.9 years (16%), expected years of 
schooling by 2.6 years (25%), and years of schooling by 4.5 (113%); and in 
contrast with GDP, GNI per capita increased 47%110. In total, this amounts to an 
overall improvement of 27% in Mexico’s HDI value. To a large extent, these 
important achievements are the result of Oportunidades. It is important to note, 
however, that despite the substantial progress achieved in education, this is the 
dimension in which Mexico performs the worst in relation to similar countries. The 
reason is the low gross enrolment ratio in secondary (87%) and tertiary education 
(28%) in comparison with the average in other high human development countries 
(91% and 44% respectively), which in turn explains the low score in mean years 
of schooling (Obregón 2013). According to the same author, this reveals the low 
quality of the education system as well as the high levels of inequality that 
characterise the country. 
                                                        
110 The difference between GDP and GNI may be explained because the latter provides a more 
comprehensive measure of income. It also accounts for property, dividends, and income earned by 





As mentioned in the brief account of Mexico’s historical development, inequality 
has been one of the most enduring features of the country throughout its history. 
Inequality is intrinsically problematic if it fails to respect all individuals’ dignity 
equally and is instrumentally problematic for social cohesion, democracy, and 
economic growth, amongst other issues (see OECD 2015b). In this respect, 
Mexico’s performance is worrying in several measures of inequality. Indicators 
show almost no improvement since the beginning of the market-oriented model 
of development and social justice. In fact, while inequality in Latin America has 
been declining during the last decade (Ferreira et al. 2013), Mexico is one of the 
few exceptions, with a ‘small reversal’ trend in the last available data (Tsounta 
and Osueke 2014, p. 4). This result is consistent with the data shown in Table 
6.4.  
According to the OECD report on inequality (2015b), Mexico’s last available data 
shows a Gini coefficient of 48.2, which indicates very high levels of inequality111. 
This score is higher than in 1985 (45.2) and is equal to its average value of the 
last 30 years. Despite minor variations, this trend is confirmed by data from the 
World Bank. In another measure of inequality, the ratio of average disposable 
income of the richest 10% divided by the average disposable income of the 
poorest 10%, Mexico shows the worst score of all OECD countries (30.5 in 
contrast to an OECD average of 9.6!)112. In 2012, the richest 10% have captured 




                                                        
111 The Gini index estimates how unequal the distribution of income is in a country in relation to a 
perfectly equal distribution. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect equality whereas an index of 
100 implies perfect inequality.  
112 Note that OECD calculations in the ratio of top10 to bottom10 of income are higher than those 
calculated using data of the World Bank where, in the same year (2012), the same ratio is 21. This 
difference is explained by the type of data used. Whereas the OECD uses average disposable 
income, the World Bank uses consumption data. Here, it is considered that data on disposable 
income captures best the levels of inequality in Mexico as it is unlikely that the bottom 10% would 




Table 6.4. Inequality in Mexico (1985–2013) 
 
Similarly, following the analysis presented by Obregón (2013), the severe problem 
of inequality in Mexico can also be appreciated by looking at the inequality-
adjusted HDI (Table 6.5), whose value declined from 0.756 to 0.583. This implies 
a loss of 22.9% in this indicator which is higher than the average loss of countries 
within the group of high human development and is equal to that of the world. 
However, in line with the Gini coefficient and the income ratio presented above, 
Mexico’s HDI inequality is primarily explained by income differences, followed by 
education and health respectively. In this regard, Obregón (2013) identifies that 
‘out of the 135 countries whose Gini coefficient is reported by the UN, only 25 
have a more unequal income distribution than Mexico, and from these, only two 
countries belong to the group of very high HDI and only five belong to the group 
of high HDI’ (p. 20).  
Table 6.5. Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, Mexico 
 
Poverty measures 
Mexico has failed not just in ensuring a certain social minimum for people to 














Mexico 0.756 0.587 22.4 10.9 19.7 34.6
very high HDI 0.896 0.788 12.1 4.9 8 22.5
high HDI 0.744 0.6 19.4 10.7 16.8 29.4
medium HDI 0.63 0.468 25.8 21.9 34.7 19.8
low HDI 0.505 0.343 32 35 37.9 22
World 0.711 0.548 22.8 17.4 26.8 24




deprivations. This is despite Mexico’s increased efforts to combat poverty and the 
success obtained by Oportunidades. There is, however, a methodological 
difficulty in presenting a consistent long-term trend of poverty in Mexico since 
there is no consistent measure. Nonetheless, reliable national surveys, including 
information about income measures, consumption and non-monetary goods of 
the population of Mexico, have existed since 1977, and these surveys have been 
carried out consistently by the equivalent to the Office for National Statistics in the 
UK (INEGI acronym in Spanish) since 1984 (Székely 2005). Therefore, to a 
certain extent, it is possible to recreate historical figures accounting for the current 
definition of poverty with information based on these past surveys.  
In addition, as mentioned before, Sen’s capability approach has been very 
influential in national conceptions of poverty. Hence, there is a growing consensus 
about the multidimensional character of poverty and the irreducibility of different 
dimensions of poverty to a unidimensional measure113. In line with this idea, since 
2008, Mexico has a multidimensional conception of poverty which includes 
income measures as well as access to social rights. In the space of income, there 
are two different poverty lines, namely an economic line of minimum wellbeing 
(línea mínima de bienestar) and an economic line of (moderate) wellbeing (línea 
de bienestar). The former accounts for the minimum amount of income necessary 
for survival, that is, sufficient to afford a basket of goods to satisfy a person’s 
minimum accepted levels of nutrition. The latter (moderate wellbeing) refers to the 
amount of income necessary to afford minimum levels of education and health, in 
addition to a minimum level of nutrition. In the space of rights, poverty measures 
include six dimensions: access to education, health, social security, home quality 
and spaces of the dwelling, access to basic services in the household, and 
nutrition114. 
On the basis of these indicators, a person can fall in any of the following four 
categories (Figure 6.1): a person can be (a) multidimensionally poor if she is 
deprived in at least one of the rights and has a level of income below the moderate 
poverty line, (b) extreme multidimensionally poor if she is deprived in three or 
more social rights and has a level of income below the minimum poverty line (not 
                                                        
113 For literature on multidimensional poverty, see, for example, Alkire and Foster (2009), Alkire and 
Santos (2010).  
114 Information available at http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Paginas/principal_EN.aspx. 





shown in the figure), (c) vulnerable in income if she has an income below the 
moderate poverty line but is not right-deprived, or (d) vulnerable by rights if she is 
not income-poor but she is deprived in at least one right. 
Figure 6.1. Identification of multidimensional poverty 
 
Source: CONEVAL 
This conceptualisation of multidimensional poverty already illustrates the use of 
Sen’s notion of capability for the practical purpose of reducing injustice. It is also 
perfectly in line with Rawls’ ideal conception of justice which provides a 
philosophical justification for achieving equal rights for all. Thus, measuring 
income poverty along with access to rights provides a more accurate, albeit 
limited, description of how close or how far a particular society is from constructing 
a more just society at a given moment in time. In this respect, Mexico does not 
fare well (Table 6.6). According to the last multidimensional poverty report carried 
out by the national entity in charge of measuring it (CONEVAL), in 2014, 46.2% 
of the population was multidimensionally poor (55.3 million) and 11.4 million of 
that population lived in extreme multidimensional poverty (i.e. deprived in three or 
more rights and earning an income not be sufficient for minimum nutrition levels). 
When one considers each of the two dimensions (income and rights) in isolation, 
these figures become more worrying still. On the one hand, the report shows that 
72.4% of the population was deprived in 2014 in at least one right and that 22.1% 
was deprived in more than three rights, and the average intensity was 2.1 
deprivations. On the other hand, 53.2% of the population had an income below 




way, only 20.5% of the population was non-poor and non-vulnerable in 2014 (little 
rectangle at the top right in Figure 6.1).  
Table 6.6. Multidimensional poverty in Mexico (percentage, population and 
intensity)115 
 
A weakness of this measure, however, is that there is no historical data on the 
evolution of multidimensional poverty in the last 30 years116. Nonetheless, as 
mentioned above, there is historical data on a similar conceptualisation of poverty 
referred to as ‘patrimony line of poverty’ or ‘national poverty line’ that accounts for 
income and non-income dimensions (health, education, clothing, housing and 
transportation). Based on this data, it is possible to see that levels of poverty at 
this national poverty line have remained considerably high despite social 
expenditure rising from 6.1% of the GDP in 1990 to 12.5% in 2008 (Cárdenas 
2009). In 2014, more than half of the population (53.2%) were living in poverty 
(World Development Indicators). More importantly, aside from the period of 2002–
2006, this pattern has not changed since the end of the ’80s (Table 6.7). As Figure 
6.2 shows, 1994–1998 reported the most dramatic levels of poverty, mainly 
because of the large social cost of the financial crisis in 1994. It then recovered, 
and from 2002 to 2006, there was a short period of improvement (from 50% to 
                                                        
115 Data available at http://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza_2014.aspx. 




42.9%), but there has been a steady reversal ever since, despite a budget 
increase of 126% in anti-poverty programmes between 2006 and 2012 (OECD 
2015a).  




Figure 6.2. Evolution of poverty 
 
After reviewing some main development indicators, it is certainly possible to be at 
least sceptical about the achievements of Mexico’s model of development in 
promoting a more just society in the last 30 years. In fact, some suggest that 
Oportunidades—despite expanding people’s capabilities—operate not within the 
logic of justice, redistribution and rights, but within the logic of the market where 
enhancing the productive capacity of individuals is in the best interest of the 
current utilitarian model of development and social justice (e.g. Bayón 2009). 
Therefore, unless we are willing to shrink the notion of ‘advancing justice’ to 
agreed minimum social advancements expressed in terms of capabilities while 
leaving everything else the same, then invoking an ideal conception of justice 
seems unavoidable. For seen in isolation, it would seem that Sen’s nonideal 
framework is much more compatible with the utilitarian framework from which he 














conception of justice is needed in order to judge whether injustice has been 
reduced in Mexico or not.  
 
6.3.2 Adding ideal justice: ‘Advancing justice’ versus constructing 
a more just society 
An ideal of justice (even if imperfect and always contestable) provides a 
systematic framework for identifying injustice and provides an objective to guide 
the direction in which to move. Thus, in line with Mexico’s recent history 
characterised by the struggle of interpreting the principles that ought to guide its 
path to development and social justice, it is assumed thereafter that Rawls’ ideal 
principles of justice best account for the moral intuitions of justice enshrined under 
the 1917 constitution. This is certainly in accordance with its liberal roots, in its 
guarantees of civil, political and social rights, and with its concern for improving 
the lives of the least advantaged. This move is useful to evaluate Sen’s framework 
from an ‘Archimedean point’ of what we expect justice to do. For example, this 
view of justice would imply that ‘advancing justice’ would have to be associated 
with social improvements in terms of equal rights, equal fair opportunities, and 
toleration of income inequalities to the extent that these are for the benefit of the 
worst off of society. Under this interpretation, the association of Mexico’s social 
improvements (i.e. capability-enhancing) with a notion of ‘justice-enhancements’ 
becomes much less convincing. 
Overall, the preceding section already indicated, through long-term trends in 
some key socio-economic indicators, that not enough has been done. All 
indicators showed little, if any, progress in the last three decades. Adding to this 
conclusion, and equally relevant for considerations of justice from a Rawlsian 
perspective, is Mexico’s failure to safeguard people’s basic political and civil rights 
and thus its attempts to establish a credible democracy.  
In this regard, the year 2000 signified a major step forward for Mexico’s 
democracy when the first pacific and transparent political alternation took place 
after 71 years of PRI’s governance. This episode was regarded as a clear 
advancement of political and civil rights in Mexico’s history. During the first decade 




scale from 1 to 7, where 7 is no political and civil freedom117. But over the last 10 
years, Mexico has gone back to a rating of 3 in both political and civil rights, 
implying that the country is considered only ‘partly free’. This regress is the result 
of severe human rights violations, ‘widespread killings, enforced disappearances, 
and torture committed by soldiers and police’ (Human Rights Watch 2015)118, the 
rise of violence, and the state’s incapacity to establish social order119. 
Indeed, Mexico has also failed to guarantee people’s safety. In 2013, it had a 
considerably high rate of homicides—22.7 per 100,000 habitants. This was 
significantly higher than the average of all 187 countries within the HDI (6.9) and 
even higher than the average of the group with low HDI (14.6). Some suggest that 
the situation in Mexico is no longer a case of ‘public security’ but one of ‘national 
security’ (Obregón 2013, p. 53)120. However, the most emblematic example of this 
humanitarian, social, political and civil crisis is the kidnapping and disappearance 
of 43 students in 2014 in Ayotzinapa, in the state of Guerrero, by the local police 
in collusion with a local gang121 (e.g. see Rath 2014, Estevez 2014, Wilton 2014). 
But more worrying is the fact that the case of Ayotzinapa is part of a much larger 
problem which includes more than 20,000 people who have disappeared since 
2006 (Amnesty International 2015; see also Grandin 2014) as well as the 
systematic killing of journalists (CPJ 2015, Hernández 2015). And yet impunity 
has been the most common resolution to this situation. According to the National 
Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE), impunity in 
Mexico—understood as the difference between reported crimes and effective 
sentences—was 99.6% in 2012 (Soltero 2015)122. 
In terms of inequality, Rawls advises that ‘large and inheritable inequities of 
wealth [are] incompatible with the fair value of the political liberties… [and that] 
large disparities of income…violate the difference principle’ (Rawls 1999, p. XV). 
                                                        
117  Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2015#.VXCMqs9Vikr. 
118  See Human Rights Watch report 2015 available at http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2015/country-chapters/mexico. 
119  See Mexico’s summary in House of Freedom available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/mexico#.VXB6ss9Viko.  
120 For issues of insecurity, see also BBC (2014b) and Partlow (2014). 
121 Ironically, these students were intercepted by the police when they were going to join the public 
protests and remembrance of the massacre of the students of 1968. A chronology of the events can 
be found at https://news.vice.com/article/ayotzinapa-a-timeline-of-the-mass-disappearance-that-
has-shaken-mexico; see also the case of the massacre of Tlatlaya by the Mexican army in Silva 
(2015). 
122 See also the Global Index of Impunity 2015 where Mexico is considered the second worst country 
among the 59 included in the report. On a positive note, Mexico is one of the 59 out of 134 country 




In this respect, the previous section showed that the levels of inequality in Mexico 
are simply indefensible. The figure becomes even more problematic when 
considering that the minimum wage in Mexico ($146 per month) is one of the 
lowest in Latin America (La Jornada 2015) and lost 71.3% of its purchasing power 
between 1983 and 2010 (Calva 2012). It is not surprising, then, that inequality in 
Mexico does not decline despite the large amount of hours worked per year123 
(OECD 2015 data).  
But more revealing is the fact that these negative effects and the threat of these 
social ailments are aggravated for the worst off of society. For instance, the 
condition of the indigenous population, which accounts for 10% of the total 
population and has been the most disadvantaged group throughout Mexico’s 
history, continues to lag behind in comparison with that of the non-indigenous 
population in most domains of life. According to a special report (PNUD 2010124), 
the HDI of the indigenous population is systematically lower than that of the rest 
of the population. In fact, the worst score of an indigenous municipality in Mexico 
(0.3) is even lower than that of the worst performer in the world (Niger) in this 
indicator (0.33). In addition, their situation has only gotten worse in recent years. 
In relation to multidimensional poverty, in 2008, 93.9% was deprived in at least 
one of the social rights, 64.2% was deprived in at least three rights, and 70.9% 
was living in multidimensional poverty (39.2% was in extreme multidimensional 
poverty) (PNUD 2010). In 2010, these figures were 95.8%, 64.3%, 79.3% and 
40.2% respectively (INEGI 2013)125. 
The situation of the indigenous population already exposes that the unequal social 
arrangement in Mexico has not been for the benefit of the least advantaged 
groups of society. Another indication is the fact that social expenditure has been 
highly regressive in terms of human development and in terms of access to rights 
(PNUD 2011) since it has consistently benefited in higher proportions the richest 
deciles of society (Scott 2008, 2014). For example, in 2008, the poorest quintile 
received 13% of the total public expenditure whereas the richest received 31.7% 
                                                        
123 Data available at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/hns/garden/columbus.html. 
124 PNUD 2010 offers a thorough analysis of the disadvantaged condition of indigenous groups in 
Mexico in terms of education, health, nutrition, opportunities, among other indicators. 
125 It is important to mention that although these numbers come from two different sources, they are 
comparable since they come from different years of the National Household Survey on Income and 
Expenditure (ENIGH; acronym in Spanish) which is designed precisely for the purpose of time 
comparison. See also CEPAL (2014, p. 85) for disaggregated figures of rural and urban poverty 




(PNUD 2011, p. 65; see also OECD 2014a, graph on p. 5). Put simply, the report 
summarises this pro-rich bias as follows: 
… in 2008, nearly four times more government resources were spent to 
subsidize gasoline than in all programmes to combat poverty. Thus, in the 
course of a month, the owner of a luxury van received a grant of $1,840 
[$122 approx.] by filling up his gas tank while a family of four living in 
extreme poverty received, on average, $1.380 [$92 approx.] by 
Oportunidades (IMCO 2009 cited by PNUD 2011, p. 32; my translation). 
This is particularly relevant once it is acknowledged that, aside from the 
indigenous population, there are many other groups that also suffer systematic 
impairments (e.g. the disabled, the elderly and immigrants). All of these groups 
are worse off in terms of income and access to social services and opportunities 
in comparison with the rest of the population (PNUD 2011, CONAPRED 2011a). 
Finally, to make things worse, public demonstrations to protest against these and 
many other atrocities have been answered by the government with repression, 
such as the response to the 43 students of Ayotzinapa, and by pre-approving a 
constitutional ban of street protests (Schwietert 2014).  
In short, in the light of this evidence, it would be unjustified to suggest that Mexico 
has become a more just society because there has been some capability 
expansion for the poor. There is little merit—with respect to justice—in advancing 
people’s basic capabilities (although these are important and desirable social 
gains) if its main achievement is that a person is now more educated and more 
healthy but exploited (and discriminated, excluded, subjugated and marginalised). 
In such a situation, capability advancements do not necessarily represent a more 
just society. Constructing a more just society would require that justice-
enhancements go in a certain direction. In this particular case, the Rawlsian ideal 
of justice serves the purpose of providing that benchmark. It is in this sense that 
what we consider an advancement of justice is heavily dependent on how justice 





6.4 Assessing the reduction of injustice through a relational lens 
Mexico’s persistent levels of poverty and inequality, as well as the major social 
and political crisis that the country has experienced in recent years, demonstrate 
that the urgency to construct a more just society is as pertinent today as it was 
more than 100 years ago when the revolution took place. The preceding section 
showed that having an ideal notion of what we should aim for is necessary to 
assess the success of practical efforts in that direction. Thus, it highlighted the 
necessity of a dual framework which combines Sen’s IJ and Rawls’ ideal theory 
of justice. This section illustrates why a translation of capabilities in the narrow 
form of Oportunidades, even if necessary, is insufficient to transform the unjust 
reality of poverty in Mexico. 
The problem with Sen’s framework, the previous chapter has argued, is that it 
misconceives injustice in the narrow form of capability-deprivation and as such 
the guidance it provides can be reduced to palliative remedies. This is because, 
by categorising social and relational factors as ‘conversion factors’, it runs the risk 
of treating this social dynamic solely as a fixed entity that should be reflected 
simply in the heterogeneity of individuals to convert resources or other 
opportunities into actual functionings. This idea can be further illustrated by 
considering Sen’s reference to Adam Smith’s classic example of the ability of 
people to ‘appear in public without shame’ and participate in the public life of a 
community. In relation to these situations, Sen concludes that, in certain social 
contexts, redressing this kind of unfreedom would require ‘higher standards of 
clothing and other visible consumption’. And he suggests that a similar logic ‘may 
[also] apply to the personal resources needed for the fulfilment of [relational 
notions such as] self-respect’ (Sen 1999a, p. 71; see also IJ, p. 255). Elsewhere, 
Sen constantly repeats that ‘more income is needed to buy enough commodities 
to achieve the same social functioning’ (Sen 1999a, p. 89, emphasis in original; 
see also p. 74). This confirms that, from Sen’s perspective, relational conversion 
factors can be subsumed in terms of the different amount of resources that 
different persons require to achieve the same functioning. 
This dissertation has argued that this indirect way of accounting for relational 
factors reinforces a confined and static understanding of injustice, i.e. as the lack 
of those things that are necessary to function adequately. In this account, 
relational conversion factors are seen only as an entity that either increases or 




less resources devoted to her. This strategy, however, is problematic because it 
fails to address the social processes that lie behind the capability-deprivations of 
individuals.  
Indeed, these worries can be also illustrated by Oportunidades in its narrow 
conceptualisation of poverty and in the actions taken to remedy it. In resonance 
with the language of capabilities and functionings, the former minister of finance 
Santiago Levy—considered the main architect of the programme—identifies the 
extreme poor as ‘those who cannot secure enough nutrition to function 
adequately…[and] are less able to lead a healthy life…and [to] participate in 
educational activities’ (1991, p. 7, emphasis added). What matters, he adds, is 
not ‘the number of hospital beds per region but…health status; longer life 
expectancy is a result of good nutrition and healthy lives’ (1991, p. 10). Extreme 
poverty is thus defined as the individual condition of simultaneously lacking 
adequate nutrition, education and health. Moreover, the design of Oportunidades 
recognises that individuals can have different abilities to achieve the considered 
functionings because of distinct social and relational factors. For instance, 
acknowledging the social processes behind the gender bias in the value of 
education for girls, the programme provides a higher scholarship stipend for girls 
than for boys from secondary education onwards—when the drop-out rates of 
girls are higher. That is, in line with Sen’s understanding of conversion factors, 
extra resources are redirected to girls in order to address the relational factors 
that disadvantage girls (in comparison with boys) and to help them attain the same 
functioning of education.  
This example reveals the potential limitations of this narrow conceptualisation of 
poverty where relational factors are taken into account only as objects that can 
exacerbate someone’s deprivation but that are left outside of direct normative 
judgement. Such a conceptualisation puts the focus of political action on the 
individual and her deprivations. As a result, reducing poverty becomes a matter 
of restoring to a greater or lesser degree what the person is lacking (income, 
access to education, health, participation, etc.) to whatever levels are deemed 
appropriate while the underlying injustice-generating social processes is left out 
of the scope of political action. For example, it leaves out the different actions and 
interactions that produce the social outcome of individuals lacking education (or 
health, fulfilling jobs, and so on, in the case of indigenous people) as well as those 




or their deprivations or both. Yet, by ignoring these social processes, a narrow 
understanding of injustice has at least two undesirable consequences. First, it 
creates a fictional division between how the life of one person goes from the 
doings and beings of the rest of the society and the social environment in which 
this deprivation takes place, which is considered only indirectly and incompletely. 
In the case of Oportunidades, for instance, only the fact that others devalue the 
worth of education for girls is taken into account and is so only indirectly. 
A second implication of interpreting injustice solely in terms of individual 
capability-deprivations is that it has the unfortunate spill-over effect of implicitly 
suggesting that the ‘causes’ of injustice can be found in what the person herself 
lacks126. This in turn gives rise to rather confused assertions about the reach of 
anti-poverty programmes, such as presenting Oportunidades as a programme 
that focuses on ‘the causes of poverty (lack of education) and not just its 
consequences (low incomes)’ (Székely and Fuentes 2002, p. 132). In a similar 
vein, Levy (1991), the former minister of finance, proudly notes that understanding 
poverty in terms of capability-deprivation ‘helps to identify what benefits need to 
be delivered, where, and in what priority’ (p. 8) in order to enable the poor to 
function adequately and ‘“get on their feet” and work their way out of poverty’ (p. 
53). Similar to the narrow view of injustice described in the previous chapter 
(Figure 5.2), this assumes that when the once-deprived individuals are educated, 
healthy and able to participate in public deliberation, a more just society will 
automatically follow from the exercise of their capabilities and agency.  
In this paradoxical way, these two implications artificially construct poverty as a 
problem of individuals themselves. If indigenous people in Mexico are worse off 
than the rest of the population, it is because they are not educated, not healthy, 
not productive, and so on. Yet this conclusion based on a narrow understanding 
of injustice would be unfortunate since it might not be coincidental that indigenous 
people are the worst performers in all of these domains of poverty. One could 
argue that it is hard to disassociate such deprivations from the multiple faces of 
discrimination they face. For example, consider the fact that the returns of an extra 
year of education, the quality of public services they receive, and the opportunities 
to get a job (or receive equal pay for the same job) are systematically lower in 
                                                        
126 Consistent with the market-liberalisation process in Mexico, Young (2011) suggests that this 
discourse where ‘the causes of being poor are largely traceable to attributes and behaviour of the 




comparison with the non-indigenous population (CONAPRED 2012, 2011a, 
2011b; PNUD 2010).  
One could argue that the example of Oportunidades relies on a particularly partial 
understanding of capabilities. However, a capability-based assessment should 
also ‘scrutinize the context in which economic production and social interaction 
take place’ (Robeyns 2005, p. 99; see also Alkire 2008). And, indeed, it is 
undeniably the case that the notion of capability is comprehensive enough to 
capture people’s varying forms of unfreedoms beyond individual deprivations. 
Nonetheless, one could still ask, what kind of public action would it inspire/justify 
to remedy such injustices? This is the real question that is being explored here. 
In this respect, one should be able to recognise that, despite its important 
achievements, a capability-based metric of injustice is susceptible to some 
problems when it comes to orienting remedial action. This is why an explicit 
reflection about the scope and consistent translation of normative demands into 
the real world is fundamental.  
To this end, by underlining the relational nature of injustice as an explanation of 
why, how and by whom some people can experience unequal access to valuable 
opportunities or participate in public deliberation (or do both), core elements of 
critical theories provide a promising complement to a dual framework in practice. 
From this perspective, action guidance should go beyond the understanding of an 
individual embedded in a particular (static) social context to focus on a person 
whose deprivations are always immersed in dynamic social processes and 
interactions with the state, institutions or others. Political action, then, takes direct 
note of the doing and beings (i.e. people’s exercise of agency) that reinforce a 
particular basic structure that systematically harms and disadvantages some. One 
could think of these human actions and interactions as sustaining a ‘social 
padlock’ (CONAPRED 2012) that cannot be disassociated from people’s 
disadvantages in terms of opportunities to be and do what they have reason to 
value. Hence, in contrast to the narrow evaluative aspect of capability, this 
refinement for practical action regards this social padlock as a function of human 
action and intersubjective processes (Young 1990, 2011) rather than 
understanding it as an ‘objective constraint’ (Young 2011, p. 53) as if ‘social facts 




This conceptual shift in the understanding of injustice towards a broader relational 
way shields a capability-inspired policy to be solely concentrated in what a 
disadvantaged person lacks to incorporate also a relational understanding of her 
deprivation. As such, a relational understanding of injustice can be seen as 
subsidiary to the Rawls/Sen dual framework127. It becomes relevant only to rectify 
an unjust situation already identified in terms of what happens to people, for 
example deprivations such as lack of education, health, income, political 
participation, etc. Hence, instead of aiming at distinguishing between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ social structures and between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours a priori, this 
dissertation has argued that the focus on these social processes is appropriate a 
posteriori.  
Under this understanding, it is once the unjust situation of 50% of Mexicans living 
in multidimensional poverty has been identified that political guidance needs to 
be broader in scope and address, in addition to people’s lack of capabilities, the 
actual behaviours and interactions that reinforce and maintain such an unjust 
outcome. This means that just as it is essential to influence poor people’s 
valuation and behaviour in relation to education, health, nutrition, etc. as these 
are thought to be non-negligible for a more just society, so it is essential (for the 
same reason) to influence other people’s behaviour towards the recognition about 
how their actions and the way they relate to one another have a negative impact 
on other people’s chances in life. That is, not only what the poor do (or not do) 
and are (or are not) is of political concern for constructing a more just society, but 
also what others do and are. In this sense, Young (2011) points out that only the 
responsibility of the poor is politicised while the responsibility of the non-poor and 
its political relevance for justice are not adequately studied. Without paying 
attention to the latter, however, Mexico’s advances in human capabilities of the 
poor become insufficient to create a more just society when embedded within a 
culture of inequality, discrimination and social fragmentation. 
This broader relational understanding of injustice thus reveals that if justice has 
anything to do with moving in the direction of Rawlsian demands of equal dignity 
                                                        
127 In this way, the contributions of critical theory ‘mean less [a] shifting away from Rawls’ theory 
than deepening some of its central elements’ (Young 2006, p. 96). They convincingly illuminate that 
in the real nonideal world, not only economic transactions but also social norms, habits, attitudes 
and social practices reproduce unjust social structures that ought to be corrected. Therefore, along 
with this dissertation, one can conclude that these corrections are relevant not as critiques towards 
ideal conceptions of justice or Sen’s comparative framework but for the practical concern of orienting 





and guaranteeing people’s exercise of rights, liberties and opportunities, then 
these social actions and interactions must be examined (when they are in 
opposition to demands of justice). For it is also through intersubjective interactions 
that rights, opportunities and self-respect are enabled or restrained (Pereira, 
2013, Young 1990). This might be particularly relevant for the context of Mexico, 
which despite its explicit political commitment for advancing social justice and its 
continual efforts in that direction, remains equally unjust, not only in terms of 
inequality and poverty but also in the most basic and fundamental aspect of 
justice, namely the recognition of people’s equal dignity. As described earlier, the 
social and political fragmentation of Mexican society has escalated in recent 
years. In this context, it is urgent that discussions of justice have something more 
to say to political actors and do something more than simply fixate efforts on 
improving the lot of the poor—as usual recommendations to the programme of 
Oportunidades do. For instance, most recommendations in the literature 
emphasise improving the quality of social services that the poor receive—which 
is considered the most ‘unequalizing factor’ (Scott 2014, p. 384)—or generating 
employment opportunities for the poor (Saucedo 2012, Medrano 2011, PNUD 
2011, Bayón 2009, Riesco 2007) or enhancing poor people’s participation in 
demanding accountability in relation to how public spending is distributed (PNUD 
2011).  
Without undervaluing these relevant aspects to improve people’s lives, one 
should note that what is omitted is the question about why these conditions are 
lacking. What are the social factors that enable and the social mechanisms that 
render acceptable the unequal provision of services, the unequal concern for the 
lives of different groups, and ultimately the unequal treatment of the poor? 
Answering this would require a direct evaluation of the mechanisms in which 
different actions, attitudes and relations determine and perpetuate—at least 
partly—people’s disadvantages. Yet, given the illustrative purpose of this chapter, 
a thorough empirical analysis of these relational features is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. But it briefly points out how the context of Mexico provides good 
reasons to highlight the practical and political relevance of these concerns128.  
                                                        
128 See CONAPRED 2012 for a more detailed analysis of these mechanisms in various domains of 
life, such as retributive justice, health, nutrition, work, freedom of conscience and religion, political 




Aside from everyday life in Mexico, the existence of social mechanisms that 
constrain people’s rights and opportunities and perpetuate the unjust status quo 
is further confirmed by two National Surveys on Discrimination in Mexico (ENADIS 
2005, 2010) and the recent Report on Discrimination in Mexico (CONAPRED 
2012) 129 . These reports understand ‘discrimination’ as the ‘asymmetry of 
treatment’ between persons (CONAPRED 2012, p. 13; my translation). It 
encompasses any intersubjective ‘process, mechanism, context, institution, 
discourse or norm… [that] unjustly, asymmetrically, and systematically exclude, 
restrict or deprive people of their dignity, autonomy, rights or goods… who are 
signalled for reasons related to stigmas or social markers’ (CONAPRED 2012, p. 
37; my translation) such as sexual orientation, colour of the skin, age, disabilities, 
and physical appearance (CONAPRED 2012, p. 19). 
Similarly to critical theories (e.g. Pereira 2013, Fraser 1997, 1995, Young 1990), 
CONAPRED suggests that these transgressions happen and are reproduced 
through relational means in the space of culture, symbols and communicative 
action. For example, with colloquial phrases such as ‘it is not the Indian’s fault, it 
is the fault of whoever made him the godfather’ or ‘we must improve the breed 
[i.e. race]’. Or, when the word ‘Indian’ is used as an insult (which is very common 
in Mexico), some races are deemed superior (Camacho 2014). Likewise, when 
Indians are portrayed as lazy, retrogrades, or an ‘obstacle in the road to 
development’ (Aubry 1989 cited by Gall 2013), it automatically justifies 
inequalities and discrimination in favour of the privileged (CONAPRED 2012). In 
general, this impairment in Mexico happens via the use of stigma to degrade 
others, a disparaging discourse, or even direct and arbitrary mistreatment by the 
authority of the most vulnerable people (or the not so vulnerable as in the case of 
the Mexican indigenous poet being detained on her way to a public performance). 
On the basis of these findings, Székely states that the results of the surveys 
expose ‘a society with strong practices of exclusion, scorn, and discrimination 
against certain groups of people’ which are ‘strongly rooted and assumed in social 
culture’ (2006, p. 9) that ‘damages millions of women and men from their birth to 
their grave’ (CONAPRED 2011a, pp. 8–10).  
In numbers, this can be summarised as follows. According to the national survey 
in 2010, 55% of Mexicans affirm that persons are discriminated against because 
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of their skin colour, and 35% of the population felt that their rights were not 
respected as a result of their personal appearance or skin colour. Given that 65% 
of the population define the colour of their skin as dark-skinned, these figures are 
telling (ENADIS 2010). Particularly relevant for this chapter, 71.4% of the 
population admit that the rights of indigenous people are not respected, and 
indigenous people themselves responded that the main problem faced by their 
group was discrimination (ENADIS 2010). For instance, it is well documented that 
indigenous people are less likely to be employed in a formal well-remunerated job 
(CONAPRED 2012). ENADIS (2010) also shows that 40% of indigenous 
respondents attest that they do not enjoy the same opportunities to get a job 
because of their ethnicity and their physical appearance (CONAPRED 2011a). 
Overall, indigenous people are among the most vulnerable groups to be 
systematically discriminated against, that is, mistreated in most areas of life 
(CONAPRED 2011b). But other groups, such as women, religious minorities, 
youngsters, the elderly, people with disabilities, immigrants, and the LGBT 
community, are also targets of these dynamic relational forms of injustice. 
However, it is those from a poor background who are generally most discriminated 
against (CONAPRED 2011a). Ultimately, these discriminatory practices and 
behaviours partly determine ‘who can achieve a satisfactory income and who is 
marginalised for unjustified reasons’ (CONAPRED 2012, p. 78).  
There are too many real cases that can be used to bring this discussion to life130. 
For example, there are various cases of indigenous women having to give birth 
outside of public hospitals because the personnel refused to attend them131; or 
the case of indigenous people arbitrarily detained, incarcerated and even tortured 
without due process for defending their territory of forced eviction132; or other 
cases of highly ranked public servants who make fun of the way indigenous or 
simply poor people speak, look and dress 133 . One of the most extreme 
expressions of this systematic social impairment is the case of Ayotzinapa 
mentioned above. More discouraging still is the fact that this appalling event was 
justified or downplayed by many people using phrases such as ‘damned shabby 
                                                        
130 See also CONAPRED 2011b for examples in relation to access to justice, health, education, 
employment, and income. 
131 Santaeulalia (2013), Tonantzin (2013).  
132  For example, see Lizarraga, available at https://www.change.org/p/freedom-for-nestora-
salgado-american-activist-imprisoned-in-mexico; Tuckman (2015).  




(nacos134), they deserved it’ and ‘too much scandal for these f*** filthy dark-
skinned Indians! They are 100% replaceable by other 30 million lacras’ 135 . 
Similarly, the Attorney General of Mexico responded with disdain when asked 
about several inconsistencies in the official version provided by the government. 
These reactions would have been unlikely had the targets been middle-class 
students from a private school (Paxman 2014).  
In sum, by illuminating the way in which rights, opportunities and equal status are 
denied to a large proportion of the population in Mexico, the documents produced 
by CONAPRED as well as this brief recount of examples offer a glimpse at the 
existence of these relational factors, the form they can take, and the way in which 
they obstruct the possibility of a more just society. What this exposes, moreover, 
is that one could be highly doubtful about any real transformation of the unjust 
status quo in Mexico unless the dynamic aspect of these relational factors is 
seriously taken into account. In fact, one could even ensure that there is little hope 
that the suggested improvements to Oportunidades (equalising quality of social 
services, creating good-quality jobs, and equalising political agency of the poor) 
would actually occur within this context of systematic discrimination.  
These fears, unfortunately, do not seem to be unjustified as they appear to be 
further confirmed by resurging—or simply continued—levels of inequality, 
privilege, racism and discrimination in different—even ‘advanced’—societies 
across the globe. Consider, for example, police brutality (see Swaine et al. 2015) 
and biased decisions against black people by the criminal justice system in the 
US (e.g. Kleeman 2014) and race discrimination or simply ‘old-fashioned 
snobbery about accents and mannerisms’ (Weaver 2015) in recruitment practices 
in the US and the UK respectively. These cases are good reminders of the limits 
of attempting to ‘advance justice’ by focusing exclusively on enhancing the 
opportunities of the disadvantaged while ignoring the practices of others.  
In this regard, the previous chapter argued that an unjust social context could not 
be transformed simply by (periodically) expanding individual capabilities in terms 
of education, health, job, participation, etc. Unless social practices that maintain 
and perpetuate the unjust status quo are directly criticised and addressed through 
                                                        
134 Naco is a pejorative word often used in Mexico to describe ill-mannered, poorly educated people 
or those with bad taste. 
135 Lacra is used to refer to a person who not only is cheap and freeloading but also uses others for 




normative political action, then there is little hope that a more just society can be 





VII. Constructing a more just society in practice: A 
comprehensive approach to justice 
 
The main objective of this dissertation has been to explore in what way theoretical 
frameworks of justice could guide justice-enhancing actions in real unjust 
contexts. It has argued that Sen’s framework is insufficient on its own to achieve 
what it claims to do, and therefore it has identified and defended different 
normative levels of justice, their distinct nature and purpose, and the scope under 
which their contributions can be judged. The overall argument that this 
dissertation has advanced is that a normative conception of justice to orient social 
and political actions should (1) be in line with an ideal of justice, (2) promote 
morally desirable mechanisms to advance justice, and (3) neutralise the relational 
mechanisms that reproduce injustice. Although this comprehensive (three-level) 
framework seems to add extra steps to each of the approaches seen in isolation, 
this dissertation has argued that this is a requirement for a practical framework 
committed to normatively informing justice-enhancing change. Each of these 
levels is essential for constructing a more just society in practice. 
These conclusions follow from research questions set out in the introductory 
chapter. This dissertation has departed from the foundational idea that 
development practice is inextricable from questions of justice. The inability of 
highly abstract theories of justice to provide adequate guidance, however, is 
pushing the general literature on social justice to shift its priority from primarily 
theoretical enquiry towards more practice-oriented frameworks. In this context, 
Sen’s Idea of Justice is considered the most representative work advocating for a 
practical conception of justice today. In contrast to previous work on capabilities, 
which he presents solely as a space of evaluation of states of affairs, The Idea of 
Justice presents a comparative method to assess the justness of states of affairs 
as a ‘broad theory of justice’ (IJ, p. ix, 397). It has the explicit aim of offering a 
useful framework to orient political action to enhance justice and to inform how 
societies should be arranged here and now.  
This dissertation set out to critically analyse Sen’s idea of justice in this endeavour 
and argued that there were important theoretical lacunas in his framework that 




interventions. This dissertation presented a step forward in this direction. Its 
argument was structured around two main research questions: (1) To what extent 
does Sen’s approach to justice succeed in offering a practical framework for 
reducing injustice in the real world? (2) What kind of guidance does Sen’s idea of 
justice offer to inform injustice-reduction interventions in the real world? 
Chapter II discussed Rawls’ theory of justice as the most important theory that 
provides an alternative framework to utilitarianism in order to place considerations 
of justice at the core of the social arrangement of societies. The chapter has 
argued that Rawls theory helps us to explain why a theory has to work within the 
boundaries of ideal theory and why justice requires the priority of the individual 
and her freedoms over other ends. It also suggested that if justice is what a society 
should strive for, then an ideal theory is necessary to provide a systematic 
conceptualisation of a just society that serves two purposes: it identifies injustice 
in a systematic way, and it offers an endpoint to which social change needs to 
transit towards.  
To answer the first research question, this dissertation addressed Sen’s twofold 
critique of Rawlsian-like theorisation, which were referred as (1) his ‘point of 
departure’ (i.e. a useful theory of justice provides criteria for comparing states of 
affairs as more or less just rather than aiming to define a perfectly just society) 
and (2) his ‘methodological proposal’ (i.e. advancing justice is a matter of 
enhancing individual freedom through public discussion). These points were 
addressed in chapter III (‘Sen’s comparative approach: A replacement of the 
transcendental approach?’) and chapter IV (‘Sen’s transcendental nonideal 
approach’) respectively. 
Chapter III highlighted that, in the absence of an external criteria of ideal justice, 
a purely comparative exercise was insufficient to adequately rank two social 
arrangements as more or less just. It argued that although the comparison 
between two nonideal states of affairs can, in principle, be carried out, (1) the 
partial ordering of such a comparative exercise depended on which criterion is 
used to assess the situation, and thus (2) it could be judged as representing a 
justice-enhancing outcome or not, depending on how justice was conceptualised. 
Hence, the chapter reaffirmed that ideal principles of justice were necessary for 
comparing two states of affairs from the perspective of justice and as an endpoint 
to orient courses of action. The chapter concluded that a comparative view of 




disjoined from Rawlsian-like theories of justice. For what may appear as a justice-
enhancing option in comparative terms in the short run may not be leading to, or 
even be counterproductive for, what justice requires in the long run. 
Chapter IV discussed the conceptual framework that Sen proposes to advance 
justice and deepened the argument of the usefulness of ideal theory for this task. 
It argued that Sen’s reliance on a shared notion of injustice as a starting point, 
and on public discussion for ranking states of affairs and promoting capability-
improvements, does not provide an adequate theoretical framework to advance 
justice in the real world. The chapter suggested that Sen’s starting point was 
inadequate for a normative theory since it could fail to call into question the unjust 
status quo in the real world. Hence, the dissertation has argued that if, in real 
unjust contexts, reaching a common understanding of injustice is often elusive 
and if a practical theory of justice should be able to criticise unjust realities beyond 
‘patent’ cases, then an ideal theory able to systematically identify injustice is a 
necessary prerequisite to Sen’s comparative method. This was illustrated by 
reference to one manifest case of injustice in Mexico which involved the arbitrarily 
detention and forced disappearance of students by the state police and which did 
not seem to disturb a significant part of the Mexican population. 
In addition, the chapter has argued that in the absence of Sen’s highly demanding 
understanding of reason and agency, partial orderings resulting from public 
discussion do not necessarily secure justice-enhancing change. At worst, in the 
context of social and political dynamics of inequality, it can end up legitimising the 
unjust status quo. Therefore, if Sen’s comparative method is concerned with 
advancing justice in practice, then the outcomes it produces need to demonstrate 
that they are transitionary to a more just society judged from the perspective of 
an ideal standard of justice. This does not necessarily imply setting a fixed ‘list’ of 
capabilities that rigidly defines (even if partially) what constitutes a good life and 
that prescribes which political action should be advanced in every corner of the 
world regardless of the specific unjust realities. The chapter has proposed instead 
that, in order to represent an advancement of justice, public reasoning would also 
have to justify the capability improvements it endorses in relation to how well they 
serve an ideal of justice. 
This dissertation has thus concluded that Sen’s comparative view of justice is 
unlikely to deliver its promise of promoting justice on its own and that it could be 




ideal theory (instead of a self-standing alternative to ideal theory). The dissertation 
has also gone beyond advocating the complementarity between ideal and 
nonideal theory by showing that, according to the nonideal criteria presented in 
this dissertation, Sen’s Idea of Justice could be naturally related to Rawls’ ideal 
theory to form an improved dual framework of justice. 
In answering the second research question, this dissertation argued that if one is 
concerned with reducing injustice in practice, one also has to reflect on how 
normative ideas can best inform political action in specific unjust realities. 
Therefore, chapter V considered Sen’s approach as a nonideal theory (i.e. as a 
framework already shielded from the difficulties it faces on its own). It discussed 
to what extent the normative guidance it provides (i.e. enhancing individual 
capabilities including the capability to be an active agent in public discussion) may 
be insufficient to transform unjust realities. The chapter has argued that the 
evaluative role of the notion of individual capability can be a liability when 
translated into political action. It runs the risk of misconstruing an unjust situation 
solely in terms of individual deprivations and as a consequence significantly limits 
the scope of political guidance it commands. The chapter illustrated this at a 
theoretical level by discussing that Sen’s conceptual framework was not well 
equipped to adequately incorporate structural and relational processes without 
challenges. It showed that by conceptualising these as external factors, they were 
seen as analogous to objective phenomena that either facilitated or thwarted 
individuals’ freedoms instead of recognising them as intersubjective actions that 
continuously reproduce injustice. Consequently, the guidance that the metric of 
capabilities offers fails to pass direct normative judgement on those doings and 
beings that maintain the unjust status quo as well as those actions that directly 
harm others.  
Finally, chapter VI relied on the case study of Mexico’s anti-poverty programme 
of Oportunidades to illustrate the main theoretical arguments developed in this 
dissertation. It exemplified first the argument that an ideal theory is needed in 
order to assess the outcomes of a purely comparative exercise from the 
perspective of justice. In this respect, it showed that although some important 
social improvements have been taking place in Mexico, these improvements—
when judged from the perspective of Rawlsian ideal principles—have not 
translated into a more just society. In addition, the chapter highlighted the 




showed that, although Oportunidades considers social and relational features, 
this information is taken into account only as affecting the intensity of the 
deprivation suffered by the individual, which in turn justifies a greater (or lesser) 
amount of resources redirected to restore individual lack of opportunities. 
Oportunidades thus leaves out of normative criticism the social mechanisms that 
reproduce those unjust outcomes. This dissertation has argued that this 
misconception of injustice and the kind of remedies it inspires partly explain the 
consistent levels of poverty in Mexico despite the increasing number of efforts to 
reduce it for the last 30 years. For this reason, this dissertation has concluded 
that if Sen’s emphasis on individual freedoms and individual agency are to 
become prescriptive, then it needs to be further complemented by a broader 
relational conceptualisation of injustice to enlarge the scope of political action and 
address not only what individuals lack but also the social mechanisms that 
perpetuate such injustices. In doing so, this dissertation has proposed a broad 
general guideline for the prospective role of capabilities (Alkire 2008).  
On the basis of its two research questions, this dissertation has reappraised well-
known approaches to justice from a more practical-oriented lens. In the process, 
it has distinguished and exposed the contributions and limitations that distinct 
conceptions of justice have for the practical aim of reducing injustice. This has 
important implications for the antagonistic way in which debates about justice are 
usually presented which arguably has hampered more than facilitated the 
emergence of a conceptual framework able to effectively inform justice-enhancing 
change through development practice. Likewise, this dissertation has questioned 
the tendency of the literature to discuss and present theoretical frameworks of 
justice as all-purpose theories by uncritically demanding that one single theory 
cover every relevant aspect involved in producing justice-enhancing outcomes. 
This dissertation has advocated not only for the complementary role of ideal and 
nonideal theories but also for the complementarity between individual-focused 
perspectives of justice and relational notions of injustice. Ultimately, this may 
entail abandoning the idea of expecting one single conception of justice to be 
triumphant over all others in all three necessary components for constructing a 
more just society. 
* 
Sen’s Idea of Justice convincingly argues that there are countless injustices that 




to inform how justice can be advanced in the real world. This has also been the 
motivation behind this dissertation. Sen’s theoretical corpus has already done 
much in providing us with the theoretical tools to start making the world more just, 
but it has stopped one step short from informing how these tools can best achieve 
their aims when translated in practice. This dissertation has attempted to 
contribute to this important discussion. If advancing justice is about constructing 
a society where all can be treated as ends in themselves and pursue their life plan 
under conditions of equality, then this dissertation has argued that, because the 
realities of injustice suffered by some are inseparable from the realities of others, 
Sen’s conceptual framework has to be supplemented with a broader 
understanding of injustice. It is only then that a normative framework of justice 
could inform political action likely to transform the unjust reality of so many people 
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